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ABSTRACT
The major theme of the research in this dissertation is the modeling of selfish
behavior and the mitigation of its effects. Game theory literature asserts
that all agents behave with complete self-interest. However, this is at odds
with empirical studies in behavioral economics which routinely show subjects
engaging in behaviors which allow them to be taken advantage of by other
agents. Despite this, the other agents rarely do so. In order to predict when
and to what degree agents engage in self-serving actions, we introduce the
concept of a Limited-Trust Equilibrium (LTE), a state in which all agents
contribute to each other’s utility, provided it is not too expensive for them
personally. Each agent is motivated to do so in order to inspire reciprocity
from its fellow agents and thus benefit in the long term. The LTE is then
shown to exist in all finite games, and the utility of agents who play in
a limited-trust manner is compared theoretically and numerically to those
who play in a purely self-serving manner to illustrate why the agents prefer
to interact in this way.
The concept of limited-trust is then applied to a social setting, in which
players need to attract and form partnerships in a social network. This
induces a metagame in which players must decide how much they are willing
to commit to reciprocity in order to attract partners, where players who
behave in a less selfish manner are naturally more attractive partners, but
more selfish players benefit more per partnership formed. When other factors
are not kept equal, such as when not all players are able to provide the same
opportunities to their potential partners, we see the emergence of “diva”
behavior, in which talented or well-connected players are easily able to form
partnerships despite behaving in a mostly or entirely selfish manner. A paper
based on this work is nearing its conclusion, and is expected to be submitted
prior to Final Defense.
As initially mentioned, our research also touches on the mitigation of the
ii
effects of selfish behavior. A major focus of research in Game Theory is on
designing games in which the interests of the players align with the interest of
the game’s administrator or coordinator, generally maximizing the net utility
or minimizing the net cost of the system the game operates in. Therefore,
following our work on the LTE to better model when and how selfish behavior
occurs, we pivot to focus on this area. We introduce the Prize Collecting
Multiagent Orienteering Problem (PCMOP), a Game Theoretic version of
the Orienteering Problem with applications to ride-sharing. We show it to
be part of the class of valid utility games, then propose and analyze three
policies for mitigating selfish behavior in the PCMOP. Two of these policies
are broadly applicable to the class of valid utility games while the third is
similarly applicable to valid utility games in extensive form.
iii
To my family, who have always supported me.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to acknowledge all of the support provided over the past several
years by my advisors, Professor Jugal Garg and Professor Rakesh Nagi, and
thank them for it. I would also like to acknowledge the other members of my
doctoral committee, Professor Carolyn Beck, Professor S. Rasoul Etesami,
and Professor Rayadurgam Srikant.
Additionally, the work of myself and my advisors was supported through
multiple grants. The work of Professor Garg was supported by NSF CRII
under Award 1755619 while my work and that of Professor Nagi were sup-
ported in part by ONR through the Program Management of Drs. D. Wagner
and W. Adams under Award N000014-16-1-2245.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2 LIMITED-TRUST EQUILIBRIUM: A NEW MODEL
TO EXPLAIN NON-SELFISH BEHAVIOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Limited-Trust Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Computation of 2-Player LTE(δ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Leader-Follower Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6 Discussion and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
CHAPTER 3 TRUST IN SOCIAL NETWORK GAMES: THE
BENEFITS OF RECIPROCITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2 Game Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Learning under unknown δ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Network Games with Variable δ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5 Numerical Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7 Conclusion and Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
CHAPTER 4 PRIZE-COLLECTING MULTI-AGENT ORIEN-
TEERING: LIMITING INEFFICIENCY DUE TO SELFISHNESS 72
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3 Results: The 2-Player PCMOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4 The k-Player PCMOP Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.5 Solution Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.6 Numerical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.7 Summary and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
CHAPTER 5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH & PROGRESS
SINCE PRELIMINARY EXAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
vi
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
APPENDIX A LIMITED-TRUST EQUILIBRIA . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.1 Proofs for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.2 Additional Results: Leader-Follower Games . . . . . . . . . . 109
APPENDIX B SOCIAL NETWORK GAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
B.1 Additional Notes: Rate of learning δ−i . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
B.2 Derivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
B.3 Additional Figure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
APPENDIX C PRIZE COLLECTING MULTI-AGENT ORIEN-
TEERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
C.1 Integer Program Formulations, Algorithms, and Numerical
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Sample Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1 Heirarchy of equilibria. Intersection of all classes occurs in
constant sum games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Best response curves for game in Table 2.3, δ1 = δ2 = 0.1 . . . 17
2.3 Hotelling Game with n = 3 players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Image in which s1 is part of limited-trust best response and
s2 is not . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 2× 2 Geometric Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6 3× 3 Geometric Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.7 2× 2 Normal Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.8 2× 2 Uniform Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.9 Leader-Follower Numerical Results, A ∼ B ∼ U [−0.5, 0.5] . . . 34
2.10 Leader-Follower Numerical Results, A ∼ B ∼ N (0, 1) . . . . . 34
2.11 Leader-Follower Numerical Results, A ∼ B ∼ e−x . . . . . . . 35
3.1 Example Social Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Pareto frontier of game/strategy in Table 3.4 for the Leader. . 52
3.3 Pareto frontier of game in Table 3.5 for the Follower . . . . . . 53
3.4 Utility for Vertex 1, Known δ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.5 δ in karate club network with k = 2 invitations per round
with ties broken uniformly at random . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.6 Mean δ by vertex degree in karate club network with k = 2
invitations per round with ties broken uniformly at random . . 62
3.7 δ in karate club network with k = 2 invitations per round
with lexicographic tie-breaking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.8 Mean δ by vertex degree in karate club network with k = 2
invitations per round with ties broken lexicographically,
non-myopic updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.9 Mean δ in Facebook Ego Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.10 Utility for Vertex 1, unknown δ−1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.11 δ in Karate Club Network, epoch = 100 rounds, k = 2
invitations per round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.12 δ in Karate Club Network with update probability = 1
100
,
k = 2 invitations per round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
viii
3.13 Mean δ in Facebook Ego Network, epoch = 100 rounds,
k = 2 invitations per round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.14 A 5-star graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.15 A diad graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.16 Mean δ by vertex degree in karate club network when k =
10 invitations per round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1 Network with no pure Nash equilibrium for a 2-Player full-
route simultaneous game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Network With PoA of 2 under reserved and unreserved
path policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3 Network with a 2-Player PoA of 4
3
under the reserved path
Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4 Network with a 2-Player PoA of 2 for Turn-Based and Un-
reserved Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5 Network with an unbounded 2-Player PoA for Turn-Based
Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.6 Network with a 3-Player PoA of 19
27
for all policies . . . . . . . 92
4.7 Average PoA for Approximate R2 Networks with Geomet-
ric Prize Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.8 Average Computation time (log-scaled) for Approximate
R2 Networks With Geometric Prize Distribution . . . . . . . . 97
4.9 Average PoA for Approximate R2 Networks with Uniform
Prize Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.10 Average Computation time (log-scaled) for Approximate
R2 Networks With Uniform Prize Distribution . . . . . . . . . 98
4.11 Average PoA for Planar Networks with Uniform Prize Dis-
tribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.12 Average Computation time (log-scaled) for Planar Net-
works with Uniform Prize Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.13 Network with a 2-Player PoA of 4
3
for reserved policy and
1 for other policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A.1 Geometric Leader-Follower Representation . . . . . . . . . . . 112
A.2 E1, E2, F3, E4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A.3 E1, E2, F5, F6, F7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A.4 Geometric Complete Knowledge Leader-Follower Representation114
A.5 Geometric Cooperative Complete Knowledge Leader-Follower
Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
B.1 Area for s2 given s1 to establish lower bound . . . . . . . . . . 122
B.2 Area for si given s1, s2 to establish lower bound . . . . . . . . 122
B.3 Example game from Table 3.4, n = 1000 fa = fb = U [0, 1] . . . 123
B.4 Area for s2 given s1 to establish upper bound, case 1 . . . . . 125
B.5 Area for si given s1 to establish upper bound, case 1 . . . . . 125
ix
B.6 Area for si given s1, s2 to establish upper bound, case 2 . . . . 126




What causes suboptimal performance? Sometimes the cause is obvious and
has a straightforward solution: Production is slow? Buy a new machine.
A part breaks habitually? Get a better quality version or keep spares on
hand. Something else unanticipated occurs? Invest in better forecasting and
analyze the new data.
But sometimes even when the cause is obvious, the solution is not. Selfish
behavior, the topic of this thesis, is one such cause. It appears in settings
where two or more agents with non-aligned interests have to interact, and
their selfish behavior frequently introduces inefficiency into any system they
are acting in. Consider a classic example from Game Theory, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. In this example, two thieves are caught attempting to rob a store
and each is separately offered the same deal: Confess to everything and if
your partner does not then you will go free and they will spend 20 years in
prison, but if they also confess you will each go to prison for 5 years. Or,
stay silent and if your partner does too then you can each go to prison for 1
year, but if your partner does confess you will go to prison for 20 years while
they go free. Figure 1.1 illustrates the situation for each of the thieves.
If neither thief confesses then the pair will receive the minimum total
amount of jail time, 2 years. However, no matter what one thief does, the
other will benefit more by confessing: if one thief confesses their partner can
receive 5 years if they also confess, or 20 if they remain silent. If one thief
remains silent then the other can receive 1 year in prison if they also remain
silent, or go free if they confess. Therefore, if both thieves are selfish then
they will both confess and spend a total of 10 years in prison, rather than 2.
The importance of the effects of self-interested behavior is well-recognized
and is the driving force behind much of the field of Game Theory. John
Nash [1] showed the guaranteed existence of an equilibrium point in finite
games, a point in which all agents have selected an entirely self-interested
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Figure 1.1: Sample Prisoner’s Dilemma
Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, https:
//www.britannica.com/science/game-theory/The-prisoners-dilemma
strategy to the strategies selected by all other agents and thus, no agent
has an incentive to change their strategy. This point has since been known
as the Nash equilibrium, and is of great interest for predicting the actions
of self-interested agents. In our sample prisoner’s dilemma, the only Nash
equilibrium occurs when both thieves confess, as doing so is the most self-
interested action either can take.
With the assumption that agents will naturally arrive at a Nash equi-
librium when behaving in a self-interested manner, a natural question is
how inefficient could these equilibrium points be? In 2002 Adrian Vetta [2]
showed that for the broad Valid Utility class of games, any Nash equilib-
rium point must achieve a minimum of 50% of the optimal outcome of the
game. In Chapter 4 we define and analyze one such valid-utility game in
extensive-form, the Prize-Collecting Multi-Agent Orienteering Problem, in
order to design policies to reduce the amount of self-interested inefficiency
in the problem with a limited degree of oversight. In doing so, we extend
Vetta’s result on valid utility games to the 2-player leader-follower setting.
The policies proposed for the PCMOP are theoretically and numerically an-
alyzed, and transplant naturally to other valid utility games, particularly
those which are also in extensive-form.
The Nash equilibrium is a natural concept, and it explains interactions
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very well when agents are purely self-interested, as is often the case in a
business or financial setting. However it provides fewer explanations when
agents exhibit non-selfish behavior, or behavior which appears to be only
partially self-interested. Because of this, before proposing and analyzing
our policies for minimizing selfish behavior in the PCMOP and valid utility
games in Chapter 4, in Chapter 2 we will address modeling and anticipating
non-selfish behavior. This will be done by introducing the concept of Limited-
Trust, in which one agent is willing to assist another agent provided the cost
to the first agent is not too high. While superficially non-selfish, the first
agent provides this aid with the intent of receiving reciprocal aid at some
point in the future. Limited-trust forms the core of this manuscript, with
Chapter 2 introducing, defining, and analyzing the concept, while Chapter 3
applies limited-trust to a social network setting. In doing so it demonstrates
that despite performing “sub-optimally” for an agent in individual games, in
aggregate the agent is far more likely to benefit than another agent playing
solely in a self-interested manner. This is because by playing in a limited-
trust manner, an agent is able to recapture some of the optimal utility which
is lost due to selfish behavior. Therefore, while appearing selfless, this play-
style actually acts as an enlightened form of selfishness for the agent.
The recapturing of the utility lost to selfish behavior by limited-trust pro-
vides a contrast to the policies considered in Chapter 4, which try to capture
that same lost utility by limiting the ability of agents to be selfish. In partic-
ular, it demonstrates that for some settings with inefficient Nash-equilibria
it is not necessary to implement policies to get rid of sub-optimal selfish be-
havior, as agents who are truly self-interested will eliminate these behaviors
themselves to benefit in the long run. The importance of the work which will
be covered in Chapters 2 and 3 is the quantification of how much sub-optimal
behavior will remain in the system. With this knowledge, the manager of
such a system can better determine what sort of policy is best to eliminate
the remaining behavior, or whether it is even necessary to do so.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we will progress made since my preliminary exam in
May 2020, as well as proposals for future research. Much of this will build
on the social network games discussed in Chapter 3. However, we will also
discuss fair-divisioning of chores as an extension of work in Chapter 4, with
an emphasis on chores which are separated by transition times. Chapter 6
will then mark the end of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
LIMITED-TRUST EQUILIBRIUM: A NEW
MODEL TO EXPLAIN NON-SELFISH
BEHAVIOR
This chapter is based on work [3] which has been accepted to the European
Journal of Operational Research.
2.1 Introduction
One of the first things children learn is to “play nice” with others. In order
to get ahead and be a functioning member of society, each individual must
sometimes make choices which do not appear to benefit them in the short
term. Even though these actions cost the individual, they make up for it in
benefit to society; over time each individual will have these costs returned
to it in the form of unexpected favors. Under the rationality considered in a
Nash equilibrium [1], it makes sense to pay these costs and only violate the
social rules when the cost is too great. This is particularly true if, after a
certain amount of time, the rule violation will be forgiven or forgotten. To
that end, a great deal of research has gone into the study of extensive form
games in general, and repeated games in particular. These games frequently
evince equilibrium behaviors which, when only considered for the individual
stages rather than the extensive game, are not rational under the Nash def-
inition. An explicit discussion of the work on these games will be presented
in Section 2.1.1.
However, when there are no formal consequences to avoiding the costs of
society, such as exile, why do individuals continue to incur these costs? For
example, why will most people give up a seat on a bus to a stranger who is
injured? In a Nash equilibrium, in which only the utility of the individual
making a decision is considered, the seat is never given up unless keeping it
incurs some cost, such as damage to one’s reputation. However, even if no
one they know is present or will ever know of the decision, most people still
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give up the seat.
Perhaps the simplest answer is that the individual in the seat cannot know
if their decision will ever make it back to others they interact with regularly
and so they are simply risk averse. Another is that humans have some intrin-
sic degree of altruism. Evolutionary biology provides the best explanation
of this in the form of Hamilton’s rule for kin selection ( [4–6]) which says
that as humans are collections of genes, our genes seek to help any of the
same genes present in other humans. To quote J. B. S. Haldane, “I would
lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins”. This idea that we lend
aid to others because they are some proportion of ourselves has given rise to
the concept of α-altruism, which will be discussed in Section 2.1.1.
In this paper we introduce a new concept which we refer to as a limited-
trust equilibrium. In it, a player i attempts to maximize its long-term utility
by trusting the other player(s) within a hard trust limit δi that it is willing to
give up when the other player(s) will gain “significantly” more than it (they)
would lose if player i were to play “rationally”. The player does this with the
hope that the other player(s) will return the favor in a similar way, as well as
form lasting partnerships and attract new ones through reputation. Given
an opportunity, if an individual must choose between two agents of relatively
equal capabilities to partner with then the individual would prefer to interact
with the more trust-worthy agent. We show through numerical trials that in
two player games, when both players have a similar trust limit, δ1 = δ2 > 0,
both players come out significantly ahead in the long term compared to if
they had played solely to maximize their own utility: in 2-player numerical
trials with δ1 = δ2 = δ we observe an average personal utility increase of δ
for each player when δ was modest compared to the value of the variance in
the utilities of randomly generated games.
The limited-trust equilibrium provides a new answer to the previous ques-
tion of why someone would give up their seat on the bus to an individual
who is injured: they do so to establish and contribute to a culture of “kind-
ness”, which will increase the likelihood of someone giving them a seat in the
event that they become ill or injured. This interpretation can be viewed as
a person avoiding the consequences of the Broken Windows Theorem ( [7])
which (loosely) states that evidence of erosion of one norm leads to further
erosion of that and similar norms.
While it will be discussed more fully in Section 2.1.1, the idea of non-
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rationality within repeated games has been extensively studied. Therefore we
pause briefly to distinguish this concept from other solution concepts which
occur within repeated games: in such situations, the same games are played
repeatedly and so players arrive at a best way to handle that single game
over time using methods such as future discounting and trigger strategies. In
limited-trust games, while players are assumed to be playing with each other
over time, they are not assumed to play the exact same game continuously.
In fact, they may never play the same game twice. Because of this, it is
necessary that one-off games be analyzed individually, as each game may be
independent of previous or later games played. This is something that other
tools for repeated game analysis cannot do. If two players do interact again,
the game will most likely be different as it is assumed to be drawn from some
probability distribution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.1.1 we provide a
more detailed discussion of previous work into extended form games as well
as α-altruism. In Section 2.2 we fully detail the properties of a limited-trust
equilibrium (LTE): we show that it is guaranteed to exist in finite n-player
games, prove where it fits within the hierarchy of equilibrium concepts (see
Figure 2.1 for these results), and show that it results in higher net util-
ity than Nash equilibria on several common games. Section 2.3 provides a
mathematical program for LTE computation, and Section 2.4 discusses sev-
eral interpretations of limited-trust in the leader-follower setting. In Section
2.5 we present the results of numerical trials in both the simultaneous and
leader-follower settings, in which we compare the highest value Nash equilib-
ria to the highest value LTE’s for randomly generated games, before moving
to our final discussion of results and concluding remarks in Section 2.6.
2.1.1 Literature Review
Since the seminal work of [1] there has been a great interest in Game The-
ory and equilibrium concepts. In particular, many papers have noted that
the strict definition of rationality adhered to by Nash equilibria, that it is
a state where no player can unilaterally improve its own utility given the
actions of other players, is frequently not observed in empirical trials. One
circumstance in which this occurs is repeated games in which players engage
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Figure 2.1: Heirarchy of equilibria. Intersection of all classes occurs in
constant sum games.
in multiple rounds of play. Various folk theorems have been considered for
these games which attempt to guarantee various measures of fairness in the
equilibria; detailed analyses of these theorems and the conditions necessary
for them to apply has been the subject of papers such as [8–11], and [12]. In
the more applied sense, there has been a great deal of work aimed at develop-
ing rational definitions of trust for repeated games: papers such as [8,13,14]
and [15] provide theoretical analysis of various games and trust strategies
while papers such as [16], [17–20], and [21] have focused on conducting em-
pirical studies on several of these trust strategies, particularly in the context
of reciprocity. In the business setting [22] experimentally tests the real op-
tions games approach put forward by [23] for trust in strategic alliances.
Meanwhile in the context of supply-chain relationships [24] empirically stud-
ies the formation of partnerships in the automotive industry, [25] derives a
model for reciprocal-minded supplier-retailer relationships, and [26] and [27]
empirically show supply-chain relationships tend to be more “fair” over time
than predicted in standard game theory. The recent survey [28] details many
of these as well as other empirical studies, all of which on average show
non-Nash behavior.
These trust papers, both theoretical and experimental, deal explicitly with
repeated games or (as in [18] and [16]) one-off games in extensive form (leader-
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follower). However, there is less work considering “non-rational” behavior in
simultaneous one-off games. Most such work is done in the framework of α-
altruism, as proposed by [29]. In this concept, each player i has a perceived
utility of u′i(σ) = (1 − αi)ui(σ) + αiu(σ) for αi ∈ [0, 1] and thus takes the
total social utility into account as part of its personal “utility”. This model
is attractive for a number of reasons: it is supported by Hamilton’s kin-
selection rule in evolutionary biology ( [4–6]), it allows for easy equilibrium
computation via Nash equilibria over perceived utilities, and it provides a
broad model which can be adapted to virtually any form of game including
simultaneous, extensive form, and repeated games. [30] provides a thorough
analysis of this concept when applied to congestion, valid utility, and cost-
sharing games, building on the analysis of [31] of this concept and extending
the definition of (λ, µ)-smoothness put forth in an earlier version of [32] to
α-altruistic games. However, this notion of altruism also has disadvantages,
particularly from a modeling perspective. First, the game is scale invariant.
This means that if player i would prefer not to collect AC1 so that player j can
collect an extra AC2 given αi, then it would prefer not to collect AC100 so that
player j can collect an extra AC200 for the same αi. Second, in games between
a large number of players, the players are likely to become completely self-
sacrificing to increase the total utility even for small αi > 0. To see this,
consider a scenario in which for every unit of utility player i gives up, all
other players receive some small amount of utility c, where 0 < c  1. As
the number of players grows, player i will seek to drive its personal utility as
low as possible so long as αi > 0.
In the next section we will propose a new concept of a limited-trust equi-
librium which applies to a similarly broad class of games, but incorporates a
hard trust-limit not present in α-altruism. Players behave in a manner which
encourages reciprocity, provided it is not to expensive for them personally
in terms of a hard limit on their current personal utility. They make this
investment in reciprocation in order to increase their personal utilities in the
long run or in expectation. This concept places a “budget” on what players
spend toward encouraging reciprocity in any one game and thus eliminates
both the tendency of players in large games to become self-sacrificing and
the scale invariance which occur in α-altruistic games.
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2.2 Limited-Trust Equilibrium
We now define a new concept of equilibrium in which players, while still selfish
and concerned primarily with their own utility, exhibit a limited interest
in the common good and contribute to it provided the cost is below some
threshold. They do so in order to encourage other players to do the same
in order to benefit in the long term. For comparison, we first review the
definition of a mixed Nash equilibrium (MNE) over a finite game:
Definition 1 (Strategy Profile of a Finite Game). Given a finite n-player
game in which each player i has mi pure strategies, a valid strategy profile
σi for player i is a probability distribution over the mi pure strategies (σi =







Definition 2 (Mixed Nash Equilibrium). Given an n-player game with strat-
egy profiles σ = (σ1, σ2, ..., σn) for each player where for a given player i,
σ−i is the set of strategies played by all other players, σ is a mixed Nash
equilibrium (MNE) if and only if for any other valid strategy profiles σ′i,
ui(σi, σ−i) ≥ ui(σ′i, σ−i) for all i ∈ [n], where [n] = {1, 2, ..., n} and ui(σi, σ−i)
is the expected utility of the game for player i.
A related concept is the ε-approximate Nash equilibrium (ε-equilibrium)
defined as follows:
Definition 3 (ε-Approximate Nash Equilibrium). For an n-player game with
strategy profiles σ = (σ1, σ2, ..., σn) for each player, σ is an ε-equilibrium if
and only if for any other valid strategy profiles σ′i, ui(σi, σ−i) ≥ ui(σ′i, σ−i)−ε
for all i ∈ [n].
Definition 4 (Price of Anarchy). The Price of Anarchy (PoA) of a util-
ity maximization game is the ratio of the the value of the socially optimal
solution, defined as the solution that maximizes the sum of the utilities of
all players (net utility), to the value of the equilibrium with the lowest social
utility.
Typically the equilibrium considered in the PoA is the Nash equilibrium;
in this paper we will explicitly state which equilibrium is being considered
when using the term.
Note that the set of Nash equilibria is merely the set of ε-approximate
equilibria for ε = 0. It is also worth noting that the conditions of an MNE can
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be defined in mathematical constraints. For an n-player utility maximization




i, σ−i)− ui(σi, σ−i) ≤ 0 ∀σ′i ∈ Σi, i ∈ [n]
where Σi is the set of valid strategy profiles for player i. We also define
σGi (σ−i) = arg max
σi
ui(σi, σ−i)
as the greedy best response of player i given σ−i. We will abuse notation
to let σGi ∈ σGi (σ−i); while there may be multiple elements of σGi (σ−i), as
it is a set-valued function, we will only be concerned with σGi with regard
to the value ui(σ
G
i , σ−i) which is equal for all elements of σ
G
i (σ−i). We say
that an ε-equilibrium σ ∈ Σ is well-supported if and only if for every player
i, ui(σ
G
i , σ−i) − ui(sij, σ−i) ≤ ε for every pure strategy sij which is played
in σi with non-zero probability. Note that any MNE is a well-supported
ε-equilibrium for all ε ≥ 0.
Having covered our preliminary definitions, we now propose a new concept
of equilibrium.
Definition 5 (Limited-Trust Equilibrium (LTE)). Consider a finite n-player
maximization game with strategy profiles σ ∈ Σ = Σ1×...×Σn and trust levels
δ = (δ1, ..., δn) for each player i, where δi > 0. σ is a limited-trust equilibrium
if and only if ui(σ
G
i , σ−i)−ui(σi, σ−i) ≤ δi and u(σi, σ−i) ≥ u(σ′i, σ−i) for any
other valid strategy profiles σ′i ∈ Σi such that ui(σGi , σ−i) − ui(σ′i, σ−i) ≤ δi,
where u(σ) =
∑n
i=1 ui(σ) is the net utility.
We will use LTE(δ) to refer to an LTE for players with trust levels δ =
{δ1, ..., δn}. This definition is equivalent to saying that the following two
conditions are met:
1. Player i cannot alter its strategy profile to increase its payoff by more
than δi. In other words, it is not giving up more than δi it could be
making by changing its behavior to take advantage of other players’
strategies.
2. Player i cannot alter its strategy profile to increase the net utility with-
out decreasing its own utility so that it loses more than δi from its
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greedy best response. In other words, it cannot increase the net utility
without violating its cost threshold δi.
As for where δ comes from, it can be viewed as the degree to which an
individual is willing to invest in the future, meaning the cost they are willing
to incur in order to benefit others and encourage them to reciprocate.





ui(σi, σ−i) = ui(σi, σ−i) + u−i(σi, σ−i)
where u−i(σi, σ−i) =
∑
j 6=i uj(σi, σ−i). While there is no mathematical ad-
vantage in doing so, it helps to illustrate that if player i gives up δi by
playing σ′i rather than σi and the net utility increases by x < δi, the δi − x
value is not simply lost. Rather, if ui(σ
′
i, σ−i)− ui(σi, σ−i) = −δi this means
u−i(σ
′
i, σ−i)− u−i(σi, σ−i) = δi + x.
Because a limited-trust (LT) best response is concerned with two values
u(σ) and ui(σ) it makes sense to examine their relationship. In particular
for a player i, if all other players are playing σ−i then player i can easily
determine the results of all of its pure strategies sij in terms of u(σi, σ−i) and
ui(σi, σ−i). Because of the linearity of u and ui with respect to s
j
i given a
fixed σ−i, any u, ui combination within the convex hull of the pure strategies
can be achieved by player i. Therefore, player i can solve the following linear
program LP1 to find its limited-trust best response σ∗i (σ−i):




δi ≥ ui(σGi , σ−i)− ui(σi, σ−i).
When we take the limit δi → ∞ we find that player i becomes completely
self-sacrificing for the net utility. Thus by careful selection of δ, players
of any degree of trustworthiness from completely self-interested (δ → 0) to
completely selfless (δ → ∞) may be modeled, though players of the latter
type may be quite uncommon.
We note that while the set σG(σ) = {σG1 (σ−1), σG2 (σ−2), . . . , σGn (σ−n)} is
the set of greedy best responses to the current strategy set σ, σG ∈ σG(σ) is
not generally a Nash equilibrium. Instead, it is merely a set of greedy best
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responses to σ for each player. As such, the fact that σGi is a component
of player i’s limited-trust best response does not imply that a limited-trust
equilibrium is dependent on a Nash equilibrium, merely that is dependent
on greedy best responses. As Nash equilibria are also heavily dependent
on greedy best responses, with σ ∈ σG(σ) being a necessary and sufficient
condition for σ to be a Nash equilibrium, this can be a subtle point. To
further emphasize this distinction, we show in an example game in Table 2.4
that has an LTE can exist independent of any Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Given an LTE(δ) σ∗, if a constant cj is added to all payoffs for
player j, σ∗ is still an LTE(δ).
The proof is included in A.1.1.
Although Lemma 1 demonstrates that an LTE(δ) is invariant under the
addition of a constant cj to all of player j’s payoffs, the same is not true
for affine transformations. This is an intentional feature of the limited-trust
concept: while a player may be willing to accept a loss of AC1 to ensure
another player gains AC2, it is not willing to accept a loss of AC100 to ensure
another player gains AC200, as would be required of an affine transformation
of a game. However, for a given affine transformation f(x) = ax + b the
equilibria are invariant if δ is rescaled to δ|a|, for a 6= 0.
Theorem 1. Every n-player finite game with trust levels δ = (δ1, δ2, ..., δk) >
0 has an LTE(δ).
Proof. This proof will follow the same pattern as Nash’s ( [1]) proof for the
existence of MNE in an n player game by making use of Kakutani’s Fixed
Point Theorem ( [33]).
To begin, let σ ∈ Σ be a set of strategy profiles for each player. Let
ui(σ) = ui(σi, σ−i) be the payoff player i derives from strategy profile σi
given that all other players are playing σ−i. Now we wish to define a new
utility function
wi(σi, σ−i) =
u(σi, σ−i) ui(σGi , σ−i)− ui(σi, σ−i) ≤ δi−M otherwise,
where M is a large positive constant. Because the game is finite, we can
pick M greater than maximum of the absolute values of the socially optimal
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solution and the most socially harmful solution multiplied by n, and the
wi(σi, σ−i) of any σi which violates ui(σ
G
i , σ−i) − ui(σi, σ−i) ≤ δi is strictly
less than wi(σ
′
i, σ−i) for some σ
′
i which does not. Therefore, maximizing
wi(σi, σ−i) is equivalent to maximizing u(σi, σ−i) over the set of points which
satisfy the maximum cost constraint. We can then say that σ∗ ∈ Σ is a





−i) ≥ wi(σi, σ∗−i) ∀σi ∈ Σi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n},
which means that σ∗ is a LTE(δ) if and only if σ∗i ∈ Bi(σ∗−i) for all i, where
Bi(σ
∗
−i) is the set of best responses (with respect to wi) for player i given that
the other players are playing σ∗−i. If we define B(σ) = B1(σ−1)× B2(σ−2)×
... × Bn(σ−n) then finding an LTE(δ) is equivalent to finding σ ∈ B(σ).
Therefore, we must show the existence of a fixed point.
We now use Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem to show such a fixed point ex-
ists. The theorem states that given a nonempty finite dimensional Euclidean
space A and f : A→ A a set-valued correspondence with x ∈ A→ f(x) ⊆ A,
a fixed point is guaranteed to exist if the following conditions hold:
1. A is a compact and convex set.
2. f(x) is nonempty for all x ∈ A.
3. f(x) is convex for all x ∈ A.
4. f(x) has a closed graph: if {xk, yk} → {x, y} with yk ∈ f(xk) then
y ∈ f(x).
In this case we have A = Σ, f(σ) = B(σ). We now wish to show that all
conditions hold.
1. Σ is a compact and convex set: trivial, as Σ is the Cartesian product
of simplices Σi.
2. B(σ) is nonempty for all σ ∈ Σ: Bi(σ−i) = arg maxσi∈Σi wi(σi, σ−i) and
so must be nonempty for each i. Therefore B(σ) is nonempty for all
σ ∈ Σ.
3. B(σ) is convex for all σ ∈ Σ: It suffices to show that Bi(σ−i) is convex
for all i. We first note that any points x, y ∈ Bi(σ−i) must provide
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equal net utility u(x, σ−i) = u(y, σ−i) and must also provide i with a
personal utility at most δi less than the greedy best response. Without
loss of generality, assume ui(x, σ−i) ≥ ui(y, σ−i). Then for any convex
combination z = λx + (1 − λ)y where λ ∈ [0, 1], the linearity of u
and ui implies that u(x, σ−i) = u(z, σ−i) = u(y, σ−i) and ui(x, σ−i) ≥
ui(z, σ−i) ≥ ui(y, σ−i) which means z ∈ Bi(σ−i).
4. B(σ) has a closed graph: While the previous three conditions were
shown to hold using the same arguments as in the proof of existence
for Nash equilibria, the use of a non-continuous function wi introduces
several complications to showing that B(σ) has a closed graph. We
will show this by contradiction. Suppose that B(σ) does not have a
closed graph. Then there exists a sequence (σk, σ̂k)→ (σ, σ̂) such that
σ̂k ∈ B(σk), but σ̂ /∈ B(σ), meaning that σ̂i /∈ Bi(σ−i) for some i. Then
there is some σ′i ∈ B(σ−i) such that
wi(σ
′
i, σ−i) > wi(σ̂i, σ−i),
which means that
u(σ′i, σ−i) > u(σ̂i, σ−i).














−i) > δi where σ
Gk
i ∈ σGi (σk−i) as otherwise this would contradict





−i) − ui(σ̂ki , σk−i) < δi. Then by the linearity
















−i) and therefore contradicts the assumption that
σ̂ki ∈ Bi(σk−i).




−i) − ui(σ̂ki , σk−i) = δi . In order for σ′i to
become a strategy in Bi(σ−i), it must be that ui(σ
G
i , σ−i)−ui(σ′i, σ−i) =
δi, as if it became less than or equal to δi for sufficiently high k, then
it would contradict σ̂ki ∈ Bi(σk−i). Similarly, ui(σGi , σ−i)− ui(σ̂i, σ−i) =





−i) − ui(σ̂ki , σk−i) < δi which we have already seen leads to
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a contradiction. However, this means that there is a strategy σ′′i =
λσGi + (1 − λ)σ′i for some value of λ ∈ [0, 1] which has u(σ′′i , σ−i) >
u(σ̂i, σ−i) and ui(σ
′′
i , σ−i) > ui(σ̂i, σ−i), due to the assumption that




















−i) − ui(σ̂ki , σk−i) ≤ δi, this means wi(σ′′i , σk−i) > wi(σ̂ki , σk−i)
which contradicts the assumption that σ̂ki ∈ B(σk−i). Therefore B(σ)
must have a closed graph.
Therefore, Kakutani’s theorem implies the existence of a σ∗ ∈ Σ such that
σ∗ ∈ B(σ∗), which proves the existence of an LTE(δ).
Having established the guaranteed existence of an LTE for δ > 0 we now
want to compare it to a Nash equilibrium on a simple example, given in
Table 2.1. This game has exactly one Nash equilibrium, at σ = {[0, 1], [0, 1]}
with pure strategies α2, β2 being played. Now consider the LTE with δ =
{0.5, 0.5}. LP1 shows that for player 2, playing the pure strategy β2 (σ2 =
[0, 1]) is still the best choice, regardless of σ1. The same is not true for
player 1: given σ2 = [0, 1], solving LP1 gives the first player’s unique best
response as σ1 = [0.5, 0.5]. The net utility of the LTE(0.5) for the game is
then u1({[0.5, 0.5], [0, 1]}) + u2({[0.5, 0.5], [0, 1]}) = 9, compared to the net
utility of 8 which occurs in the Nash equilibrium.
Table 2.1: Example game for LTE
Player 2
β1 β2
Player 1 α1 4,0 5,5
α2 5,1 6,2
The equilibrium in Table 2.1 highlights an important fact about the limited-
trust best response, that there may not be a pure strategy best response.
This is at odds with the greedy best response where there is always a pure
strategy best response. This implies that there does not appear to be a
straightforward transformation of a limited-trust game into a Nash game.
Next, we wish to consider where the LTE fits within the hierarchy of
standard solution concepts within game theory.
Theorem 2. For any finite n-player game G, the set of LTE(δ) is a subset
of the set of ε-equilibria of G, where ε ≥ maxi δi.
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Proof. Consider that in any LTE(δ), no player can improve its own payoff
by more than δi by definition of an LTE. Therefore such an LTE is also an
ε-equilibrium for ε ≥ maxi δi.
While each limited trust equilibrium is also a maxi δi = ε-equilibrium, the
converse is not true, even when δi = δj for all ∀i, j ∈ [n]. This is because of
the additional constraint on an LTE(δ) that no player i be able to improve
the total utility without decreasing its own utility below the δi level. Further,
although the set of LTE(δ)’s is a subset of ε-equilibria as described in Theo-
rem 2, they are important because they represent a state in which each player
is contributing to the net utility as much as they are able within their limits,
not merely a state where each player has decided it is not worth the effort (or
in the case of irrational-valued Nash equilibria it is realistically infeasible)
to change from their current strategy to the optimal strategy, particularly if
the current strategy is pure.
In general, we say that an LTE(δ) σ is well-supported if it is a well-
supported ε-equilibrium for ε = maxi δi. Although any LTE(δ) is an ε-
equilibrium for ε as previously specified, it need not be a well-supported
ε-equilibrium . The 2-player game in Table 2.2 demonstrates this for δ1 =
δ2 = 0.5. From player 2’s limited-trust perspective, β2 is a best response
to any σ1 as it offers both better personal and better net utility. Player
1’s limited-trust best response to β2 is to play αi with probability 0.5, for
i = {1, 2}. Given that player 2 will only play β2, the only LTE([.5, .5])
is given by {[0.5, 0.5], [0, 1]}. This is not a well-supported 0.5-equilibrium:
σG1 = α2 and player 1 is playing α1 with nonzero probability, despite the fact
that ui(σ
G
i , β2)−ui(α1, β2) = 1 > 0.5. As this is the only LTE([0.5, 0.5]), this
game also shows that the set of LTE(δ) may be entirely disjoint from the set
of well-supported ε-equilibria for a game.




Player 1 α1 2,4 3,5
α2 3,2 4,3
Despite the fact that players in a limited-trust game all attempt to improve
the net utility, it is possible for the highest value LTE(δ) (the LTE(δ) which
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Figure 2.2: Best response curves for game in Table 2.3, δ1 = δ2 = 0.1
provides the highest net utility) to produce lower net utility than the highest
value Nash equilibrium for a game. We show this with an example game,
given in Table 2.3, which we consider with δ1 = δ2 = 0.1. There is a pure
Nash equilibrium (PNE) which occurs for α2, β1. As β1 is a strongly dominant
strategy for player 2, and α2 is player 1’s best response to it, this is the
only Nash equilibrium. If we consider the limited-trust best response curves
in Figure 2.2, we see that there is only one place the curves intersect and
hence there is one LTE(0.1). Using optimization program MP1 from Section
2.3, we find this is at approximately σ1 = {p11, p12} = {0.204, 0.796}, σ2 =
{p21, p22} = {.795, .205} which has a total utility value of approximately 6.089,
which is less than 6.2, the utility generated by the pure Nash equilibrium at
σ1 = {0, 1}, σ2 = {1, 0}.
Table 2.3: Game in which LTE(0.1) < MNE
Player 2
β1 β2
Player 1 α1 1,2 5,0
α2 1.1,5.1 4,5
While it is non-intuitive that the value of the best LTE can be less than
a Nash equilibrium, given that each player is willing to give something up
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in order to help its fellow players, we do see analogues of this in the day-to-
day social interactions which the concept of limited-trust emulates. Consider
two cars reaching an intersection across from each other. Both need to turn
left and the intersection is too narrow for both to go at once. Rather than
attempting to go through first, one driver tries to wave the other through,
only to realize that the other driver is doing the same. Both drivers start
to move, then stop as they realize the other is moving as well. This then
repeats back and forth until one driver loses their patience (δ is reached) and
makes it clear they are going. Meanwhile the whole interaction slowed down
both drivers more than if one had simply made this decision when they both
arrived at the intersection.
Although it is possible to find games in which there is a Nash equilibrium
better than any LTE, we will see in Section 2.5 that it rarely occurs, particu-
larly as δ increases; it is more common to find games in which there are more
LTE(δ) than Nash equilibria and some of them are worse. Table 2.4 provides
an example of this, where (α2, β2) is both an LTE(δ) and a pure Nash equi-
librium. However, for δ1, δ2 ≥ 0.1, (α1, β1) is also an LTE(δ), independent of
a Nash equilibrium.
Table 2.4: Game with more LTE(δ) than Nash equilibria
Player 2
β1 β2
Player 1 α1 3,3 2,3.1
α2 3.1,2 5,5
Further, the occurrence of less optimal solutions due to cooperation is
not unique to limited-trust games: [30] shows that while normal cost-sharing
games have a PoA of n for n players, cost-sharing games in which all players
have a uniform level of α-altruism have a PoA of n
1−α , becoming unboundedly
inefficient for fully altruistic players. The remainder of this section will be
spent considering limited-trust versions of several standard games, and we
will see that Theorem these inefficiencies do not apply to them.
2.2.1 LTE(δ) in Common Games
In this section we examine the behavior and value of LTE(δ) in several com-
mon classes of games.
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Theorem 3. For any constant sum game, {ε-equilibria} ⊆ {LTE(δ)} where
ε = mini δi.
Proof. First, note that in a constant sum game the total utility is equal for
all σ ∈ Σ. Therefore, any strategy σ played by player i maximizes the total
utility. Thus, player i’s best response to any σ−i is any strategy which makes
sure it receives at most δi less than its maximum personal utility. This is
exactly the definition of a best response under ε-equilibrium conditions for
δi = ε, and so the set of LTE contains the set of ε-equilibria for a constant
sum game where ε = mini δi.
Note that Theorem 2 states the LTE set is a subset of the ε-equilibria set
for ε = maxi δi, so if δi = δj = δ for all i 6= j then Theorem 3 implies the set
of ε-equilibria is equal to the set of LTE(δ) for ε = δ.
Next we consider the public goods game from experimental economics. In
it, n players each receive an amount of money, mi, and must decide how
much to contribute to the public good. Any contributed money is multiplied
by a factor of c such that 1 < c < n, then divided evenly among all players.
Therefore, if player i contributes xi to the public good, it will receive back
cxi
n
< xi of its investment, plus
c
n
of the other players’ investments. The
only Nash equilibrium for this game is for all players to contribute xi = 0,
as any contribution lowers player i’s payoff regardless of contributions made
by other players. The PoA is therefore c.








Proof. Consider the contribution player i should make: the social utility
strictly increases with i’s contribution xi, therefore player i would like to
contribute as much as possible. i is willing to lose at most δi and regardless
of the value of xj for j 6= i, if player i contributes xi then it loses n−cn xi it
could be making. Therefore, player i contributes xi = min{ nn−cδi,mi}. The
total amount contributed is
∑n
i=1 xi, and the total uncontributed utility is∑n




n−cδi,mi}. This is the unique LTE(δ) for the public goods game. The
socially optimal result occurs when all players contribute mi and there is a
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1 3 2 1
Figure 2.3: Hotelling Game with n = 3 players
total utility of c
∑n







that is at most c.
Our next consideration is the Hotelling game, which does not generally
have a pure Nash equilibrium for any number of players n We will consider
the simplest form of the game, in which each player has a continuous strategy
space [0, 1] and all players have symmetric payoffs, meaning that for any two
players i, j and all other strategies σ−ij fixed, if i and j switched strategies
they would also switch utilities (ui(σi = x1, σj = x2, σ−ij) = uj(σi = x2, σj =
x1, σ−ij) for all x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1]). Given strategies {σ1, σ2, ..., σn}, if we assume
without loss of generality that 0 ≤ σ1 ≤ σ2 ≤ ... ≤ σn ≤ 1 then for σi−1 <
σi < σi+1 ui(σ) =
σi+1−σi−1
2
. If there is a set of k strategies σi = σi+1 =
... = σi+k−1, then uj(σ) =
σi+k−σi−1
2k
,∀i ≤ j ≤ i+ k − 1. Additionally, for the
purposes of computing σ1 and σn, let “σ0” = −σ1 and “σn+1” = 1 + σn.
This simple form of the Hotelling game can be viewed as each player claim-
ing a space on the interval [0, 1], with each player attempting to maximize
the portion of the interval which is closer to them then all other players.
Figure 2.3 provides an example of this for a 3-player Hotelling game, which
does not have a pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5. The 3-player Hotelling game possesses a pure LTE(δ) for δi ≥
1
10
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.







LTE(δ) for δi ≥ 110 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We begin by noting that the Hotelling
game is constant-sum, so any strategy produces the same net utility. We first
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, there cannot be: σ′1 ∈ [0, 12), (
1
2
, 1] will result in utility strictly
less than 1
2
, and σ′1 =
1
2
will result in the same utility as player 2 receives,
which can be at most 1
2
as the net utility for the game is 1. Therefore player
1 is at equilibrium, and similarly player 3 is at equilibrium as its position is
symmetric to that of player 1.
This leaves player 2. u2(σ) =
1
5

































as well, so player
2 is at equilibrium.
Before moving on, it is worthwhile to note that although Theorem 1 only
implies the existence of the LTE(δ) in finite normal form games, players in
both the public goods game and Hotelling game possess a continuous rather
than finite strategy set. This helps to highlight that while non-finite games
are outside the scope of this paper, many classes of these games are also
likely to possess limited-trust equilibria.
Finally, we consider the 2× 2 prisoner’s dilemma, though we will focus on
the utility maximization version rather than the cost minimization version.
Let (α2, β2) be the socially optimal outcome, and let (α1, β1) be the strategy
in which each player betrays the other. In a Nash game, the only equilibrium
is (α1, β1), the worst possible outcome. In the limited-trust game, limδ→0
LTE(δ) is (α1, β1), but as δ increases, it shifts to (α2, β2). Table 2.5 shows
the general form of a symmetric version of the game, with 0 < d1 < c < d2.
By noting the fact that both players will be playing the same strategy σ =
{p1, 1− p1} at equilibrium if δ1 = δ2, we can find the LTE(δ) by solving the
quadratic equation (1− p1)(p1d1 + (1− p1)d2 − (1− p1)c) = δ1 which yields
p1 =
2(d2 − c)− d1 ±
√
(d1 − 2(d2 − c))2 − 4(d2 − c− d1)(d2 − c− δ1)
2(d2 − c− d1)
provided d2 − c− d1 6= 0. If d2 − c− d1 = 0 then p1 = δ1−d2−cd1−2(d2−c) .
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Table 2.5: Example Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Player 2
β1 β2
Player 1 α1 d1, d1 d2, 0
α2 0, d2 c, c
Table 2.6: A game with Nash and limited-trust dominated strategies
Player 2
β1 β2 β3
Player 1 α1 0,7 5,5 0,5
α2 3,2 5,4 7,1
α3 0,6 4,1 1,5
α4 2,1 3,10 1,0
2.3 Computation of 2-Player LTE(δ)
In this section we present a mathematical program for computation of an
LTE(δ) in 2-player games. However, before doing so we consider the con-
cept of a dominated strategy in a limited-trust game. By removing strongly
dominated strategies, we will make the game smaller to aid in computation.
In a Nash game, a pure strategy s for player i is said to be dominated if
ui(s, σ−i) ≤ ui(s′, σ−i) ∀σ−i for some alternate feasible strategy s′ which is a
convex combination of player i’s other pure strategies. s′ is said to weakly
dominate s if there is at least one σ−i for which there is equality and at least
on for which there is strict inequality. It is said to strictly dominate s if there
is strict inequality for all σ−i. In a limited-trust game with given δ, s
′ is said
to dominate s if u(s, σ−i) ≤ u(s′, σ−i) ∀σ−i and ui(s, σ−i) ≤ ui(s′, σ−i) for
all σ−i. Weak dominance occurs if there is some σ−i for which u(s, σ−i) =
u(s′, σ−i). As with Nash equilibria, no LTE will have a player i playing a
strictly dominated pure strategy si with nonzero probability. Also as in Nash
equilibria, we can iteratively remove dominated strategies by examining each
strategy individually to see if it is dominated by a convex combination of the
other still present strategies (this is done by using a linear program).
Having introduced the idea of dominance in the limited-trust context, we
now demonstrate it on the game in Table 2.6. From a Nash perspective,
it is clear that α2 strictly dominates α3 and α4 and weakly dominates α1.
Similarly, β1 strictly dominates β3. Therefore, these strategies need not be
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considered when looking for an MNE. From a limited-trust perspective this
changes. α2 no longer dominates α1, α3, or α4 and β1 no longer domi-






u1(σ1, βi) > u1(α3, βi) and u(σ1, βi) > u(α3, βi) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} so α3 is still
strictly dominated and can be dropped from the problem. However, α4 is
part of the socially optimal σ and therefore cannot be strictly dominated
unless β2 is strictly dominated first. While β3 cannot be strictly or weakly
dominated by a convex combination of β1 and β2 in the original problem,






we see that u2(αi, σ2) > u2(αi, β3) and u(αi, σ2) > u(αi, β3) for i ∈ {1, 2, 4}.
Therefore, while we cannot remove β3 immediately as in the Nash case, we
can still remove it through the iterated removal of other dominated strate-
gies. In the Nash case we then get the equivalent game in the left side of
Table 2.7, and for the limited-trust case we get the equivalent game on the
right side.








Player 1 α1 0,7 5,5
α2 3,2 5,4
α4 2,1 3,10
It is interesting to note that the value of δ is not relevant in determin-
ing whether a strategy is dominated in a game. This is because we cannot
say that s′ dominates s if u(s, σ−i) ≤ u(s′, σ−i) ∀σ−i and either ui(s, σ−i) ≤
ui(s
′, σ−i) or ui(σ
G
i , σ−i) − ui(s′, σ−i) ≤ δi for all σ−i. If the second condi-
tion occurs, s may still be part of a unique limited-trust best response. An
example of this is given in Figure 2.4, in which, for a fixed σ−i, player i has
three strategies s1, s2, and s3: despite the fact that u(s2, σ−i) > u(s1, σ−i)
and ui(σ
G
i , σ−i)− ui(s2, σ−i) < δi, the limited-trust best response is a convex
combination of s1 and s3, but not s2.
Having defined limited-trust dominance to reduce computational effort, we
now introduce our solution method. Our mathematical program for finding
an LTE in a 2-player bimatrix game given by A,B ∈ Rm×n will be loosely






Figure 2.4: Image in which s1 is part of limited-trust best response and s2
is not
finding Nash equilibria, which determines if a given support pair SA, SB
admits an MNE (i.e. there is an MNE in which only the pure strategies
in SA, SB are played with positive probability, and all such strategies are




xT (A+B)y subject to xTAy ≥ eTj Ay − δ1, ∀j ∈ [m]
and fy(x) is similarly defined. MP1 constitutes a quadratically-constrained
program with a bilevel component from fx(y) and fy(x). A,B are the m×n
payoff matrices for players 1 and 2, respectively, and ej is the vector with







xTAy ≥ eTj Ay − δ1 ∀j ∈ [m] (1)
xTBy ≥ xTBej − δ2 ∀j ∈ [n] (2)
xT (A+B)y ≥ fx(y) (3)
xT (A+B)y ≥ fy(x) (4)∑
i∈SA
xi = 1 (5)∑
j∈SB
yj = 1 (6)
xi = 0 ∀i /∈ SA (7)
yj = 0 ∀j /∈ SB (8)
xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [m] (9)
yj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [n] (10)
The bilevel elements of constraints (3) and (4) are a necessary portion of
the program: without these constraints, which force the total utility to be
the greatest possible when each player is playing within δi of its greedy best
response to the other, the solutions of MP1 would simply be a subset of the
ε-equilibria for ε = maxi δi, regardless of whether they were also limited-trust
equilibria. This cannot be solved using the objective function to drive the
program, as the socially optimal ε-equilibrium is not necessarily an LTE. We
also mentioned above that MP1 is loosely based on the Support Enumera-
tion algorthim for finding 2-player MNEs. However, due to the fact that a
general LTE(δ) is not a well-supported equilibrium, we are unable to fully
linearize the constraints as in the support enumeration algorithm for finding
MNE’s. As a consequence, if SA ⊆ SC and SB ⊆ SD, then any solution
to MP1(SA, SB) is also a solution to MP1(SC , SD), which is not the case
in the Nash support enumeration. The same problem is observed in find-
ing non-well-supported approximate Nash equilibria as well, so this is not
surprising.
We now prove below any LTE(δ) given by (x, y) is a solution to MP1 for
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appropriate SA, SB.
Theorem 6. A strategy set (x, y) for a two player game is an LTE(δ) if and
only if it is a feasible solution to MP1 for SA = [m], SB = [n].
The proof of this Theorem may be found in A.1.2.
Corollary 1. For any feasible solution to MP1, constraints (3) and (4) are
fulfilled with equality.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 6: any solution to MP1 is an LTE(δ), and
any LTE(δ) fulfills the constraints with equality as each player is playing a
limited-trust best response to the other.
Given that MP1 was stated to have been loosely based on the linear pro-
gram used in the support enumeration algorithm for Nash equilibria, it is
natural to question why the program is not set up to iterate over supports,
as in that algorithm. This comes about because in any greedy best response,
every pure strategy which player i plays against the other player is a best
response, and so the quadratic constraints (1) and (2) in MP1 can be trans-
formed into a larger set of linear constraints which enforce the condition that
every pure strategy in the support of a Nash equilibrium is a greedy best
response. There is no corresponding condition for an LTE which allows us to
consider the pure strategies of a support individually rather than the mixed
strategy LTEs as a whole. However, if we are looking for well-supported
LTE’s we can use a support enumeration method be replacing constraints
(1) and (2) in MP1 with those below and then apply Algorithm 1.
eTi Ay ≥ eTj Ay − δ1 ∀i ∈ SA ∀j ∈ [m]
xTBei ≥ xTBej − δ2 ∀i ∈ SB ∀j ∈ [n]
xi = 0 ∀i /∈ SA
yj = 0 ∀j /∈ SB.
Algorithm 1 will find at least one LTE for every support pair SA, SB
which admits a well-supported LTE. However, as we have already seen well-
supported LTE’s may not exist.
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Algorithm 1 LTESupportEnumeration(A,B, δ1, δ2)
Initialize hashset LTESet ← ∅;
for SA ∈ [m], SB ∈ [n] do
(x, y)← SolveMP1(SA, SB);
if (x, y) /∈ LTESet then





We have defined the concept of Limited-Trust equilibria in simultaneous
games in a natural manner, and showed that at least one LTE exists in
any simultaneous game of n players. The next natural extension to consider
is LTE’s in turn-based games, i.e. leader-follower or Stackelberg games.
Consider a two-player turn-based game of complete information, i.e. player
1 picks from m strategies and in response, player 2 picks from n strategies
with full knowledge of the first player’s choice. Such a game is akin to a
bi-level optimization problem for the first player: given full-knowledge by
all players, the second player’s response is deterministically dictated by the
first player. As such, this game always has a pure equilibrium known as the
Stackelberg equilibrium and, assuming a fixed tie-breaking rule for players
between multiple equivalent strategies, the Stackelberg equilibrium is unique.
While this is true for n-player games, for the sake of simplicity we will confine
our discussion to n = 2, as n > 2 follows naturally.
We now want to consider what happens when players have trust levels
δ1, δ2. Although this is a full knowledge deterministic game with regard to
the payoffs and the first player’s action being known to the second player,
unlike in the simultaneous game the nature of the equilibrium changes sharply
depending on the first player’s knowledge of δ2 and the values from which
each player measures δi. Because of this, we will examine three policies which
represent different interpretations of a Limited-Trust Stackelberg Equilibrium
(LTSE). We assume a bimatrix game with payoff matrices A,B ∈ Rm×n for
players 1 and 2, respectively. Note that here n is the number of pure strategies
possessed by the second player.
1. Incomplete Knowledge: The first player does not know anything about
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δ2 and, being risk averse, assumes the second player is not trustworthy
(δ2 = 0). The first player then determines the second player’s response
to each of its possible actions under this assumption and finds strategy i
such that i = arg max0≤j≤m ajr(j) where r(j) is player 2’s best response
to j and aij and bij are the first and second players’ payoff if they play
i and j, respectively. The first player then plays j which maximizes
ajr(j) + bjr(j) subject to air(i) − ajr(j) ≤ δ1, and the second player plays
l which maximizes ajl + bjl subject to bjr(j) − bjl ≤ δ2.
2. Complete Knowledge: The first player knows δ2. It knows that if it
plays i, then player 2 will play its best response s(i) which maximizes
ais(i) + bis(i) subject to bir(i)− bis(i) ≤ δ2. Player 1 then finds i such that
i = arg max0≤j≤m1 ajs(j), and plays j which maximizes ajs(j) + bjs(j)
subject to ais(i) − ajs(j) ≤ δ1. The second player then plays s(j).
3. Cooperative Complete Knowledge: Let i, j be the regular Stackelberg
Equilibrium. The players play k, l which maximizes akl + bkl subject to
akl − aij ≤ δ1 and bkl − bij ≤ δ2.
Of these policies, the first two seem like the most natural interpretations of
the LTE in the turn-based game: a player is willing to forgo a payoff at most
δi higher than what they could get, provided that the other player gains at
least that much. The only question is whether or not player 1 knows δ2: while
the question was unimportant in the simultaneous setting as equilibrium was
merely a point where no player could unilaterally improve the total utility
without exceeding its maximum cost, here the leader-follower nature of the
game means the first player can determine exactly how the second player will
act and plan its strategy accordingly. The only question for the first player is
the value of δ2; if it is unsure then it plans for the worst and assumes δ2 = 0.
While the cooperative complete knowledge policy may seem less natural,
the confusion is a matter of perspective: with the first player having full
knowledge of δ2, instead of measuring its payoffs over the second player’s re-
actions to each strategy i it could play, it instead measures them with respect
to the Stackelberg equilibrium. The second player makes the same choice: it
is rational and can determine the first player could have played according to
the Stackelberg equilibrium if it wished to, and so reacts accordingly. This
policy requires more coordination between players, but can be interpreted as
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two players who regularly interact and strive to maintain a good relationship.
In this sense it is less suited for one-off games. However, the same could be
said of the complete knowledge policy, as it is otherwise infeasible to expect
the first player to know δ2 a priori.
We have derived additional results in regard to the expectations and prob-
abilities for all three of these policies in random leader-follower games. How-
ever, the details are somewhat involved and do not provide any great insight
to the reader. As such, these results and their derivations are available in
A.2.
2.5 Numerical Results
In this section we present a numerical comparison of the efficiencies of the
LTE when compared to Nash equilbria in both the simultaneous and leader-
follower settings. LTE’s are found for randomly-generated games and com-
pared with the maximum-value Nash and Stackelberg PoA’s of these games.
These represent random repeated games, a set of games which, while not
identical, are all drawn from the same distribution. These games are of
particular interest because while the LTE is explicitly created for analyzing
one-off games, it is implicitly motivated by the expectation that future games
will be played. Day-to-day societal interactions are a perfect example of this,
and are well modeled by random repeated games: such interactions between
players are not identical, but will display a pattern over time so that they
could be said to come from some “typical” distribution.
Theoretical results related to random repeated games in the leader-follower
setting can be viewed in detail in A.2.3, but one which we will state here is
that the expected PoA of the Stackelberg equilibrium for a 2-player leader-
follower bimatrix game. In such a game with m × n payoff matrices where
each entry generated is generated independently and from and identical dis-




where X(n) is the maximum of n samples xi generated iid from distribution
X.
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We consider random repeated games in our numerical trials. These are rep-
resented as bimatrix games where the payoff matrices A,B for each player
are generated according to some distribution. In particular, we consider ma-
trices where each entry is generated iid for each player, though A and B may
not come from the same distribution. The majority of games were generated
as 2-player 2 × 2 repeated games, with entries of player 1’s payoff matrix
generated iid according to a distribution A and player 2’s payoff matrix gen-
erated iid according to a distribution B. One instance of 2-player 3×3 games
was generated, as unlike in the leader-follower games we have a less precise
bound on the PoA as a function of m and n. LTE’s of simultaneous games
were computed using MP1 in Section 2.3, and LTSE’s were computed for
each leader-follower policy using the methods given in their descriptions in
Section 2.4.
2.5.1 Simultaneous Games
We consider games where players’ payoffs are generated iid from three dis-
tributions: geometric with p = 1
4
, uniform over the set of integers in [0, 10],
and Normal N (0, 1). 100 instances of 2 × 2 games are generated from each
of these distributions, as well as 100 3× 3 games drawn from the geometric
distribution. We then vary δ1 = δ2 = δ from 0.01 to 1 for each game, to see
how the value of the LTE changes as a function of δ. For each test case, we
use the support enumeration method to determine the MNE with the highest
net utility for comparison to the LTE with the highest net utility. Because
any MNE which provides the optimal level of social utility is also an LTE,
we ignored generated test cases where the social optimum was also an MNE.
Because of the nonconvex and potentially disjoint nature of the solution
space, we include a constraint in MP1 that the value of the net utility of the
LTE must be greater than or equal to the utility provided by the best MNE
(net utility-maximizing MNE). As we have already seen in Section 2.2, such
an LTE may not exist for all values of δ. Therefore, if the solver fails to
locate a feasible solution to MP1 after 50 attempts on a particular test case,
this constraint is relaxed. It is not reintroduced until after δ has increased
to a level where an LTE with better net utility than the MNE is discovered.
Additionally, while we compute an LTE which has higher net utility than all
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MNE’s, it may not necessarily be the maximum value LTE. This is due to
the nonconvexity of the set of LTE’s.
Figure 2.5: 2× 2 Geometric Games
Figures 2.5 through 2.8 detail the results of our numerical trials. Although
δ is always varied from 0.01 to 1, in the figures it is rewritten as the percentage
of the net utility generated by socially optimal (net utility-maximizing) MNE
so as to compare values across different distributions. In all but Figure 2.7, we
see a very clear linear relationship between δ as a percentage of the maximum-
valued MNE and LTE as a percentage of the MNE. In both the geometric
games, the curve has a slope of approximately 2, meaning that on average,
for every game a player has to give up δ, there is a game where it gains 3δ
over what it would receive by playing selfishly. The uniform games in Figure
2.8 show a similar result, with a slope of approximately 1.3.
This brings us to Figure 2.7, which unlike the others does not evince an
approximately linear curve. However, consider the variance of the distribu-
tions: the geometric distribution with p = 1
4
has a variance of 12 and the
discrete uniform distribution over [0, 10] has a variance of 10. In contrast,
the variance of 1 possessed by the Normal distribution is quite small. Now
consider what the curves in Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.8 would look like if we
continued to increase δ: the curves would eventually start to evince diminish-
ing returns, as increasing δ past the point where many social optima start to
become LTE’s will produce very little additional social utility. This explains
the curve in Figure 2.7: it is merely a curve in which the δ is already quite
large compared to the variance of the distributions from which the entries
of A and B are generated, and thus is experiencing diminishing returns. It
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Figure 2.6: 3× 3 Geometric Games
Figure 2.7: 2× 2 Normal Games
also indicates that if we continue to increase δ, the other figures will come to
resemble Figure 2.7.
2.5.2 Leader-Follower Games
We conduct numerical studies on 2×2 games with payoff matrices generated
from three distributions: U [−0.5, 0.5], N (0, 1), and exp(1). For each set
of trials, we let A ∼ B, and let δ1 = δ2 = δ. We define the Stackelberg
gap as the difference between the Stackelberg equilibrium and the social
optimum. Figures 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11 each show the average PoA of 1000
games generated according to these distributions and solved for δ ∈ [0, 1]
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Figure 2.8: 2× 2 Uniform Games
in the first graphs, where as mentioned in Section 2.4, δ = 0 indicates that
there is no trust between the players. The second graph considers how much
of the Stackelberg gap is covered by each of the policies at the varying δ
levels. Unlike in the simultaneous case, in the leader-follower setting under
the complete knowledge policy if the Stackelberg equilibrium is the social
optimum that does not guarantee it is also the LTSE. For that reason we
have not ignored games in which this occurs.
Unsurprisingly, in all three distributions for all values of δ, the cooperative
complete knowledge policy results in the best performance. We even note
that with δ = 0 it still manages to recover an average of approximately 20%
or greater of the Stackelberg gap for each tested set of games. This “Reward
without Risk” comes from the greater cooperation between players seen in
this interpretation of the LTE.
Also unsurprisingly, the complete knowledge policy tends to outperform
the incomplete knowledge policy on average, for most δ values. Figure 2.9
provides an excellent demonstration of this: because the max and min pos-
sible payoffs have a gap of 1, by the time δ = 1 both players are trying
only to maximize the social utility. In particular, by the time δ reaches ap-
proximately 0.75, the complete knowledge game tends to result in the social
optimum being played virtually every time. This is because the entries of
A and B are drawn from U [−0.5, 0.5] so the chance of the socially optimal
outcome having a utility for player 1 which is more than 0.75 less than the
player’s greediest move is nearly 0. In contrast, while the same is true in the
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Figure 2.9: Leader-Follower Numerical Results, A ∼ B ∼ U [−0.5, 0.5]
Figure 2.10: Leader-Follower Numerical Results, A ∼ B ∼ N (0, 1)
incomplete knowledge case, the game levels off to covering slightly over 80%
of the Stackelberg gap even at δ = 1. This occurs due to the fact that al-
though both players are effectively altruistic at this level of δ, the first player
does not believe that the second player is. This causes player 1 to attempt
to maximize the social utility around the assumption that δ2 = 0, despite
the fact this is not true. We can consider this gap between the incomplete
and complete knowledge cases as the cost of ignorance.
It is important to note that the cost of ignorance may not be bad. Indeed
Figure 2.11 shows that for δ between approximately 0.05 and 0.3, the cost
of ignorance is negative. This occurs due to the fact that the first player is
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Figure 2.11: Leader-Follower Numerical Results, A ∼ B ∼ e−x
unaware that the second player is willing to give up δ, and thus is unable
to take advantage of that fact for its own gain. This is identical to what
happens for some values of δ in the game described in Table A.1 in A.2.1.
2.6 Discussion and Summary
Throughout this paper we have been considering limited-trust equilibria as
a description of behavior which is not entirely selfish, provided the opportu-
nity cost of the behavior for player i is less than some bound δi. This idea
of an LTE was expressed very naturally in simultaneous games, where at
equilibrium each player does not care about the δ values which are motivat-
ing other players, only that it plays its best response to what those players
are actually doing. The key managerial insight of the LTE is that while the
players in giving something up appear to be playing “non-rationally” when
games are considered in isolation, when considered as a whole both players
actually achieve more than they would have received if they had myopically
played the “rational” Nash equilibria in each game. We saw that while it
was possible for limited-trust games to have worse results than Nash games,
it will not happen in several common classes of games, and occurs rarely in
others: in 2-player numerical trials with δ1 = δ2 = δ we observed an average
personal utility increase of δ for each player when δ was modest compared to
the variance in the utilities of randomly generated games. When we consider
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the leader-follower setting players can no longer ignore the δ values of their
fellows, and we considered the effects of whether or not players knew each
other’s δ’s or had to prepare for the worst (assume δ−i = 0).
It is natural to question the method developed in this paper for the com-
putation of LTEs in a simultaneous game. Given that LTEs are a subset of
ε-equilibria, which are PPAD-hard to compute for general ε, we do not expect
to derive an algorithm for the general k-player case without a mathematical
program similar to MP1. However, readers may wonder why we have not
provided a different algorithm for computing an LTE in the 2-player game.
The Lemke-Howson algorithm [34] is one of the first algorithms for finding
Nash equilibria in a 2-player bimatrix game and remains one of the most
popular. It relies on the observation that at equilibrium (σG1 , σ
G
2 ), if player i
has mi pure strategies then for a best response σ
G
i = {pi1, pi2, ..., pimi} either
pij = 0 or playing the pure strategy s
i
j is a best response to σ−i. With
this observation, the Lemke-Howson algorithm is able to set up a linear
complementarity program (LCP) for which any feasible solution is a Nash
equilibrium. Unfortunately the definition of an LTE does not lend itself well
to this method. This is partially due to the fact that we cannot make a
similar observation about pure strategies in an LTE. However, while this
problem may be possible to overcome, the larger difficulty comes from the
fact that there is an optimization problem embedded in each player’s best
response to the other. While this is also true of a greedy best response, that
optimization problem can be expressed solely as a set of linear constraints
with no objective function, i.e. σi is a best response to σ−i if and only if
ui(σi, σ−i) ≥ ui(ej, σ−i) for all j ∈ [mi]. The optimization problem embedded
in the limited-trust best-response cannot be absorbed to a larger program
due to having an objective function. This is reflected in the fact that the best
response function is explicitly brought into MP1 in constraints (3) and (4),
rather than bringing in constraint sets. Even the further generalization of
the algorithm in [35] is unlikely to adapt to computing LTEs. Although the
Lemke-Howson algorithm is nearly sixty years old and has since been shown
to be a special case of the Global Newton Method by [36], it remains an
extremely prevalent method for computing Nash equilibria in 2-player finite
games in practice. This is particularly true following the proof by [37] that
ε-equilibria (and Nash equilibria) are PPAD-complete to compute even for
2-player finite games. It is worth noting that as a consequence, LTE(δ) is
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also PPAD-hard to compute.
We also considered several natural interpretations of the LTE in a leader-
follower game, which vary drastically depending on how much knowledge
players have of each other. More definite theoretical probabilities for the
likelihood of a social optimum occurring in a random game in the leader-
follower context, as these equilibria are significantly easier to compute. We
then moved onto numerical testing of the LTE, comparing how the social
utility varied over random repeated games as a function of δ, particularly
when compared to Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. One of the more surpris-
ing results of our numerical trials in simultaneous games was how strong the
linear relationship was between the net utility and δ, prior to the onset of di-
minishing returns as δ continues to increase. In our leader-follower games we
observed the differences in the utility of each of our interpretations, noting
that the cooperative complete knowledge case produced significant gains at
the no risk level of δ = 0, and also that the gap between complete and incom-
plete knowledge effectively measured the price of ignorance. Perhaps more
surprising was that the price of ignorance was sometimes negative on aver-
age, rather than just occasionally, with parameters existing for which player
1 assuming the worst of player 2 resulted in higher average total utility.
As noted earlier in this section, while many traditional equilibrium compu-
tation methods such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm are unlikely to adapt
well to the LTE computation, we would still like to put more study into the
computation of simultaneous game LTE’s. Additionally, we are interested
in considering how LTE’s model behavior in larger systems such as social
networks. Perhaps the most exciting line of inquiry is that of learning: the
LTE is positioned as a tool for non-Nash analysis of repeated game that can
also solve one-off simultaneous games, something for which there are few ex-
isting tools. As such each player should be trying to set their δi in order
to maximize their utility over time. We are very interested in the potential
dynamics of shifts in δ values as players interact with each other, particu-
larly if they take each other’s playing history into account. Also of interest
is the relationship between talented or well-connected but relatively selfish
individuals as opposed to trustworthy individuals without specialized skills,
and the resulting “diva” behavior often exhibited by the former. We will
focus on these areas of study in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
TRUST IN SOCIAL NETWORK GAMES:
THE BENEFITS OF RECIPROCITY
A paper based on the work in this chapter has been submitted to IEEE
Transactions on Network Science and Engineering.
3.1 Introduction
Choose your friends wisely. It’s good advice and it also applies to the prob-
lem of selecting partners to work with. Developing corporate partnerships
and alliances is a long-standing business practice, with many modern suc-
cessful examples such as GoPro and Redbull, Amazon Inc and the US Postal
Service, and Disney and Pixar (pre-acquisition), just to name a few. While
strategies for corporate partnerships are well-studied, the problem of form-
ing interpersonal partnerships is more nebulous. However, a vital factor in
partnerships between peers is trust. Suppose you have put together a project
which will require collaboration from a colleague, and you must decide be-
tween two potential collaborators. Both candidates possess the same basic
level of expertise, leading you to expect that the project will be a success with
either of them, but one candidate has a reputation for taking all of the credit
in collaborations and using them to advance their own interests over those of
their partner. As the head of the project, you would prefer to avoid working
with this individual, and instead collaborate with your other colleague who
has a reputation for being upfront and fair during collaborations.
In this paper we consider agents in a social network who have the oppor-
tunity to interact and benefit from each other. These interactions occur as
limited-trust leader-follower games, where limited-trust (and associated equi-
libria) is a concept recently developed by [3]. Loosely speaking, the limited-
trust concept assumes that an agent will help its fellow agent, provided that
the cost is not too high and is outweighed by the utility provided to the other
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players. The trust level of an agent i is determined by a metric δi ≥ 0 so
that if δi = 1, agent i is willing to give up $1 provided it helps its partner
agent j receive more than $1 extra. The concept is natural, and players in
2-player limited-trust games both benefit in the long run when playing in this
way. However, it is not standalone in the same way that concepts like grim
trigger strategies and the Nash equilibrium are: in any given interaction, a
player can only increase its utility by being more selfish if all other players
have fixed δ. When limited-trust is viewed in the context of agents who must
compete to attract partners though, we will see that self-interested agents
engage in strongly trustworthy behavior, as doing otherwise causes them to
miss out on partnership opportunities.
The main contribution of this paper is the development of a system for
modeling interactions between individuals in a social network. This system
is thoroughly analyzed, with algorithms developed for individuals to learn
how trustworthy their neighbors are and how to alter their own trust level
accordingly. As we will see later, these behavioral changes increase trust-
worthiness which leads to a substantial increase in the total utility across
the entire network. Empirically, such a system is substantiated by numerous
studies in evolutionary biology and psychology whose results mirror the be-
haviors which are naturally occurring in the model. These results indicate
that the most successful individuals are those who are willing to behave in
a trustworthy manner. What they lose in individual interactions they more
than make up for by increasing their opportunities. Further, myopic agents
naturally arrive at trustworthy behavior without the use of external history-
based mechanisms such as grim trigger or tit-for-tat strategies. As such, we
feel that the flexibility of limited-trust is more natural and intuitive for the
social scenario we consider.
Our empirical studies also reveal a counter-intuitive managerial insight.
While it would be natural to expect extreme competitiveness and selfishness
when opportunities are limited and individuals try to make the most of them,
we actually observe the opposite and find that individuals are at their most
trustworthy when opportunities are limited. Indeed, individuals do their best
to appear trustworthy in order to capture the few available opportunities.
Similarly, it is also natural to expect individuals to be more trustworthy when
there are more opportunities, as taking advantage of any one opportunity is
not worth the resulting reputational damage. Instead, it is surprising to
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observe that the relative glut of opportunities outweighed the reputational
consequences for selfish individuals, as they knew that their behavior would
not limit their opportunities (subject to network structure).
We next consider a motivating example, given by the social network in Fig-
ure 3.1. Suppose that each agent has to lead k = 2 leader-follower games and
can select any 2 neighbors as followers for these games, which are randomly
drawn from a known distribution. Let the games be over 2 × 2 payoff ma-
trices with each entry drawn independently and identically at random from
an exponential distribution where λ = 2. If all agents play selfishly, with
δi = 0 for every agent i, then each agent will select its partners uniformly at
random. That means that agent 7 can expect to be chosen as a follower for
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games, in addition to the 2 games where it is a leader. Suppose that agent
7 now behaves in a slightly trustworthy manner, with δ7 = 0.01 whenever it
interacts with any other agent, while all of its neighbors remain selfish: it
can now expect to attract games from all of its neighbors, and participate in
4 games as a follower. Doing so it will likely achieve less utility per game,
but it will play in an additional 7
6
games over what it would otherwise ex-
pect. Table 3.1 compares these two settings, showing that when all other
agents are selfish, agent 7 can improve its average utility by over 25% by
being only slightly trustworthy! The table also reveals a second managerial
insight: when all agents are equally trustworthy (δi = 2 for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 7}),
all stand to gain a significant amount of utility (approximately 14.5% per
agent) and hence drive a significant increase in the net utility of the system.
After defining the model in Section 3.2, we will return to this example to
understand how network position interacts with the distribution of δi across
players. We will see that generally speaking, having a comparatively high
value of δ leads to an agent increasing its utility by increasing its number of
interactions. We also note that while in this paper we will constrain agent i
to express a single value of δi to each of its neighbors for the sake of simplicity,
in Section 3.4.1 we will cover how agent i can optimally set personal values
δi(j) for each of its neighbors j.
This paper is organized as follows: the rest of this section conducts a
literature review over relevant work to our topic, particularly on the subjects
of network games and evolutionary biology and psychology. In Section 3.2 we
formally define the mechanics of our model and how agents within it behave
in a full knowledge setting while in Section 3.3 we define the same functions
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Figure 3.1: Example Social Network
Table 3.1: Comparison of utilities for different values of δ for the network in
Figure 3.1
δi = 0
δi = 0 ∀i 6= 7
δ7 = 0.01
δi = 2
Player Degree Utility per Round Utility per Round Utility per Round
1 3 10.532 10.743 11.974
2 4 12.880 11.469 14.935
3 3 10.596 10.356 12.271
4 4 13.420 13.395 15.479
5 4 13.100 11.499 14.716
6 2 9.178 8.570 10.289
7 4 14.338 18.025 16.531
Average 12.012 12.014 13.749
for agents with incomplete information and knowledge of their fellows. In
Section 3.4 we consider the metagame which occurs on top of the model when
agents are able to adjust their levels of trustworthiness, before exploring the
model numerically in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 we discuss the numerical
results and future directions of our work, before concluding our paper in
Section 3.7. Additionally, we provide multiple appendices for exploration of
additional topics related to our system, and proofs of some theorems.
We note that readers who are primarily interested in the results of our pa-
per may wish to skip Sections 3.3 and 3.4: while these sections are necessary
to explain how the system operates when players have incomplete informa-
tion or vary their level of trustworthiness, they are in-depth descriptions of
functions which can be grasped intuitively.
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3.1.1 Literature Review
Explaining and modeling unprompted generosity has been an intriguing ques-
tion within Game Theory, one apparently at odds the widespread idea of
Nash equilibria [1]. [29] provides one explanation in the form of α-altruism.
α-altruism is inspired by Hamilton’s rule for kin selection ( [4]) which loosely
states that we help others because they are some portion of ourselves on a
genetic level. α-altruism incorporates this by computing perceived costs for
each player, which are a convex combination of the player’s personal cost
and the net cost for all players. Hamilton’s rule applies only to kin though,
both theoretically and empirically. Thus α-altruism is less solidly grounded
outside of this setting.
However, evolutionary biology offers another explanation for unprompted
generosity: partner selection. Studies such as [38–43] consider various set-
tings under which participants engage in 2-stage interactions: while part-
nered randomly during the first stage, participants may decide who to part-
ner with in the second stage. In each study, participants who were more
generous in the first stage were more desirable as partners in the second,
and were more likely to be generous in the first stage if they knew before-
hand about the second stage. [39] also finds that generosity may be faked
in the first round to take advantage of the partner in the second round. [44]
conducts an empirical study which demonstrates that generosity and cooper-
ation only tend to arise between partners of relatively similar opportunities
(for selection of partners). [45] empirically tests partner selection as a moti-
vation for generosity with a competing theory, threat premium, which states
that individuals are generous in order to avoid potential conflict or danger.
The study finds that partner selection is a far stronger motivator.
This paper makes use of the LTE from Chapter 2. We noted then that
the LTE is explicitly motivated by partner selection and in this paper it is
applied to study how partnerships form within social networks. Social net-
works are a frequent topic of study in evolutionary game theory, with papers
such as [46–51] studying how coalitions and cooperative behaviors can form
naturally within social networks under various settings and assumptions. [52]
is particularly interesting under this evolutionary setting, as it studies the
problem of seed selection for cooperative behavior, i.e., how many people
must play cooperatively in order to trigger a cascade of cooperative behavior
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throughout the network. On a related topic, [53] provides a large scale ex-
periment which successfully identifies network structures which increase the
effect of peer influence. For the interested reader, [54] provides a good primer
on evolutionary game theory through 2007, and [55] provides an extensive
survey over a much larger class of games in social networks through 2015.
However, none of the evolutionary game theory papers mentioned above
study partner selection in conjunction with social networks. To the best of
our knowledge the only paper which does so is [56]. It finds that frequent
partner switching helps to dissuade defection in the prisoner’s dilemma, as
individuals who take advantage quickly find that no one is willing to play
with them. As in our setting, players make partner selections based on rep-
utation and past observations of their two-hop neighborhoods. However,
these agents select their partner groups by updating their one- and two-hop
neighborhoods within the network, and update their reputations by mim-
icking their successful neighbors rather than playing best responses to their
neighbors. Additionally, in this chapter we consider a broader class of games
generated from arbitrary distributions. These can model any interactions
necessary including the prisoner’s dilemma considered in [56]. We consider
these games within the limited-trust setting, and find our results congruent
with the recent papers on partner selection mentioned above.
3.2 Game Model
3.2.1 Preliminary Concepts
Before defining the systems we consider, we begin with a review of some
standard concepts in game theory.
Definition 6 (Strategy Profile of a Finite Game). Given a finite N-player
game in which each player i has a set Σi of pure strategies, a valid pure
strategy profile for the game is given by σ = {σ1, σ2, ..., σN} where σi ∈ Σi is
the pure strategy played by agent i.
Definition 7 (Stackelberg Equilibrium). A 2-player leader-follower (Stack-
elberg) game is said to display a pure Stackleberg equilibrium {σ1, σ2} when
player 2 is playing its best response to player 1’s strategy, and any deviation
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by player 1 from σ1 to a new strategy σ
′
1 will not increase its utility after
player 2 makes its best response σ′2 to σ
′
1.
While it is common to consider mixed strategies, we will be consider-
ing leader-follower games with full knowledge. All such games posses pure-
strategy Stackelberg equilibria, and any mixed strategy equilibria are convex
combinations of pure equilibria. Therefore, we will not need to consider
mixed strategies in this paper. Additionally, although the Stackelberg equi-
librium can be easily extended to the N -player setting, we will consider only
one-on-one interactions between players which eliminates the need for this
extension.
We are interested in a related concept to the Stackelberg equilibrium,
the Limited-Trust Stackelberg Equilibrium (LTSE) ( [3]). The LTSE sim-
ilarly possesses pure-strategy equilbria, and will govern player interactions.
A limited-trust game is a game in which each player i has a trust-level δi ≥ 0
which it is willing to give up from its greedy best-response (the strategy
which maximizes its own utility given the strategies of all other players) pro-
vided that doing so increases the net utility of all players. For example,
consider the 2-player game in Table 3.2 in which player 2 must decide be-
tween two strategies a2 and b2. Suppose that player 1 has selected a1, and so
player 2 must decide between u1(a1, a2) = 4, u2(a1, a2) = 3 if it selects a2 and
u1(a1, b2) = 2, u2(a1, b2) = 4 if it selects b2. Suppose that δ2 = 2. Then the
Table 3.2: Example 2× 2 game
Player 2
a2 b2
Player 1 a1 4,3 2,4
b1 3,2 1,3
second player’s best response to the first player is to play a2, as it maximizes
net utility (4 + 3 > 2 + 4) and results in a loss of 1 from player 2’s greedy
best response, which is acceptable given δ2 ≥ 1. This allows all players to
benefit in the long run by avoiding inefficient equilibria which only benefit
one player. In a 2-player leader-follower game the limited-trust best response
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of the follower to the leader playing s1 ∈ Σ1 is
r2(s1, δ2) = arg max
s2∈Σ2
u1(s1, s2) + u2(s1, s2)
s.t. u2(s1, G2(s1))− u2(s1, s2) ≤ δ2,
where G2(s1) = arg maxs2∈Σ2 u2(s1, s2) is the follower’s greedy best response.
r2(s1, δ2) is therefore the strategy which maximizes net utility, subject to the
constraint that the follower does not give up more than δ2 than it could have
obtained from the greedy best response. The leader’s limited-trust optimal
strategy is
s∗1(δ1, δ2) = arg max
s1∈Σ1
u1(s1, r2(s1, δ2)) + u2(s1, r2(s1, δ2))
s.t. u1(G1(δ2), r2(G1(δ2), δ2))− u1(s1, r2(s1, δ2)) ≤ δ1,
where G1(δ2) = arg maxs1∈Σ1 u1(s1, r2(s1, δ2)) is the leader’s greedy best
strategy, given the limited-trust best response which will be made by the
follower.
Next, we define the 2-player LTSE, which will be relevant for this paper,
and the N -player extension can be easily intuited from this and the definition
of a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Definition 8 (Limited-Trust Stackelberg Equilibrium). A strategy pair (s1, s2)
in a 2-player limited-trust Stackelberg game with trust levels δ1, δ2 is said to
be a limited-trust Stackelberg equilibrium if and only if s1 ∈ s∗1(δ1, δ2) and
s2 ∈ r2(s1, δ2) (if each player plays its Stackelberg limited-trust best response
or strategy to the other).
Note that when δ1 = δ2 = 0, the LTSE reduces to a Stackelberg equilib-
rium.
3.2.2 System Model
Having covered the preliminaries, we now introduce our model for interac-
tions in a social network. We consider a system over a social network G(V,E)
with a set of vertices V and edges E. Vertices represent agents in the net-
work and an edge between vertices means that the corresponding agents can
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interact. Each agent in G is self-interested and seeks to maximize its own
utility. However, direct interactions between agents occurs only in a one-
on-one setting through 2-player limited-trust Stackelberg games. As such,
each agent i has a trust level δi which governs its individual interactions
with other agents. The system as a whole can be considered as an N -player
utility maximization game, where N = |V |.
Let N1i represent the one-hop neighborhood of agent i in G: N
1
i is the set





 \ (N1i ∪ {i})
represent the 2-hop neighborhood of i, the set of agents who are not in N1i
but have neighbors in N1i . For one time period in the system, agent i may
invite at most ki of its fellow agents in N
1
i to interact, where ki ∈ Z+. If
agent j ∈ N1i accepts an invitation from i, they engage in a leader-follower
game with leader i and follower j over payoff matrices A and B, respectively,
such that A ∼ Aij and B ∼ Bij where Aij,Bij are probability distributions
for interactions between i and j initiated by i.
Although agent i may issue at most ki invitations per time period, it is
allowed to accept as many as it receives. This consideration is motivated by
the fact that it is easy for an individual to take a supporting role in many
endeavors, but it generally only has the time or resources to take a lead role
on a small number. Further, while i may both accept an invite and receive
an invite from a neighbor j, leading to two separate interactions, it may
not issue multiple invitations to j within a single time period. This means
that agent i may have up to a maximum of ki + |N1i | interactions per time
period. An interaction in which i invites j can thus be fully characterized by
θij = {Aij,Bij, δi, δj}, with expected utilities ui(θij), uj(θij) for each player.
Agent j will accept i’s invitation provided uj(θij) ≥ 0. i will choose to
invite (at most) ki of its neighbors, with a neighbor j being selected if it
provides one of the ki highest values for ui(θij) in N
1
i . This is subject to
ui(θij), uj(θij) ≥ 0 as otherwise either it does not benefit i to interact or it
does not benefit j to accept the invitation.
Given the methods that i uses to choose which neighbors to invite and
which invitations to accept, we can characterize all behavior in the system
46
if we know θ = {G,A,B, δ} where A = {Aij}(i,j)∈E, B = {Bij}(i,j)∈E, δ =
{δi}i∈[N ]. Let K1i be the set of neighbors that i invites to interact and K2i
be the set of neighbors that invite i to interact in a time period. Agent i’s
expected total utility is




ui(θij), the value of the games i initiates which are
accepted, and wi(θ) =
∑
j∈K2i
ui(θji), the value of the games i accepts in-
vitations to. Note that K1i can be determined entirely from knowledge of
N1i , and K
2
i can be determined from knowledge of N
1
i ∪ N2i , meaning that
agent i’s interactions depend only on its 1- and 2-hop neighborhoods, not
the network as a whole.
Lemma 2. Given a 2-player limited-trust Stackelberg game between a leader
i and a follower j, uj(θij) increases monotonically as δi increases.
Proof. Consider a follower j with fixed δj. For any action si the leader i
takes, j has a deterministic response r2(si, δj). Note that r2 is not a function
of δi, so j’s response is fixed for fixed δj. Suppose that for given δi, player i
takes action a and that for δ′i = δi + ε, ε > 0, player i takes action b. Given
r2 is not a function of δi it must be that the reason i switches to b when
operating under δ′i is that it increases the net utility, but results in a loss of
more than δi from i’s greedy best strategy G1(δj). Given i’s utility decreases
and the net utility increases, it must be that j’s utility increases.
Corollary 2. Given a 2-player limited-trust Stackelberg game between a
leader i and a follower j, ui(θij) decreases monotonically as δi increases.
Corollary 3. Given a 2-player limited-trust Stackelberg game between a
leader i and a follower j, net utility increases monotonically as δi increases.
Although Lemma 2 shows that for any fixed game, the follower can only
benefit if the δ of the leader increases, the same is not always true for the
leader if the δ of the follower increases. However, [3] provides strong empirical
evidence that in games randomly generated from several types of distribu-
tions, the utility of the leader has a strong positive correlation to the δ of
the follower. With that in mind, we will make the assumption that given
two players l and j such that Ail = Aij, player i would prefer to send an
47
invitation to whichever of the two has a higher δ, and is indifferent between
them if δj = δl.
Corollary 4. Given a network G in which all games between any two players
have nonnegative expected utilities and are independent, vi(θ) is monotoni-
cally decreasing with δi.
Proof. Given all games have nonnegative expected utility for i and a game
between players i and j is independent of the payoff in a later game between i
and l or j and h, all players will accept any games they are invited to. There-




monotonically with δi and so vi(θ) decreases monotonically with δi.
Note that the lemma and corollaries mentioned here do not imply that
the utility of the follower j in a particular game decreases monotonically
with δj, because this is not true: games can be constructed where j’s utility
increases with δj. Intuitively, these games reflect situations in which the
leader i can trust j not to take advantage of its strategy si, allowing both
players to benefit. Once again though, [3] provides empirical evidence that
j’s expected utility decreases monotonically with δj for games generated from
several distribution types.
Theorem 7. Given two agents i, j with continuous distributions Aij,Bij in
which any element d which is dependent on any other set of elements D has
a continuous marginal distribution function fd|D for any realization of the
elements of D, ui(θij) and uj(θij) are both continuous in δi and δj provided
ui(θij), uj(θij) <∞ and have finite variance for all δi, δj ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider the set of games C ⊆ (Aij,Bij) for which ui(C, δi, δj) is
discontinuous on the interval δi ∈ [x, x + ε) for ε > 0. Note that in each
of these games (A,B) ∈ C, ui(A,B, δi, δj) is a constant-valued step function
where it is not discontinuous. By definition as an expected value,




where fij is the distribution function over (Aij,Bij). Therefore, as ε→ 0
(3.1)




fij(A,B) (ui(A,B, x+ ε, δj)− ui(A,B, x, δj))
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due to the fact that ui(A,B, δi, δj) is a constant-valued step function. Note
the change in the limits, which comes from the fact that
(ui(A,B, x+ ε, δj)− ui(A,B, x, δj)) = 0
for A,B /∈ C.
As ε → 0, then for all δi ≥ 0 C → ∅ by the continuity of the Aij,Bij
and all marginal distributions therein. Therefore, ui(Aij,Bij, x + ε, δj) −
ui(Aij,Bij, x, δj) goes to 0 because ui(θij), uj(θij) < ∞ and ui(θij), uj(θij)
have finite variance. Therefore, ui(θij) is continuous in δi.
Identical arguments show that ui(θij) is continuous in δj, and that uj(θij)
is continuous in both δi and δj.
In this chapter we assume that ui(θij), uj(θij) <∞ and have finite variance
for all δi, δj ≥ 0, all i, j ∈ [N ]. We will use Theorem 7 in Section 3.4 for games
in which agents are able to change their value of δ.
Having defined the system, we now return to the example we gave earlier
in Figure 3.1. Suppose that ki = 2 for all agents i and all games between any
players are nonnegative and independent and identically distributed. This
means Aij = Blh for i, j, l, h ∈ [N ] where [N ] = {1, 2, ..., N − 1, N}. Further
suppose that δi < δi+1 for i ∈ [6]; in particular δi = 2(i−1)3 for i ∈ [7]. We can
then predict exactly who will invite whom to interact (since all outcomes are
nonnegative, expected utility for any interaction for both leader and follower
is nonnegative and all invitations will be accepted). The behavior is fully
characterized by Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Behavior of Network in Figure 3.1 under Different δ Distributions
δi = 2(i− 1)/3 δi = 2(7− i)/3
Player Degree Invites Invited By Utility per Round Invites Invited By Utility per Round
1 3 5,7 ∅ 7.750 2,5 2,5,7 15.559
2 4 5,4 ∅ 7.360 1,3 1,3,4,5 20.446
3 3 5,7 5 11.040 2,5 2,7 12.859
4 4 6,7 2,5,6,7 21.064 2,5 6 9.960
5 4 3,4 1,2,3 15.193 1,2 1,3,4 18.059
6 2 4,7 4,7 13.754 4,7 ∅ 6.607
7 4 4,6 1,3,4,6 18.931 1,3 6 11.244
Average 13.591 13.559
Table 3.3 presents an interesting interaction between δ and the network
structure. In the first set of columns, when δi =
2(i−1)
3
, player 7 is invited
to play by every one of its neighbors in the network. This is unsurprising as
49
δ7 > δj 6=7. So is player 6, which is again unsurprising as we have ki = 2 for all
players i ∈ [7] and the only player for which δj > δ6 is j = 7. What is more
interesting is that player 4 is being invited to play by all of its neighbors,
and is engaging in as many games per round as player 7. Further, it is
engaging with players that have a higher δ than player 7’s partners, both as
a leader and as a follower, so we expect that it achieves a higher utility per
round than player 7, especially because it is behaving more selfishly. If we
define Aij = Blh to be a probability distribution over 2 × 2 matrices with
all entries generated from independently and identically from an exponential
distribution with λ = 2, we see that this is exactly what happens. Column
5 represents the average utility each player receives per round after 1000




, reversing which players are the most valuable partners.
We also remind the reader of the information in Table 3.1 which considers
the same values of k and Aij,Bij. For the two cases in Table 3.3 the average
value of δ is 2, so it is unsurprising that they have roughly the same average
utility as when δ is uniformly equal to 2 for all agents in Table 3.1. With
that being said, the more even distribution of a uniform δ = 2 produces
higher average utility. In Section 3.5 we numerically examine the relationship
between network structure and δ.
We saw that the behavior of systems with a fixed, known θ can be char-
acterized and readily predicted. We now shift our focus to when parts of θ
are unknown or are not fixed. Section 3.3 focuses heavily on the algorith-
mic methods agents use to learn the δ of their neighbors, and Section 3.4
mathematically details how agents should adjust their δ to maximize their
utility in response to their 1- and 2-hop neighborhoods. For those who are
concerned primarily with the results of our numerical trials, we recommend
skipping ahead to Section 3.5.
3.3 Learning under unknown δ
In this section we consider how agents behave when they don’t have accurate
information about their their neighbors’ δ values. The expected utility an
agent i will gain by partnering with another agent j is dependent on both the
utility j brings (Aij and Bij) and its trustworthiness (δj). These parameters
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are independent, allowing each to be estimated separately. Aij,Bij are multi-
dimensional distributions and thus can be estimated using standard statisti-
cal methods such as kernel density estimates and expected log-likelihood if
they are not known a priori. Therefore we focus on how agent i estimates
δ−i from observations, where δ−i = {δj}j∈[N ]\{i} is the set of δ values for all
agents other than i.
Note that as much of this section considers only interactions between two
players in a game rather than agents in a larger network, we will use the
terms “player” and “agent” interchangeably here.
3.3.1 Learning δ−i as Leader
Consider an m × n leader-follower game with leader player 1 and follower
player 2. Assume that player 1 knows through past observations that δ2 ∈
[δl21, δ
u





because when we observe δlji being given up we know δj ≥ δlji, but when δuji
is not given up all we know is δj < δ
u
ji. Suppose that player 1 has selected
strategy si to play. At this point, the game is equivalent to the 1× n game
given in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: 1× n Leader-Follower Game
Player 2
s1 ... sn
Player 1 si (a1, b1) ... (an, bn)
Player 1 can refine its knowledge of δ2 based on player 2’s response by
considering the Pareto frontier of player 2’s strategies measured in the val-
ues of u2 and u1 + u2. Without loss of generality, assume that there are
k strategies on the frontier and they are relabeled {s1, s2, ..., sk} such that
u2(s1) > u2(s2) > ... > u2(sk) and u1(s1) + u2(s1) < u1(s2) + u2(s2) < ... <
u1(sk) +u2(sk). Figure 3.2 gives an example of such a frontier with k = 5. If
player 2 plays sj in response, then it must be that b1 − bj ≤ δ2 < b1 − bj+1.
Let bk+1 = −∞ for the case where j = k.
Analyzing the Pareto frontier allows player 1 to determine whether a better
bound for δ2 is found and whether δ2 has changed. Consider Figure 3.2 again:
based on player 1’s previously derived bounds for δ2, it expects player 2 to
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Figure 3.2: Pareto frontier of game/strategy in Table 3.4 for the Leader.
select either s2 or s3 in response, depending on whether b1 − b3 > δ2. This
means that if player 2 responds with sj ∈ {s1, s4, s5}, there has been a change
to δ2. Algorithm 1 gives the full method for the leader player 1 to update its
bounds for the follower player 2, while noticing any detectable changes in δ2.





21, S = {s1, s2, ..., sk}, j
l← b1 − bj
u← b1 − bj+1
change← False





δl21 ← max{l, δl21}





3.3.2 Learning δ−i as Follower
We now show how a follower can learn the δ value of a leader. Consider
an m × n game with leader player 1 and follower player 2. Assume that
player 2 knows from past observations that δ1 ∈ [δl12, δu12). Recall that player
2’s best response function to player 1 selecting si is s
∗
j = r2(si, δ2). While
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Figure 3.3: Pareto frontier of game in Table 3.5 for the Follower
player 1 does not know δ2, it does have an estimate δ21. Unless otherwise






the mean of the observed bounds. Thus from player 1’s
perspective, the game can be rewritten as the m× 1 game in Table 3.5.








Provided that player 2 knows δ21, player 1’s estimate of δ2, it is able to con-
struct the m×1 game that player 1 is considering. Based on past interactions,
player 2 can compute δl21, δ
u
21 exactly from its own past actions, and there-
fore compute δ21. Player 2 can then construct a Pareto frontier of player 1’s
strategies similar to Figure 3.2, but measured in the values of u1 and u1 +u2.
Without loss of generality, assume that if there are k strategies on the fron-
tier, they are relabeled {s1, s2, ..., sk} such that u1(s1) > u1(s2) > ... > u1(sk)
and u1(s1)+u2(s1) < u1(s2)+u2(s2) < ... < u1(sk)+u2(sk). Figure 3.3 gives
an example of such a frontier with k = 5. If player 1 selects si while antici-
pating r2(si, δ21) in response, it must be that a1− ai ≤ δ1 < a1− ai+1, where
ak+1 = −∞ in the case that i = k. δl12 and δu12 are updated if this implies a
better bound.
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Similar to the leader in the previous section, the follower can also use the
Pareto frontier to determine if δ1 has changed. For the frontier in Figure 3.3,
player 2’s previously derived bounds for δ1 indicate that if δ1 hasn’t changed,
player 1 will select s2, s3, or s4, with s2 occurring if δ1 < a1−a3. This means if
player 1 selects s1 or s5, there has been a change to δ1. The follower can then
use Algorithm 1 with slight modifications (consider b1, bi, bi+1 rather than
a1, ai, ai+1) to update its knowledge of the leader player 1, while noticing any
detectable changes in δ1.
3.3.3 Network Dynamics Under Unknown δ
So far in this section we have focused on the learning of unknown δ between
two players. Now we turn our attention to the network as a whole. Recall
that each agent in the network can initiate at most k interactions per round.
Therefore, any agent i with neighborhood |N1i |> ki faces an exploration-
exploitation dilemma for each of its invitations: select a neighbor j for which
ui(θij) is maximized or select a neighbor h for which δ
u
hi − δlhi is large.
We consider agents which address this dilemma in the following manner:
At the beginning of round t, agent i selects at most ki other agents from its
neighbors N1i to interact with. At the beginning of each round, agent i selects
some of these neighbors for the purpose of exploration and some for exploita-
tion. For each neighbor j, although i does not know δj it has an estimate






decides to exploit h(t) of its interactions in round t, then it selects the set of
S neighbors such that S = arg maxS
∑
j∈S ui(θij), subject to |S|≤ h(t) and
uj(θij) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ S, as otherwise the invitation will not be accepted. Note
that based on past interactions, player i is capable of determining the value
δij that player j estimates for δi, and so can avoid sending an invitation which
is likely to be rejected. h(t) is determined according to a multi-armed bandit
scheduling policy, such as uniform ε-greedy, -first, or -decreasing, or a more
sophisticated policy such as Thompson sampling. Player i then randomly
samples ki − |S| of its remaining neighbors for exploration, according to a
discrete probability distribution ft(N
1
i \S, δ′i), where δ′i = {(δlji, δuji)}j∈N1i is i’s
estimates of the δ values of its neighbors. For each invited neighbor j player
i then plays according to δi and its estimate δji: player i should not forego a
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large opportunity or accept a large cost while interacting with a neighbor it
is exploring. Instead, it will take that into account in determining the value
of issuing j future invitations.
3.4 Network Games with Variable δ
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we defined the basic mechanics under which network
games function. A natural extension of this system is considering how a
player i might change δi in order to take advantage of δ−i = {δ1, δ2, ..., δi−1,
δi+1, ..., δN}. Therefore, if agent i can change δi between rounds, it should
set it to
δ∗i = arg max
δi∈∆i
ui(θ−i),
where θ−i = {G,A,B, δ−i} and where ∆i = [0, δmax] and δmax is an arbitrarily
enforced maximum value of δ for the system. Note that while δmax can be
arbitrarily large, we require δmax ∈ R+.
Finding δ∗i is complicated by two factors. The first is that agent i does
not know δ−i. Instead, it has estimates of δji for its neighbors j ∈ N1i based
on past interactions. This prevents it from accurately determining whether
or not it will receive an invitation from j for a given value of δi, and it will
be forced to estimate the expected value of the game if it does receive the
invitation. The second complication is that agent i’s neighbor j does not
know δ−j: agent j will not immediately notice a change in δi, and so agent i
will not immediately receive the expected utility from shifting from δi to δ
∗
i .
This occurs in the form of j not correctly deciding whether or not to issue
an invitation to i, as well as not estimating agent i’s trust level correctly if
they do interact.
With mild re-use of notation, we will let δ′i = {δji}j∈N1i be agent i’s es-
timates of δj for each of its neighbors j. Because we are considering social
networks, it is reasonable to assume that agents share knowledge and im-
pressions of their own neighbors during their interactions via gossip. This
leads to agent i knowing δ′j for each of its neighbors j ∈ N1i . i can thus
address the first complication in finding δ∗i : by knowing δ
′
j for each of its
neighbors j, agent i can predict whether or not it will receive an invitation
from agent j if it shifts the value of δi. As noted in Section 3.2, agent i’s
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expected utility can be determined entirely from its 2-hop neighborhood. i
therefore does not need any additional information from other agents l /∈ N1i .
While it must still estimate the expected value of the game that agent j ini-
tiates as a function of δji and δi, after several interactions it is likely that
δji ≈ δj. By the continuity implied by Theorem 7, this means that as δji → δj,
ui(Aji,Bji, δji, δi) → ui(θji) and ui(Aij,Bij, δi, δji) → ui(θij). This addresses
the first complication in determining δ∗i .
The second complication is addressed heuristically. Because it takes time
for knowledge of a change in δi to become apparent to agent i’s neighbors
j ∈ N1i , particularly if the change is small, it is not to i’s benefit to change
δi frequently. Doing so will result in it never gaining the expected utility it
computed when determining δ∗i . Therefore, agent i will only recompute δi
in a given round with arbitrary probability pi. The number of rounds that
each agent i will commit to a given δi before reevaluating then becomes a
geometric random variable. Another heuristic option is for agents to update
on an epoch schedule, after every t rounds. This allows agent i to better
estimate δ′i, and allows agent j ∈ N1i to better determine δi so that i realizes
the value it expected when it set δi. We consider both of these mechanisms
in our numerical trials in Section 3.5.
Having covered the mechanics by which δi varies for a given agent i, we now
address changes to the exploration-exploitation methodology given in Section
3.3.3. This framework functioned well when δ was fixed for all agents, as the
value of exploration decreased with accumulated knowledge. However, when-
ever δj shifts, agent i’s past knowledge of δj becomes obsolete and additional
exploration is beneficial. This means that rather than using h(t) to deter-
mine how many of its neighbors to exploit and explore, agent i should now
also take into account how recently each of its neighbors j ∈ N1i changed δj.
This is easily accomplished, as Algorithm1 1 reports whether or not a change
in δj has been detected. Therefore, a vector ti of how many rounds ago each
neighbor j ∈ N1i changed δj can easily be maintained and exploitation and
exploration can instead be determined by h(ti).
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3.4.1 Personalized δ
Before beginning numerical studies in the next section, we first consider how
the system functions if an agent i uses different values of δi depending on
which of its neighbors it is interacting with. This reflects the fact that some
individuals may prefer specific trusted partners or be more willing to help
them than they would other acquaintances.
Let δi(j) be the value of δi agent i uses when interacting with agent j.
Similarly, let δji(i) be agent i’s estimate of δj(i). In many ways this will
make the problem of selecting δ∗i simpler, despite the fact that agent i now
needs to select a vector rather than a single value. This is because i can
determine δ∗i (j) while only considering j and N
1
j , and only taking N
1
i into
account at the end.
The procedure for agent i to determine δ∗i (j) is straightforward. First, i
determines δFi (j), where
δFi (j) = arg max
δi(j)≥0
I1(Aji,Bji, δj(i), δi(j)) max{0, ui(Aji,Bji, δj(i), δi(j))}
and I1(Aji,Bji, δj(i), δi(j)) is an indicator function which is 1 if agent j will
issue i an invitation and 0 otherwise. δFi (j) is the optimal value of δ
∗
i (j) if
agent i does not intend to issue j an invitation, but would still benefit from
receiving one from j. Note that the term max{0, ui(Aji,Bji, δj(i), δi(j))}
indicates that i will decline the invitation if ui < 0. Next, agent i determines
δLi (j) such that
δLi (j) = arg max
δi(j)≥0
I1(Aji,Bji, δj(i), δi(j)) max{0, ui(Aji,Bji, δj(i), δi(j))}
+ I2(uj(Aij,Bij, δi(j), δj(i)) ≥ 0)ui(Aij,Bij, δi(j), δj(i))
where I2 is an indicator variable which is 1 if agent j would accept an invi-
tation from agent i at the specified δi(j). δ
L
i (j) represents the optimal value
of δ∗i (j) if agent i would like to issue an invitation to j, as well as potentially
receive one.
Having compiled a pair (δFi (j), δ
L
i (j)) for each neighbor j ∈ N1i , agent i
now can select δi(j) as one of the two values from each pair. This is subject
only to the constraint that i may select δi(j) = δ
L
i (j) for at most ki of its
neighbors, as it can only issue at most k invitations. By choosing at most ki
57
neighbors for which this difference is highest, agent i can determine δ∗i .
Note that while we assumed δ−i to be known for simplicity, the proce-
dure for determining δ∗i (j) when δ−i is unknown is analogous, utilizing the
techniques from earlier in Section 3.4.
3.4.2 Variable Known δ
Before moving on we again pause here to consider the case when δ−i is known
to agent i. While agents in the network interact with each other in 2-player
Stackelberg games, allowing agents to modify their values of δ between rounds
gives the agents a second, indirect way to interact with each other. When
each agent selects a value for δ it does not directly result in utility for the
agent, but it influences which agents will interact with it as well as how they
will interact, which in turn results in utility. For this reason, selecting δ
represents an N -player game on top of the system. Because the strategies
for this game indirectly influence utility, instead influencing the system that
will determine utility, we refer to this as an N -player continuous strategy
“metagame” over the system. As each player displays trust only in its own
self-interest, to attract more interactions, we can show that under certain
settings the metagame displays mixed Nash equilibria through use of [57]’s
results for Nash equilibria in games with continuous strategy sets.
Definition 9 (Mixed Nash Equilibrium). Given an N-player game with
strategy profiles σ = (σ1, σ2, ..., σN) for each player where for a given player
i, σ−i is the set of strategies played by all other players, σ is a mixed Nash
equilibrium (MNE) if and only if for any other valid strategy profiles σ′i,
ui(σi, σ−i) ≥ ui(σ′i, σ−i) for all i ∈ [N ], and ui(σi, σ−i) is the expected utility
of the game for player i when it plays strategy σi.
Theorem 8. Consider a social network G with uniform interactions Aij =
Blh for all l, i, j, h ∈ [N ] such that all payoffs are nonnegative and for agent
i with neighbors j and l, δj ≤ δl → ui(θij) ≤ ui(θil). Then the N-player
metagame with closed interval strategy space ∆i ⊆ R and utility function ui
for i ∈ [N ] possesses a mixed Nash equilibrium.
The proof to Theorem 8 is given in Appendix B.2.1.
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3.5 Numerical Studies
In this section we empirically examine the relationship between network po-
sition and trust level δ in real social networks. We will study Zachary’s
Karate Club network from [58], as well as the ego-Facebook network curated
by SNAP. The karate club network is visually represented in Figure B.7 in
Appendix B.3. We will consider separately when δ−i is known and unknown
for agent i in each network. When agent i determines which of its neighbors
j ∈ N1i to issue invitations to, ui(θij) is estimated as the mean of i’s utility
in 1000 games drawn independently and identically at random from Aij,Bij
with δi, δj. We will confine our attention to distributions where uj(θij) ≥ 0,
so that all invitations will be accepted.
3.5.1 Known δ
We consider the Karate Club network with the following parameters:
• Aij = Bhl for all h, i, j, l ∈ [N ]. Aij ∼ Aij is a 2 × 2 matrix with
entries generated independently and identically from the exponential
distribution with λ = 4.
• δi ∈ [0, 30] ∀i ∈ [N ].
• δi is known to all agents.
• δi updates between rounds. δi at time t is a greedy best response to
δ−i at time t− 1. For t = 0, δi = 0, ∀i ∈ [N ].
• ki = 2 for each agent i.
ui(θij) and uj(θij) as functions of δi, δj are estimated by taking the sample
mean utilities of 1000 simulated games generated independently and identi-
cally according to Aij,Bij.
Figure 3.4 illustrates u1(θ−1, δ1) as a function of δ1 for fixed (random) δ−i,
for vertex 1 in the karate club network. The left plot gives the value of
u1(θ−1, δ1) and the right plot shows the number of games the agent at vertex
1 in the Karate Club network participates in per round. We see in the left
plot that u1(θ−1, δ1) is monotonically decreasing mildly with δ1 at all but a
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Figure 3.4: Utility for Vertex 1, Known δ
handful of points where there is a sharp increase. These points occur when
δ1 is large enough to attract a new player to begin interacting with agent
1, as shown by the plot on the right. This is unsurprising: the utility of a
single game for the follower may not monotonically decrease as δ increases,
but as stated in Section 3.2 we strongly suspect that for many distributions
it monotonically decreases in expectation.
Now we examine how players behave under the parameters above when
all are adjusting δ together between rounds. As noted, ui(θij) is estimated
numerically. Between rounds, it is sampled at a number of points in the
interval [0, 30] then set to the one which maximizes ui(θ−i, δi). Each curve in
Figure 3.5 plots δi for an individual agent as it varies over time. We see the
majority of players reach δmax = 30 and stay there. They do so in order to be
competitive in attracting partners, with only occasional decreases to δ = 0
when they are not competitive enough. The curves in Figure 3.6 display
the mean value of δ for all verteces of the same degree. For example, the
yellow curve is the mean value of δ across all verteces of degree 4. Figure
3.6 clearly shows what is occurring: we see that at any given time there are
generally between 0 and 2 verteces of degree 2 (out of 11) with low values
of δ. The variance of which ones are not at δ = 30 at any time may be due
to best response dynamics between them, or to insufficient sample size when
estimating utilities.
Vertex 12, the only vertex with degree 1, is easier to examine. Its only
neighbor is vertex 1, which has degree 16. If all of vertex 1’s other neighbors




per round. Figure 3.6 indicates that u12(θ12,1, δ12 = 0) > u12(θ12,1, δ12 =
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Figure 3.5: δ in karate club network with k = 2 invitations per round with
ties broken uniformly at random
30)+ 1
8
u12(θ1,12, δ12 = 30). The occasional jumps of δ12 = 30 can be attributed
to the changes in behavior of the verteces of degree 2. The points at which
δ12 is low but not 0 are attributable to insufficient sample size.
We previously focused on ties being broken randomly when deciding whom
to issue invitations to. Now, we examine when ties are broken according to
the lexicographic ordering. Figure 3.7 is analogous to Figure 3.5 with this
change. It shows a strong, consistent, and repeating pattern in the values
of player δs over time. When δ is low for most players, there is a general
pattern of one-upsmanship between players: Each tries to slightly outdo its
competitors, which progresses toward large jumps as the costs of increasing
δ relative to a player’s current δ value shrink. The resulting pattern is a very
clear S-curve. However, once many players reach δ = 30 the “losers” of the
tie-breakers drop down to δ = 0 resulting in a gradual cascade of all players
back to low values of δ, at which point the process repeats. This echoes the
findings of [39], in which players “fake” generosity to attract partners: once
they have either failed to attract partners or their competitors have given
up, each player returns to selfish behavior until it is once again forced to
behave in a trustworthy manner due to competition. In contrast, randomly
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Figure 3.6: Mean δ by vertex degree in karate club network with k = 2
invitations per round with ties broken uniformly at random
breaking ties maintains a constant state of competition, stopping backslid-
ing. Further, it is supported by [56] which finds that semi-frequent partner
changes are necessary to motivate generous behavior, as otherwise partners
become complacent and attempt to take advantage of each other.
We do note that we suspect that this behavior in which all agents cyclically
return to low values of δ does not persist when agents are less myopic. To
demonstrate that, we consider agents who make updates to their δ value by
maximizing the sum of their expected utility and a constant ρ > 0 times their
expected utility after their neighbors react to the new value of δ. Figure 3.8
considers this setting with verteces conjoined by degree in the karate club
network with lexicographic tie-breaking and k = 2 invitations per player with
ρ = 0.8. Due to increased computation, expected utility is determined as the
mean of 200 games drawn independently and identically at random rather
than 1000. While Figure 3.8 still shows evidence of some cyclic behavior, it
appears greatly reduced and more stable than that in Figure 3.7. This leads
us to suspect it would be further reduced by even more far-sighted agents,
however computational concerns prevent us from testing this.
We also consider a second, larger social network where N = 333. This
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Figure 3.7: δ in karate club network with k = 2 invitations per round with
lexicographic tie-breaking.
network is a subset of the ego-Facebook network curated by SNAP. We let
ki = 3 invitations for each agent i and keep all other conditions identical to
our previous setting, breaking ties uniformly at random. Figure 3.9 displays
the same behavior which occurred in the Karate Club network in Figure 3.5,
rather than the repeated S-curves seen in Figure 3.7. Similarly, nearly all
agents stayed at δmax = 30 with a small number playing very small values of
δ ≈ 0. This divide, with approximately 5
6
agents using a high δ while 1
6
us
a low δ, leads to a remarkably stable average δ ≈ 25. Also as in Figure 3.5,
there are a handful of agents which occasionally drop to low values of δ for
a short time period when they judge it too competitive before returning to
δ = 30. This suggests that the pattern of an S-curve increase in δ followed
by a plateau may be characteristic of naturally occurring social networks
engaged in partner selection.
3.5.2 Unknown δ
In the Section 3.5.1 we considered networks in which each player i knew the
value of δ−i, and was immediately aware of any changes in it. Now we consider
behavior when δ−i is unknown, and agent i estimates it using Algorithm 1.
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Figure 3.8: Mean δ by vertex degree in karate club network with k = 2
invitations per round with ties broken lexicographically, non-myopic
updates
Figure 3.9: Mean δ in Facebook Ego Network
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Figure 3.10: Utility for Vertex 1, unknown δ−1
We again consider the Karate Club Network and ego-Facebook Network. All
parameters will be identical to those in the previous subsection for ease of
comparison. The points in the curve in Figure 3.10 are computed as the
average of 1000 independent identically distributed games and provides a
direct comparison to Figure 3.4. We see that the estimates in the unknown
case approximate those in the known case. This suggests that as knowledge
of δ−i improves, players will approach the same behaviors they display when
δ−i is known to agent i.
We consider agents who update their values of δ in the two ways we dis-
cussed in Section 3.4: all agents either update their δ value probabilistically
between rounds, or all agents work on an epoch system, updating their δ
values every t rounds after they and their neighbors have learned about each
other.
Figure 3.11 illustrates how delta shifts when players update according to
an epoch system, every t = 100 rounds. The acceleration to δmax = 30 is
faster than in the known δ setting, likely due to agents overestimating the
trustworthiness of those they are competing with and accidentally overcom-
pensating in response. Due to the fact that players only have estimates of
each other’s δ, we see some of the gaming which occurs in Figure 3.7: agents
attempt to lower their δ value once they believe they’ve discouraged their
competitors down to lower δ values. Upon learning otherwise they increase
again. However, the time these agents spent with decreased δ values acts as
a signal to their competitors. These competitors then believe that they can
lower their δ value in the same way the original agent did, acting as a new
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Figure 3.11: δ in Karate Club Network, epoch = 100 rounds, k = 2
invitations per round
signal for the original agent. This cycle leads to an oscillation between points
in the range [23, 30] for δ. However, agents’ estimates of their competitors
are accurate enough that they rarely underestimate them badly enough to
drop below this range.
Figure 3.12 illustrates the same setting when players independently up-
date their δ value with probability 1
100
after each round. The behavior is
very similar to that in the previous figure, again showing the attempts at
gamesmanship where agents try to lower δ once they feel they have discour-
aged competition. They also oscillate within a similar range of values for
δ. It is worth noting that for both heuristic update schemes, lexicographic
tie-breaking results in identical behavior to that pictured in Figures 3.11 and
3.12 rather than the sharply cyclical behavior seen in Figure 3.7. This is
likely due to agents not having any ties to break, as the continuous payoff
distribution leads to δji 6= δli for l, j ∈ N1i , even if δj = δl.
Finally, we consider the ego-Facebook network with ki = 3 invitations for
each agent i. The mean δ value is displayed in Figure 3.13, where players
update according to the epoch system. The comparison between Figures 3.9
and 3.13 appears identical to the Figures 3.5 and 3.11. As in Figure 3.13, the
network quickly settles to an average δ value of ≈ 25. Unlike in that figure,
player behavior is closer to that of Figure 3.11, with the majority of players
oscillating in the range [23,30], with some few consistently playing δ ≈ 0.
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Figure 3.12: δ in Karate Club Network with update probability = 1
100
,
k = 2 invitations per round
We see in both networks that competition between agents strongly pushes
them to maintain increasing levels of trustworthiness; this stops only at the
point they are no longer competitive. This increase in trustworthy behavior
is healthy for the system as a whole both when δ is known and when it
is not. When δ = 0 for all players in the karate club network under the
setting considered, the average utility per player per round is 22.792. When
δ is known it is 27.578, when δ is unknown and updates are on an epoch
schedule it is 27.540, and when δ is unknown and updates probabilisticly it
is 27.747. Similarly for the ego-Facebook network, when δ = 0 the average
utility per player per round is 30.905; when δ is known it is 37.750 and when
δ is unknown and updates on an epoch schedule it is 38.297.
3.6 Discussion
In the previous section, there was an increase in trustworthiness which oc-
curred naturally in both social networks. However, we can construct “ar-
tificial” networks in which this does not occur. Consider the 5-star graph
in Figure 3.14: the central vertex does not need to compete to receive in-
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Figure 3.13: Mean δ in Facebook Ego Network, epoch = 100 rounds, k = 2
invitations per round
vitations from the other verteces, as it is their only option. Conversely, for
ki ≤ 4 for the central vertex i, the other verteces must compete to attract the
invitations of the central vertex, and will be forced to maintain a high level
of trustworthiness. For ki ≥ 5 this competition goes away: each non-central
vertex will receive an invite provided the expected utility for the central ver-
tex is positive. In this case all δ values drop to 0. This is an interesting
dynamic, and one which is at play in all networks: by restricting a resource,
in this case the number of invitations which may be issued, agents actually
become more trustworthy in their dealings with each other as behaving oth-
erwise causes a loss of access to the resource. Counter-intuitively, they thus
become more selfish when the resource is abundant, rather than less. This
is particularly apparent in the diad graph in Figure 3.15: each player knows
that it is the other players only option and thus has no need to compete to
attract an invitation. However, the fact that these players do not need to
compete does not mean that both do not stand to benefit from trustworthy
behavior in the long term, merely that it is no longer an attractive option for
myopic agents focused only on the short term. Traditional mechanisms for
repeated games such as as grim trigger and discounted horizon analysis have
been shown to help players avoid such avoid such short-sighted behavior,
which is why we hope to incorporate these techniques into future versions of
our system.
Nonetheless, as we noted previously this behavior does not seem to exist in
naturally occurring social networks. While there are “singleton” verteces in
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Figure 3.14: A 5-star graph Figure 3.15: A diad graph
Figure 3.16: Mean δ by vertex degree in karate club network when k = 10
invitations per round
these networks with only one neighbor who does not need to compete for their
invitation, the desire of these neighbors to attract other invitations keeps the
singleton verteces from being taken advantage of. We therefore conjecture
that this is why humans in social settings generally behave in a trustworthy
and cooperative manner, even when they have the chance to take advantage
of each other. It is only when the model is taken to extremes that we observe
this behavior in social networks: Figure 3.16 illustrates this phenomenon in
Zachary’s karate club network when we let ki = 10 for each agent i, with
all other parameters the same as in Section 3.5. The figure displays the
mean value of δ for all verteces of the same degree, and we see that while
the verteces with fewer neighbors continue to compete for invitations, the
verteces with more neighbors stop competing in order to take advantage of
the invitations they receive, similar to the 5-star graph.
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In addition to the numerical and theoretical results presented and discussed
in this paper, there is still exploration to be done within the model. Empir-
ically, the interactions we examined were strictly nonnegative between any
two agents to avoid computational cost. We expect to see different behavior
if this is changed so that the interactions are only nonnegative in expectation.
This is a reasonable avenue of exploration, as sometimes partnerships may
not work out despite positive expectations. Another interesting setting is
non-uniform interactions between agents. For example, suppose that agent
i provides a better partnership than agent j. How will δi and δj change in
reaction to the utilities each can provide? We expect to see “diva”-like be-
havior in this case, with i displaying a low δi and still attracting many more
partners than j.
3.7 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this chapter we considered pairwise interactions between agents arranged
in a social network. We sought to determine how agents behaved when
they had to compete with each other for interaction opportunities, using
the limited-trust equilibrium to define player interactions. The agents in
the network evolved to display behaviors which mirrored various empirical
findings on human interaction, particularly [39] and [56] from the field of
evolutionary biology. This is particularly notable as agents within this model
were not forward thinking as real humans are: each focused on displaying
a level of trustworthiness which was a best response to that currently being
displayed by other players. Yet despite their lack of foresight or hindsight,
the model motivates agents to behave in a trustworthy fashion without these
considerations or historically-based mechanisms such as Grim Trigger or Tit-
for-Tat.
In addition to empirical results of the model, a thorough mathematical
analysis was presented. Simple learning algorithms were derived allowing
agents to learn about their neighbors through interactions. A process for
agents to update their trustworthiness metric δ based solely on their two-
hop neighborhood within the network was also presented, and a Nash equi-
librium was shown to exist in the δ-selection metagame that agents engage
in. Along with the algorithms and processes which define how agents within
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the network evolve over time, mathematical bounds were also developed for
the expected time for an agents to learn each others’ δ to a given level of
precision. These bounds can be viewed in Appendix B.1.
The model and experiments performed in this paper present a wide array
of options for future research. While we noted that agents need not utilize
mechanisms such as Grim Trigger or Tit-for-Tat in the social networks we
considered, we also saw that limited-trust is not enough to encourage trust-
worthy behavior in the networks in Figures 3.14 and 3.15. Therefore, it will
be interesting to incorporate these long standing concepts into the social net-
work model proposed here. We believe that doing so will allow our model to
more accurately represent interactions in smaller communities which run the
risk of exhibiting the behaviors discussed, such as diades.
We are also interested in incorporating historical data more generally into
the decision making process. Individuals who interact frequently are more
likely to have an established relationship. They are thus less likely to switch
partners if the utility increase is minor. Another way to incorporate historical
data is based on past utility earned. Agents who do well are able to increase
the number of interactions they can initiate per round. Changes to network
structure based on past behavior is a related topic: edges may wither if
unused, or new edges may appear from an agent i to an agent j if the two
have a mutual neighbor l whom both interact with frequently.
One final area of interest is how agents behave with unknown network
structure. Consider the case in which an agent i is only aware of its one-hop
neighborhood N i1, and cannot know for certain its two-hop neighborhood
when updating δi. We would like to develop methods for i to estimate the




It is our hope that the wider research community is as excited by this work
as we are. In order to make it easier for interested researchers to explore this
setting, we have made a portion of our code publicly available on Github at
https://github.com/kzr-soze/SocialNetworkGames. This repository is
written in Python3 and contains the class file which can be used to generate
a network and track player behavior, as well as demo scripts to show its






INEFFICIENCY DUE TO SELFISHNESS
This chapter is based on work which has been accepted for publication in
IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering.
4.1 Introduction
Previously in this dissertation, we considered agents who did not behave in
a completely selfish manner. In this chapter, we return to the traditional
assumption of selfishness and instead focus on policies to mitigate the effects
of this selfishness from the perspective of a game’s organizer.
Team Orienteering Problems (TOPs) began as outdoor games: players
arrive in the woods and are equipped with compasses, maps, and instructions
for finding checkpoints, and must visit as many checkpoints as possible within
a given time limit. These games have a natural link to the classical Vehicle
Routing Problem (VRP), but are distinct from the VRP in that it may
not be possible to visit all checkpoints; the players must decide where they
should go in order to collect the maximum number of points given that not
all checkpoints are equal. The TOP is NP-hard even in the single agent case;
see [59].
The TOP arises naturally in logistics as an extension of the VRP: direct-
to-customer shipping companies must decide which of their orders should
be filled today rather than tomorrow when it is infeasible to fill all orders,
and retail companies must determine which outlets need to be resupplied
immediately to maintain positive inventory and which can wait until next
week. Fittingly for such an important problem, it has been well-studied and
heuristics have been proposed with empirically satisfying results (more on
this in Section 4.1.1).
The situation which we were interested in modeling as a TOP is an Un-
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manned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or drone Intelligence Surveillance and Recon-
naissance (ISR) network. However, we found that the traditional TOP setup
could not realistically model this scenario: TOP problems assume centralized
solutions or communication between teammates, as all are working toward
a common goal. This is not a realistic assumption for a drone intelligence-
gathering network, particularly in an adversarial setting where incoming and
outgoing communications may be observed or denied by jamming, and team
members may be out of communication with the central authority for ex-
tended periods of time. Agents may be aware of their teammates’ locations
through passive sensing techniques such as visual detection but are unable or
unwilling to communicate more actively by broadcasting information. There-
fore, we consider a natural approach to this problem, allowing each team
member to act as an independent agent seeking to maximize its own score.
By reasoning about their fellow agents’ locations, agents attempting to max-
imize their own scores will naturally try to minimize their overlap. We des-
ignate this setting as the Prize-Collecting Multi-Agent Orienteering Problem
(PCMOP), a new variation on the TOP. The PCMOP is distinct from the
Multiagent Orienteering Problem (MOP) formulated by [30] as prizes can
be collected by only one agent, with rules regarding which agent may collect
them determined by a policy over the game. More detail on these distinctions
will be given in Section 4.1.1. We propose three such policies to determine
how prizes can be distributed among the agents, and examine the resulting
total prize collection. We consider the equilibria resulting from our policies
on different graphs such as general, undirected, and directed acyclic, and
calculate the theoretical Price of Anarchy (PoA) related to them as a mea-
sure of the maximum inefficiency of these equilibria compared to a centrally
coordinated optimal solution. The goal of the fleet operator is to have agents
collect a maximum value set of prizes through the selection of an appropriate
policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the following subsection
comprises an in-depth literature review of work related to the traditional
TOP, as well as the few papers which address situations with self-interested
agents. Section 4.2 details the setting of our problem, and provides a full
description of the three policies we propose and examine. In §4.3, we analyze
our policies for different network types for 2 agents and develop tight bounds
on the PoA for each policy, as well as an extension to the result on the
73
PoA of simultaneous games over valid utility systems [2], showing that they
display a PoA of at most 2. In §4.4, we repeat the analysis for an arbitrary
number of players k. In §4.5, we develop methods for solving the Stackelberg
games resulting from each of our proposed prize-division policies. In §4.6,
we numerically analyze on test cases by generating approximate R2 and R2
planar networks. In §4.7, we present a summary and discussion of our results.
A full summary of our theoretical results is given in Table 4.2 organized by
network type, policy type, number of players, range of players, and whether
players represent a homogeneous fleet (the details of the policies are defined
in §4.2).
4.1.1 Literature Review
As mentioned in the introduction, the TOP is well-studied and several heuris-
tic and exact solution approaches have been proposed and empirically tested
in papers such as [59–66]. [67] performs an in-depth analysis of the single-
agent case. [68] examines the applicability of the TOP to drone-related mil-
itary situations and [69] addresses a UAV variant in which each prize is
information, and depending on UAV configuration a single agent may only
collect certain types of information from each location. Additionally, [70] ad-
dresses the problem of managing a UAV fleet in a communication denied area
where time to complete actions and the reward for doing so are uncertain.
Many works, such as [71–78], propose frameworks and algorithms for co-
ordination of UAV fleets in different settings, such as combating wildfires,
surveillance, and target removal, and do so under both online and a priori
knowledge settings.
Another work somewhat closely related to ours is [30], which formulates
and addresses the MOP, and relies on a game-theoretic framework for anal-
ysis. In particular, a node i with a prize pi takes time ti to deliver that
prize to any player who visits it. The node i can only service ki players at
a time, leading to a queue if more than ki players are present. However,
while the number of players who may receive a prize at once on a node is a
limiting condition, once an earlier player leaves, the next queued player can
still receive a prize. This game models theme-park or tourist routing situ-
ations, in which players want to visit the most attractions with the fewest
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lines, but does not adapt to the situation of limited prizes which we con-
sider, necessitating our PCMOP model. However, the work from which this
paper most draws inspiration is the recent article [79], which considers the
problem of area surveillance with self-interested agents. In it, two or more
UAVs greedily consider choosing routes for the next l time-steps. Addition-
ally, different types of information/prizes are available at each site, which
can only be collected by a specific UAV if it has the appropriate sensor type
(audio, video, thermal, etc.). The sensors have varying levels of effectiveness
so that some portion of the collectible information type is captured and the
residual information of that type may be collected by another UAV. How-
ever, there are two fundamental differences between [79] and our work: [79]
considers simultaneous movements in the game, while our paper considers
variations on leader-follower strategies. We will see in Sections 4.3 and 4.4
that the leader-follower setting introduces several new complications. Ad-
ditionally, [79] focuses on games over spacial grid graphs, while we consider
games over more general networks.
The proposed PCMOP model has the following similarities with congestion
games [80]: both consist of multiple self-interested agents attempting to get
from source to destination. However, congestion games focus on the edges
of the graph as the source of the delay, while the PCMOP focuses on the
nodes of the graph as the locations of prizes. Further, unlike in a congestion
game where each player of the same type traveling along an edge experiences
the same delay, variations on the prize collecting problems provide inherently
unequal payoffs as prizes can only be collected by one individual. However,
the two classes of games are similar enough that we look to similar tools in
order to analyze them: [81,82] and [83] all describe variations on Stackelberg
(leader-follower) strategies for player decision-making in the congestion game
which we consider in our analysis of the PCMOP. In this paper, we focus on
a Stackelberg setting in which a pure equilibrium is guaranteed to exist,
as opposed to the simultaneous setting (meaning that both players choose
their routes simultaneously rather than in leader-follower ordering) in which
a PNE does not necessarily exist; see Lemma 4. However, a leader-follower
setting also introduces complications to decision-making and analysis, which
we detail in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
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4.2 Setting
A Prize-Collecting Multi-Agent Orienteering Problem is defined by a graph
G(V,E,R) and agents P (D,S, T ) where |P (D,S, T )|= k is the number of
agents. Here,
• V := the set of vertices/nodes in the network, |V |= n.
• E := the set of directed or undirected edges in the graph. Edge e has
a nonnegative length le.
• R := the set of prizes at each vertex.
• D := the set of maximum distances each player can travel before they
must reach their destination.
• S := the set of source nodes for each player, i.e. where they begin their
route.
• T := the set of terminal nodes for each player, i.e. where they must
end their route.
• Σ := the set of strategy spaces of each player, with Σi the set of mixed
strategies of player i; a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over
the pure strategies, which in this context are the set of all paths from
si to ti.
We consider positive edge lengths and non-negative prizes as we are con-
cerned primarily with the drone surveillance network use-case, and a graph
network is a convenient abstraction from the R2 setting that prizes (areas
of interest for surveillance) are likely to be in. Graphs can be constructed
as a grid network, or solely as edges between the prize locations (nodes)
depending on operator preference.
We consider the general case of this problem, where player sources, termi-
nals, and maximum distances may vary, although traversal speed is assumed
to be equal for all players. However, special consideration will also be given to
the case of a homogeneous fleet, in which each player has the same maximum
distance d, a common source S, and a common terminal T . We will consider
the homogeneous case specifically due to its relation to our underlying use
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case: operators of a fleet of surveillance drones will likely have a homoge-
neous fleet, and may well be operating from the same origin/destination
(si = sj, ti = tj ∀i, j). A natural question for a manager or fleet comman-
der in this setting is how to deploy its agents such that the inefficiency due
to agent selfishness is minimized. That is, the manager wants its agents to
collect a set of prizes so that the net value of prizes collected by all agents
is maximized. This is in contrast to the agents, who want to collect as set
of prizes of maximum value for themselves. We will consider three potential
deployment policies.
4.2.1 Policies to explore
We propose and explore the efficiencies of three natural policies. We assume
an arbitrary ordering of the players 1, 2, ..., k to indicate turn-ordering in a
leader-follower setting. We believe both the policies and the ordering to be
natural to large organizations, which frequently display hierarchies based on
seniority (e.g., nurses or flight attendants picking schedules). The policies
are:
1. Reserved path policy: A player i declares its path from si to ti. All
prizes it claims cannot be picked up by another player j > i, even if j
arrives first.
2. Unreserved path policy (priority for ties): A player i declares its path
from si to ti, and may not deviate from it. If another player j with
lesser priority (i.e., j > i in the ordering) arrives at a node first, j
collects the prize. If both i and j arrive simultaneously, i collects the
prize in its entirety and j receives nothing.
3. Turn-based policy: Players take turns moving through the network one
node at a time. This corresponds to players moving simultaneously
through the network but only having to commit to the next node,
rather than their whole route. In the event that two players i and j > i
arrive at a node simultaneously, i collects the prize in its entirety and
j receives nothing.
We use the term “full-path” policies to refer to the reserved and unre-
served path policies, as each player i’s strategy set consists of full paths from
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si to ti. Additionally, we assume that agents are not capable of waiting in
a single location, i.e. choosing not to move, as areas which need constant
surveillance will have permanent cameras installed. However, waiting can be
easily incorporated by adding a self-loop on each node in the network. Wait-
ing will only occur in the turn-based policy though, as it is sub-optimal in
the reserved and unreserved path policies. We choose these policies because,
due to the successive manner in which players choose their moves, each can
be considered an instance of a Stackelberg game in which players take turns
selecting their strategies, and the actions of earlier players can be observed
by later players. This guarantees the existence of a pure equilibrium. While
Stackelberg defined the equilibrium for games of 2-players, the concept can
be generalized to k players. More formally:
Definition 10. A k-player leader-follower (Stackelberg) game with a leader-
follower ordering of players {1, 2, ..., k} is said to display a pure Stackleberg
equilibrium when no deviation by player i will result in a higher payoff for
player i, taking into account the changes that players i + 1 through k will
make to their strategies in response.
We adopt this k-player extension of the Stackelberg equilibrium from [84].
Lemma 3. Any k-player full-knowledge leader-follower game displays a pure
equilibrium provided the maximum total number of strategy decisions for the
game is finite and players have a fixed rule for breaking ties between strategies
with equivalent payoffs.
Proof. Consider player k, the last player to move. Player k must pick the
strategy which benefits it the most with full knowledge of the strategies
chosen by the first k − 1 players. Therefore, the choice which maximizes its
payoff given those strategies is a pure equilibrium choice. In the event of an
equal maximal payoff between multiple strategies, player k picks according
to the fixed tie-breaking rule. Player k − 1 can predict exactly how player k
will react to its own strategy and has full knowledge of the first k−2 players.
The use of a fixed-rule for choosing between ties ensures this. Therefore,
the choice which maximizes its payoff given those strategies and player k’s
response is a pure equilibrium choice. Similarly, player i knows the strategy
choices of the first i − 1 players, and can predict how player i + 1, and by
extension all players after it, will react to its own strategy. Thus, picking the
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strategy which maximizes i’s payoff given the chosen strategies and coming
(predictable) reactions is a pure equilibrium for i. Therefore, under this
policy, every player has a pure equilibrium choice regardless of what the
previous players did.
We note that we require the maximum total number of choices made to
be finite, not the total number of choices available: On an undirected graph,
an agent with infinite range has an infinite number of routes, as it may cycle
indefinitely. However, it has only a finite, albeit exponentially large in |E|,
number of routes it should consider as cycling will not result in any increase
in payoff. We note that when each agent i has finite range di ∈ D, this is
not a problem as there are only a finite number of choices available. With
non-finite di we resolve this issue by assuming that given two strategies with
equal payoff from the same set of nodes, an agent will pick the one corre-
sponding to a shorter route (i.e. avoiding needless cycling). This removes
the possibility of non-terminating routes in the reserved and unreserved path
policies. However, it does become a problem in the turn-based policy when
agents have unrestricted range, as it may result in non-terminating routes.
Theorem 13 shows this in more detail. We also note that having an agent
with non-finite range is not feasible in our motivating use case, but we believe
it important to consider how agents behave in extreme settings.
While the term PoA traditionally refers to the ratio of the optimal centrally
coordinated solution to the worst Nash equilibrium when discussing utility
maximization games, we will use it here to refer to the ratio of the optimal
centrally coordinated solution to the worst Stackelberg equilibrium where




is the centrally coordinated solution. It is also standard practice to denote
the PoA of a set of games G as the supremum of the PoAs of the games
in the set, PoA(G) = supg∈G PoA(g). Finally, we will be interested in two
specific fixed tie-breaking rules in this paper, Goodwill and Sadism. The
rule of Goodwill will limit or reduce some of the performance inefficiencies of
our three policies, and the corresponding rule of Sadism will increase these
inefficiencies.
Definition 11. A player i is said to display goodwill to a player j if, given
a set of strategies Σi all resulting in equal (maximal) payoff for i, player i
picks the one which allows j to achieve the maximum payoff.
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Definition 12. A player i is said to display sadism to a player j if, given
a set of strategies Σi all resulting in equal (maximal) payoff for i, player i
picks the one which forces j to achieve the minimum payoff.
Under any fixed rule which fails to break a tie, we assume that the player
choosing makes its choice according to some second arbitrary rule, such as a
lexicographic ordering of routes, which will not fail.
Another policy to consider would be one of simultaneous route picking, in
which each agent simultaneously picks its entire route and proceeds through
the network, collecting any prizes it comes across first. However, we have
largely neglected to explore this policy because it does not necessarily possess
a PNE as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Consider a 2-player game in which both players simultaneously
pick their entire routes and split any prizes they arrive at simultaneously
according to some fixed proportion λ ∈ [0, 1]. This game does not necessarily
contain a PNE.
Proof. We show this by a counter-example. Consider the network in Figure
4.1. There are 3 routes between S and T : ABC, AC, and D. The value
underneath each node label is the prize associated with that node, i.e. node
C has a prize of 2 − 4ε, where 0 < ε  1. Players are identical: both start
from S and go to T , with d1 = d2 ≥ 4 and le = 1 for all edges e ∈ E . If
both players arrive simultaneously at a node, player 1 receives λ ∈ [0, 1] of
the prize and player 2 receives µ = (1 − λ). Due to the small number of
routes, we construct the payoff matrix for both players picking their entire
route simultaneously in Table 4.1, where player 1 is the row player and player
2 is the column player. There is no value λ ∈ [0, 1] in which causes a cell in
the matrix to be a PNE.
Table 4.1: Payoff matrix for a full-route simultaneous game on Figure 4.1
Route ABC AC D
ABC λ(3− 2ε), µ(3− 2ε) 1 + (1 + λ)ε, 2− (3 + λ)ε 3− 2ε, 1 + 2ε
AC 2− (4− λ)ε, (2− λ)ε λ(2− 3ε), µ(2− 3ε) 2− 3ε, 1 + 2ε
D 1 + 2ε, 3− 2ε 1 + 2ε, 2− 3ε λ(1 + 2ε), µ(1 + 2ε)
We conclude this section with a compilation of our theoretical results,
presented in Table 4.2. We use e to represent Euler’s number, ≈ 2.718, as e












Figure 4.1: Network with no pure Nash equilibrium for a 2-Player full-route
simultaneous game
4.3 Results: The 2-Player PCMOP
We now provide the proofs of the results for 2-player games.
4.3.1 The General 2-Player PCMOP
Before providing results related to the PoAs of the reserved and unreserved
path policies, we first revisit the idea of simultaneous games under these
full-path policies. Lemma 4 shows that a PNE may not exist in all games
for this setting. Therefore, we now derive PoA bounds under mixed Nash
equilibrium, which is guaranteed to exist [1], and we show that the PoA
under the reserved and unreserved path policies is at most 2. We will do so
by drawing upon the concept of a valid utility system from [2].
A utility system is defined with the following structure: Non-cooperative
agents whose action spaces are subsets of an underlying groundset make
decisions which induce some social utility, measured by a set function on
the actions taken. The agents attempt to maximize their own private utility
rather than the social utility. Additionally, the following three conditions
hold:
1. The social utility function u and the private utility functions ui are
measured in the same standard unit.
2. The social utility set-function u is submodular. Mathematically, for
A ⊆ B and x /∈ B, we have u(A ∪ {x})− u(A) ≥ u(B ∪ {x})− u(B).
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Table 4.2: PoA Bounds for studied policies on different network types
Homogeneous Fleet General Fleet
































































1∗ 1∗ 1∗ 1∗
Unreserved
Path
1∗ 1∗ 1∗ 1∗
Turn-Based 1∗ 1∗ 1∗ 1∗
* Bound is tight
† Non-Terminating
3. The private utility of an agent i is at least the change in social utility
which would occur if the agent did not participate in the game. For
a strategy set σ and σ−i, the actions of all other agents, we have that
ui(σ) ≥ u(σ)− u(σ−i).
A utility system is valid if and only if
4.
∑k
i=1 ui(σ) ≤ u(σ) for all strategy profiles σ.
[2] shows that any game over a valid utility system has a PoA of at most 2.
Theorem 9. Any simultaneous game under the reserved or unreserved path
policies has a PoA of at most 2.
Proof. This proof will proceed by showing that in the simultaneous setting,
the game under the reserved and unreserved path policies is a game over a
valid utility system, as defined in [2]. This is sufficient, as [2] also shows that
any k-player game over a valid utility system has a PoA of at most 2.
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1. The social utility function and player utility functions are both mea-
sured in the same units: the value of the prizes collected.
2. The social utility function is submodular. To see this, suppose we have
two sets of player paths, S and S ′ such that S ⊆ S ′. For some path
p, we have that u(S ∪ {p})− u(S) ≥ u(S ′ ∪ {p})− u(S ′) as the set of
prizes on p which are uncollected in S ′ must be a subset of the set of
prizes on p which are uncollected in S.
3. Private utility of each player is at least as much as the change in the
social utility if that player was not present and all other players played
the same strategy: The change in the social utility from player i being
present is exactly the value of the prizes which are on its path pi and
not any of the other paths p−i, and player i receives at least this set of
prizes under both policies.
4. The sum of the players’ private utilities is at most the value of the
social utility function. This is equivalent to saying
∑k
i=1 ui(S) ≤ u(S)
for any set of paths S. Here the social utility is defined to be the value
of all prizes obtained which means that
∑k
i=1 ui(S) = u(S).
This completes our proof.
Next, we provide an extension of [2]’s proof to show that any 2-player
Stackelberg equilibrium over a valid utility system also has a PoA of at most
2 when the social and private utility functions are ui(S−i ∪ ∅i) = 0 for all
S−i ∈ Σ−i for all players i. Here ∅i is equivalent to player i taking no action.
Theorem 10. Given a 2-player leader-follower game over a valid utility
system in which
∑2
i=1 ui(S) = u(S) and ui(∅i) = 0, the PoA is at most 2.
Proof. This will be proven by constructing a new simultaneous game in
which there is a PNE equivalent to the leader-follower equilibrium, then
showing that the setting over which the new game is played is still a valid
utility system. Let Sst = {sst1 , sst2 } be the Stackelberg equilibrium. Define
BR2(s1) = arg maxs2∈Σ2 u2(s1, s2) as the second player’s best response to the
first player playing s1. We next introduce a new pure strategy ∗2 for player
2, where u1(s1, ∗2) = u1(s1, BR2(s1)) and u2(s1, ∗2) = u2(s1, BR2(s1)) for all
s1 ∈ Σ1. Thus playing ∗2 is equivalent to player 2 playing its best response
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to s1 after observing s1. Because ∗2 is the best response to every pure strat-
egy s1, it is also the best response to every mixed strategy σ1. ∗2 is thus a
(possibly weakly) dominant strategy for player 2, and therefore there exists
at least one PNE {sst1 , ∗2}. This equilibrium is equivalent to the Stackelberg
equilibrium Sst. As an example, consider playing the simultaneous prize-
collecting game over the network in Figure 4.1 under the unreserved policy:
After the introduction of ∗2 there is a pure equilibrium of (AC, ∗2), which is
equivalent to the Stackelberg equilibrium of (AC,D).
Next, we show that the new game still represents a game over a valid
utility system as defined by [2]. As the original game was over a valid utility
system, we only need to consider what happens when the second player plays
∗2. However, we first note that if player i takes action si and player −i takes
no action, then u(si) = u(si,∅−i) = ui(si,∅−i)+u−i(si,∅−i) = ui(si,∅−i) =
ui(si).
1. The social utility and players’ personal utilities are still measured in
the same units. This is because the original game was over a valid
utility system, and the utility functions have not changed with the
introduction of ∗2.
2. The private utility each player receives is at least as much as the change
in social utility from their action. To demonstrate this, we must show
u2(s1, ∗2) ≥ u(s1, ∗2) − u(s1) and u1(s1, ∗2) ≥ u(s1, ∗2) − u(∗2) where
s1 is any action taken by player 1. u2(s1, ∗2) ≥ u(s1, ∗2)−u(s1) follows
from the fact that the original game was over a valid utility system and
playing ∗2 is equivalent to playing BR2(s1), player 2’s best response to
s1. For the second, let s2 = BR2(s1) be the second player’s best re-
sponse to s1 and let s
′
2 = BR2(∅1) be player 2’s best action when under
no competition. Clearly u(s′2) = u2(s
′
2) ≥ u2(s2) = u(s2). Therefore,
u1(s1, ∗2) = u1(s1, s2) ≥ u(s1, s2)− u(s2)
≥ u(s1, s2)− u(s′2)
= u(s1, ∗2)− u(∗2).
3. The social utility function is submodular. To show this, we note there
are only two players and show that u(∗2)−u(∅) ≥ u(s1, ∗2)−u(s1) and
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u(s1) − u(∅) ≥ u(s1, ∗2) − u(∗2). The first follows from the fact that
the original game was over a valid utility system: adding ∗2 to the set
is equivalent to adding s2 = BR2(s1), player 2’s best response to s1, on
the right hand side. On the left hand side, it is equivalent to adding s′2 =
BR2(∅1), player 2’s best action when under no competition. Therefore
u(∗2)− u(∅) = u(s′2) = u2(s′2)
≥ u2(s2)
= u(s2)
≥ u(s1, s2)− u(s1)
= u(s1, ∗2)− u(s1),
where u2(s
′
2) ≥ u2(s2) was established in the previous point. For the
second, from the original game we know that u(s1) ≥ u(s1, s2)− u(s2).
We also know u(s2) ≤ u(s′s) which implies
u(s1)− u(∅) ≥ u(s1, s2)− u(s2)
≥ u(s1, s2)− u(s′2)
= u(s1, ∗2)− u(∗2).
4.
∑2
i=1 ui(S) ≤ u(S). As we have assumed
∑2
i=1 ui(S) = u(S), and the
utility functions have not changed with the introduction of ∗2, this is
true.
This completes the proof.
It is immediately apparent that Theorems 9 and 10 together imply an
upper bound of 2 on the PoA of 2-player games under the unreserved path
policy. In Theorem 12 we will show that this bound is tight.
Lemma 5. The PoA in the general k-Player setting under the reserved path
policy is at most 2.
Proof. Theorem 9 demonstrates that in the simultaneous setting, the k-
Player game under the reserved path policy represents a game over a valid
utility system. Therefore, [2] implies that under the simultaneous setting,
the game has a PoA of at most 2. We make the observation that under the
reserved path policy, the leader-follower and simultaneous games are equiv-












Figure 4.2: Network With PoA of 2 under reserved and unreserved path
policies
the actions of player i, as i can also ignore all players with less “seniority”
than it has, even in the simultaneous setting. Therefore, the reserved path
policy has a PoA of at most 2 in the general setting, as it is equivalent to a
simultaneous game over a valid utility system. Figure 4.2 shows this bound
to be tight using k = 2 players: The first player will go to B and the second
will go to C before continuing to t1 and t2, respectively. A total of 1 + 2ε in
prizes will be collected, when the centrally coordinated solution would collect
a total of 2 in prizes, from nodes A and B.
4.3.2 The Homogeneous 2-Player PCMOP
Previously, we considered the most general form of the 2-Player PCMOP.
Now we consider the homogeneous fleet PCMOP, where si = sj = S, ti =
tj = T , and di = dj = d. We refer to such a setting as a homogeneous
game and we will see that although the PoA for the 2-player game under the
unreserved path policy remains 2, the PoA for the reserved path policy will
be reduced to 4
3
.
In order to prove several of our results in this section, we first let A[i]
denote the total value of the prizes that are on the routes planned by players
1 through i. We let A∗[k] denote the total value of the prizes collected by
k players in the optimal centrally coordinated solution. We will typically
normalize A∗[k] = 1 when proving theorems.
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Lemma 6. In a k-player homogeneous game in which players 1 through i
have planned their routes to collect a total of A[i] prizes, there is a path
containing at least 1
k
(A∗[k] − A[i]) prizes which none of the first i players will
collect in the unreserved and reserved path policies.
Proof. If the first i players have set their routes so that their paths contain
a set of prizes valued at A[i] in total, then the optimal paths of the k players
must still retain at least (A∗[k] − A[i]) in ignored prizes. There are k optimal
paths, so at least one must contain a set of prizes with minimum value of
1
k
(A∗[k] − A[i]) which is non-overlapping with the set of prizes in the first i
players’ paths.
Theorem 11. Under the reserved path Policy, the PoA of 2-player homoge-
neous games has a tight upper bound of 4
3
.
Proof. Lemma 6 directly provides an upper bound of 4
3
on the PoA: If we
normalize A∗[2] = 1, the value of the prizes collected by two players in the
centrally coordinated solution, there is a path containing a1 ≥ 12 in prizes
which the first player collects. With that in mind, the Lemma then shows
there is a path containing a2 ≥ 12(1−a1) in uncollected prizes which is taken
by the second player, as it cannot steal any prizes from the first player. The
total collected is a1 +a2 ≥ 34 . We show this bound is tight by example, using
the network in Figure 4.3. The network displays a PoA of 4
3
, so this is a
tight bound for the reserved path policy in a directed acyclic, and therefore
general, graph: In the figure, the first player will maximize its payoff by going
to the two nodes containing prizes of 1 + ε, leaving the second player able
to collect only one of the remaining prizes. We also show it to be tight on
an undirected graph with restricted range d using the same example. We do
so by setting the range to d = 3 and changing the edges in Figure 4.3 to be
undirected. Player 1 again collects the two 1 + ε prizes and Player 2 again
collects only one of the two remaining prizes. Therefore, the PoA is 4
3
, so
this is a tight bound for undirected graphs with limited range as well.
Theorem 12. Under the unreserved path Policy, the PoA of 2-player homo-
geneous games has a tight upper bound of 2.
Proof. Theorems 9 and 10 together imply that in the general 2-player game
the unreserved path policy has a PoA of at most 2 for all networks. Now we
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Figure 4.3: Network with a 2-Player PoA of 4
3
under the reserved path
Policy
show by example that this bound is tight for identical 2-player games: Figure
4.4 demonstrates a PoA of 2 on a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and hence
a general graph, with the first player choosing B → C → T and the second
choosing C → T . If the network in the figure is undirected and each player
has a maximum range of 4, then the first player again chooses B → C → T
while the second player now chooses C → T → E → T . Thus the bound of
2 also applies to undirected networks with limited range.
Figure 4.4: Network with a 2-Player PoA of 2 for Turn-Based and
Unreserved Policies
Thus far we have not addressed the turn-based policy. This is because
even in the 2-player setting it must be considered as an extensive-form game,
something which we can avoid in the reserved and unreserved path policies.
Therefore, most of our work with the turn-based path policy is presented in
Sections 4.5 and 4.6, as an empirical study. However, we will at this time
provide one theoretical result:
Theorem 13. Under the turn-based policy, the Price of Anarchy for a k-
player homogeneous game may be unbounded for an arbitrary fixed tie-breaking
rule.
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Proof. This will be a proof by example using a game with k = 2. Suppose
there is a bound r on the PoA of turn-based games in general graphs. We
will construct a game which has a PoA greater than this. Consider the graph
in Figure 4.5 and a 2-player game where each player has range d = r+ 3 and
the directed ring of 1-prize nodes is of length greater than 2(r + 1). There
are directed edges from both A and B to every node in the ring, and every
ring node also has a directed edge going to T. Centrally coordinated, each
player should move to one of the staging nodes (A and B) and then move
to the ring in such a way that they can each collect r + 1 + ε prizes before
moving to T, resulting in 2(r + 1 + ε) prizes collected in total.
Now we consider the game when each player displays sadism toward the
other. After both players’ initial moves, each will be at A or B. Without
loss of generality, assume player 1 is at A and player 2 is at B. The first
player must decide whether to go to B or go to one of the nodes on the ring.
If it goes to one of the nodes on the ring, the first player will collect a prize
of one and the second player, being sadistic, will move directly in front of it
resulting in the first player obtaining 1 + ε prizes. The first player is able to
do this at any point, as the second player cannot collect all the ring prizes,
so it obtains the same value in prizes by waiting. Additionally, it knows that
the second player will not venture into the ring and so will reduce the number
of prizes it can collect. Because the first player is sadistic, it therefore moves
to B. The second player is then faced with the same choice and, as it is also
sadistic, it moves from B to A. The two players cycle back and forth until
each has two moves left, then each will visit one ring node before proceeding




Note that Theorem 13 only implies that an arbitrarily chosen fixed tie-
breaking rule may have an unbounded PoA, not that every fixed tie-breaking
rule has one.
Note that as this result applies to homogeneous games, it also applies to
the more general PCMOP setting. It is also worth noting that in the setting
described in the proof of Theorem 13, if both players have infinite range they
may cycle indefinitely, and the game will not terminate.
Despite the lack of formal theoretical bounds on the performance of the
turn-based policy, we show in Section 4.6 that empirically it results in a
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Figure 4.5: Network with an unbounded 2-Player PoA for Turn-Based
Policy
lower average PoA across nearly all tested problem classes and sizes than the
unreserved policy.
4.4 The k-Player PCMOP Game
We now wish to consider the PCMOP with an arbitrary number of players k.
For the k-player game, we confine our discussion to the homogeneous setting.
From Lemma 5, we know the k-player reserved path policy has a PoA
of at most 2, and that bound is tight. However, Theorem 11 shows the
bound improves to 4
3
in 2-player homogeneous games, leading to the following
Theorem:
Theorem 14. Under the reserved path Policy, the Price of Anarchy for
homogeneous k-player games has a tight upper bound of k
k
kk−(k−1)k , with a
limit of ee−1 as k →∞.
Proof. Suppose A∗[k] = 1. Using Lemma 6 we know that the first player
captures prizes with a value of a1 ≥ 1k . The second player captures prizes
with a minimum value of a2 ≥ 1k (1 − a1) after player 1 plays, so players
1 and 2 together capture prizes with a minimum value of 2k−1
k2
. Table 4.3
shows the results of continuing this line of reasoning. We next show that
















of what they optimally could. Now consider player
90



























We then have A[i+1] = A[i] + ai+1, and note that the minimum value of A[i+1]
can occur only if the minimum value of A[i] occurred (and thus we have the
maximum guarantee on the value of ai+1) as an increase of δ to A[i] results
in a decrease of only δ
k
to the guaranteed minimum of ai+1. Thus






































. As k →∞, we have
lim
k→∞
















= 1− e−1 = e
e− 1
.
We can show that this is a tight lower (upper) bound on the efficiency (PoA)
of the reserved path policy by constructing examples of networks with these
efficiencies (PoAs). We do so by creating a graph with k parallel paths of
length kk−1 and add edges in a way so that each player collects the minimum
it is guaranteed, and visits all paths. Figure 4.3 displays this PoA of 4
3
for
k = 2, and Figure 4.6 displays a PoA of 19
27
for k = 3, but due to exponential
size of these graphs in k we have not provided images here for k ≥ 4.
We now consider the unreserved path policy. From Theorem 9, we know
that the k-player game under the unreserved path policy represents a game
over a valid utility system when played simultaneously. Therefore, we know
that in the simultaneous setting the PoA of the k-player game is at most 2.
However, we do not have a theorem concerning the PoA of k-player leader-
follower games over valid utility systems. Because of this, we establish a
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Table 4.3: Reserved Path Bounds



























Figure 4.6: Network with a 3-Player PoA of 19
27
for all policies
loose bound on the PoA of the unreserved path policy.
Lemma 7. Under the unreserved path Policy, the Price of Anarchy for a
k-player homogeneous game on a general graph is less than or equal to k
2
k−1 .
Proof. We will normalize A∗[k] = 1. Consider the case where k − 1 players
have laid out their routes and collected a total of A[k−1]. If A[k−1] ≥ 1k then












uncollected prizes, so we know that the kth player will
collect at least this many.
Lemma 8. Under all policies on an undirected graph with unlimited range,
the general game has a PoA of 1.
Proof. The reserved path policy is trivial: The first player will plot the short-
est route which visits all nodes and collect all prizes. The unreserved path
policy is similarly easy: The first player must plot a path which ultimately
ends at t1, as must the second player and so on. If by the time player k must
select its route, there are still prizes which will remain uncollected, then
player k will make sure to obtain all of them before terminating at tk. The
turn-based policy is slightly more difficult: Each player has determined its
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entire route prior to making its first move. Each infinite route is dominated
by a finite route (unlike in the directed cyclic case seen in Figure 4.5) because
after some time, none of the routes plan to collect anymore prizes. Since all
players plan to end at ti in a finite number of turns, some player i plans
to finish last. i will not move to T until all remaining prizes are collected,
because range is unlimited and the undirected graph has full bi-directional
connectivity between all collectible prize nodes.
In the case where the graph has disconnected components, each component
represents its own subgame where the above scenarios play out.
4.5 Solution Methods
Having introduced the PCMOP and providing theoretical analysis of the
PoA under our three policies in Sections 4.2 through 4.4, we next develop
solution methodologies to solve a 2-player games with integer length edges.
This section illustrates how to solve a game for each policy on directed acyclic
graphs, beginning with an integer program formulation for the original TOP.
Formulating the TOP is necessary for two reasons: First, to measure the PoA
of a given problem to compare to our theoretical bounds, we must compute
the optimal solution to the TOP. Second, all of our policy solution methods
incorporate the TOP formulation as a helper function. Our reserved path
solution method uses the TOP formulation repeatedly to iteratively construct
each player’s path, the solution method for the unreserved path approach uses
it to iterate over multiple high value paths and expands it to compute best
responses for the second player to the first player’s path, and our solution
method for the turn-based policy, which iterates over the game tree, will use
the TOP formulation to avoid non-optimal leaves in the tree. All algorithms
will be discussed in depth in the remainder of this section, with pseudocode
for each provided in Appendix C.1.
TOP Formulation: We begin by formulating the TOP because each of our
solution methods will either build on it or solve the formulation as a helper
method. We model the problem as an Integer Program patterned on the
integer-valued flow-conservation formulation given in [85], given here as IP1
in Appendix C.1. xmij is binary to indicate whether agent m traversed edge
(i, j), zi ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the prize at node i is collected, lij is
93
the length of an edge, and r is the common maximum range for all players.
Finally, dj = 0 except for d1 = 1, dn = −1 to establish the flow conservation
constraints, and ci is the value of the prize at node i.
Reserved Path Analysis: The reserved path policy is the simplest policy
to derive a solution for. Because each player does not need to be concerned
with the actions of any later player, each need only solve a single-player
orienteering problem where the prizes that earlier players will collect are set
to zero. Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 3 in Appendix C.1, where SolveIP1
is a helper function which solves the integer program formulation (IP1) of
the TOP presented in the previous subsection.
Unreserved Path Analysis: Given the complexity of this problem, we only
consider the two-player game. We consider the unreserved path as a two-stage
game tree. While the players may no longer be able to observe each other
after they begin moving through the network, each is required to declare its
path prior to setting out. However, for a directed acyclic graph of n nodes
there may be as many as 2n−2 paths going from node 1 to node n, meaning
the tree may have as many as 22(n−2) leaf nodes. To reduce computation
time we make the following observation: if the first player has found a path
that gives v in prizes after the second player makes its best response, then
any path containing less than v total prizes must be strictly worse for the
first player than the path it has already found. Thus we can order the paths
in the network according to the value of their prizes and stop searching
paths once their value drops below the current best value v that the first
player is able to obtain after player 2’s best response. We refer to v and the
corresponding path as the first player’s best strategy so far. Therefore, we
adopt a computation strategy based on computing the k′-best paths. Note
that k′ is distinct from k, the number of players in the game.
In order to compute the second player’s best response, we use the integer
program IP2 in Appendix C.1, where M is defined to be a large, positive
constant. tji is a variable that represents the time-step at which player j
arrives at node i, and is 0 if i is not visited by j. vji is a binary variable
which is 1 if and only if player j visits node i. Because we are calculating
a best response to player 1’s path, all t1i and v
1
i are set to their appropriate
value to represent the path, and are capitalized to T 1i and V
1
i to indicate they
are constants. We offset arrival times for visited nodes so that if the first
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player reaches node i at time j, then T 1i = j− 0.5, in order to represent that
the first player obtains the prize in any tied arrivals. Again, it is important
note that IP2 is made for Directed Acyclic Graphs, as constraint (C.13) will
allow a node to be visited by the second player no more than once.
The problem of finding the top k′ paths through a network is well studied,
with efficient algorithms proposed as far back as the 1970’s in [86] and [87]:
these still form the basis for many algorithms used today. While these ap-
proaches are developed towards finding the k′-shortest or cheapest paths, it
is possible that algorithms patterned after them may be developed in the
case of directed acyclic graphs. In an enterprise-level solution this should
be attempted, but we chose to solve the TOP iteratively with k′ = 1 for
convenience as we already developed the framework (IP1) to do so by set-
ting k = 1. Paths are constructed iteratively, then compared the value of
the path to the value v of the first player’s current best strategy. If the
value of the current path is less, we terminate and return the current best
strategy. Otherwise, we compute the second player’s best response to the
path using IP2. Following the best response of the second player, the first
player’s best strategy is updated if a new best strategy is found. We then
add a constraint to IP1 to disallow the current path, and continue to the
next iteration. The pseudocode in Algorithm 4 in Appendix C.1 illustrates
this method, where SolveIP2 computes the second player’s best response to
the first player’s current path.
Turn-Based Analysis: For the turn-based policy, we again consider the
game tree. The game tree has the same number of leaf nodes as the two-level
game tree from the unreserved path policy, but resists an easy ordering of
them. However, there is a great deal of commonality between several nodes
in the game tree: For a DAG, if the next player to take a turn is at node i and
the other player is at node j, then it does not matter where they were before,
only which prizes have been collected on the nodes between i and j and the
remaining range of each player. Because of this, we maintain a hashset with
states of the game as keys, and the next move (i.e., next state) along with
the value for each player of the current state. If a state is not already in the
set then it has not been solved yet, and its solution is the successor state
that leads to the maximum value. The recursion stops when it reaches a
state where one player is at n. It then solves IP1 with k = 1 starting from
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the position of the unfinished player and returns. Algorithm 5 illustrates
this approach, using Algorithm 6 as a helper function. The helper function
fills in the game tree (StateSpace in Algorithm 5) for each feasible pair of
positions for the two players, including which nodes between their positions
have been visited. Finally, a second helper function ConstructPaths follows
the pointers in the game tree to return the path of each player as a sequence
of nodes. Pseudocode versions of both algorithms are given in Appendix C.1.
Of our solution methods, the turn-based solution is the only one which
requires integer length edges. To represent the fact that players are moving
and making decisions near simultaneously, we convert the integer edge-length
graph into an unweighted graph, dividing a length l edge into l length-1 edges
with l − 1 nodes between them, containing no prizes.
4.6 Numerical Analysis
This section presents numerical experiments using the solution methods de-
tailed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6.1 details our generation of test-cases for




Because our motivation for considering the PCMOP is for its applications to
UAV surveillance networks, we chose to generate networks which resemble
real geography. We did so as follows: consider a l× l box in the plane (R2).
To generate an n node DAG, place n points uniformly at random within the
box and label the points so that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ... ≤ xn. Compute the Euclidean
distance between each pair of points. Let D ∈ Z+ be the maximum length
permitted for any edge within the network. For i < j, if the distance from
point i to point j is dist(i, j) ≤ D, add an edge from node i to j of length
ddist(i, j)e to the DAG. We take the ceiling of the distance because, as noted
in the previous section, it is easier to compute the turn-based game with
integer length edges. Because we only consider adding an edge (i, j) if i < j,
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the resulting network will be a DAG. Having constructed the network, we
then ran tests using two different prize distributions for the nodes: In the
first, each node is assigned a prize drawn from the geometric distribution
with p = 1
2
. In the second, each node is assigned a prize of value 1, 2, or 3,
uniformly at random. Therefore both distributions generate the same mean
prize value. Additionally, the prizes on S = 1 and T = n are set to 0.
It should be noted that the resulting network may not have a path from
1 to n, or may not have one of sufficiently short length. In this case, a new
network is generated.
Planar Networks
We were also interested in studying planar networks, as they are another
common type of real network in R2. In particular, they better model a
surveillance fleet which is restricted to roads. In order to generate these
networks we again generate a set of n nodes uniformly in a box on the plane
(R2). We then use the method of Delaunay triangulation to produce planar
networks from these points. If an edge exists between nodes i and j such
that i < j then the edge is assigned to be (i, j) rather than (j, i), which
guarantees the resulting network is a DAG. After constructing the network,
we use the same uniform prize distribution we used previously and assign all
nodes other than S = 1 and T = n a prize of 1, 2, or 3 uniformly at random.
We chose not to run trials for the geometric prize distribution because while
we are interested in planar networks as a subset of networks in R2, they are
less applicable to our use case as UAVs are not bound to existing roadways.
Figure 4.7: Average PoA for
Approximate R2 Networks with
Geometric Prize Distribution
Figure 4.8: Average Computation
time (log-scaled) for Approximate
R2 Networks With Geometric Prize
Distribution
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Figure 4.9: Average PoA for
Approximate R2 Networks with
Uniform Prize Distribution
Figure 4.10: Average Computation
time (log-scaled) for Approximate
R2 Networks With Uniform Prize
Distribution
Figure 4.11: Average PoA for
Planar Networks with Uniform
Prize Distribution
Figure 4.12: Average Computation
time (log-scaled) for Planar
Networks with Uniform Prize
Distribution
4.6.2 Empirical Results
Table 4.4 at the end of this section presents the full details of our numerical
experiments, both in our approximate R2 and planar networks. Max Edge
refers to the maximum length edges inserted into the graph as described in
Section 4.6.1. Box refers to the edge length l of the box used to generate the
graph. All entries related to Computation Time are in seconds. Tests for
uniformly distributed prizes in both planar and approximate R2 networks
were run on machines using the Windows 10 Enterprise OS and 16GB RAM
with Intel Xeon(R) v6 CPUs at 3.30GHz. Tests for the geometrically dis-
tributed prizes for the approximate R2 networks were run with Windows 10
Pro OS and 32GB RAM with Intel(R) i7 CPUs at 2.6GHz.
To test how PoA changes with the average size of the network, we generated
instances of approximate R2 networks with varying numbers of nodes n.
These trials are detailed in Table 4.4. Additionally, Figures 4.7 and 4.9 show
the average PoA for approximate R2 networks as function of n when these
graphs are generated in an l = 10×10 box, with max edge length 3, range 15,
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and prizes drawn geometrically with p = 1
2
and uniformly at random from
1, 2, 3, respectively. Figures 4.8 and 4.10 show the corresponding average
computation times for solving these networks, given as the log of the average
milliseconds (ms) required.
When we consider the figures, we see that the computation times for the
two prize distributions display similar behavior, with an approximately linear
increase in log-scaled mean computation time as a function of the number of
nodes n. The unreserved case for n = 35 and geometrically distributed prizes
is the main contradiction to this statement, however this is likely due to the
fact that only 5 trials were run for this instance: Considering the high sample
variance for the unreserved policy when n = 25, 30 when compared to their
sample means, it is evident that when test cases are generated according
to this distribution there is a tendency to produce very difficult outlying
instances, which may not occur with a smaller sample size of test cases.
The more interesting figures to consider are Figures 4.7 and 4.9. While
test cases generated from the uniform distribution in most cases demonstrate
a lower average PoA, the results are empirically very close. However, while
we see a possible upward trend with respect to n in the average PoA for all
policies when prizes are geometrically distributed, the same is not true of the
networks when prizes are uniformly distributed: While the reserved policy
seems to display an upward trend, it is difficult to say what if any regular
behavior the average PoAs of the unreserved and turn-based policies display.
While we are interested in planar networks as they are an important subset
of graphs inR2, we have already noted that they are less relevant to our UAV
use-case as UAVs are not bound to existing infrastructure. Because of this,
and the fact that computing the equilibrium in the turn-based game is the
most computationally expensive portion of the approximate R2 networks, we
used our planar test cases to consider what happens to the turn-based game
when some of the computational complexities disappear. In particular, all
tests were run with unit edge lengths and unlimited range, with prizes again
drawn uniformly at random from 1, 2, and 3 for each node. The resulting
average PoA’s as a function of n can be seen in Figure 4.11, with Figure 4.12
containing the associated average computation times. Unsurprisingly, this
reduces the computation time immensely for the turn-based game, bringing
computation time down by a factor of approximately e compared to a uniform
distribution of prizes over a similarly sized approximate R2 network which
99
can be seen by comparing Figures 4.10 and 4.12. What is initially surprising
though is the degree to which it raises the computational effort for calculating
the unreserved equilibrium. However, upon further consideration the reason
becomes clear: As what is essentially a bi-level optimization problem in which
the first player needs to calculate its optimal move given the best response
of the second player, removing limits on the range of each player, even in a
DAG, allows for the potential of exponentially more strategies being available
without a method to remove consideration for some of these strategies. Still,
the fact that the average computational effort exceeds that of the turn-based
game is noteworthy. The variance in computation times sheds some light on
this, as Table 4.4 shows in all cases the variance in computation time for the
unreserved case is an order of magnitude or more higher than the variance for








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.7 Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we introduced the Prize-Collecting Multi-Agent Orienteering
Problem and proposed three policies to govern the selfishness of the agents.
Given that the PCMOP lies at the intersection of congestion games, shortest
path computation, longest path computation, top k paths computation, and
the TOP, it is natural that it inherits complexities from each of them, in
particular an extreme sensitivity to changes in parameter values. Despite
these complexities, we derived theoretical bounds on the maximum ineffi-
ciency possible under each of these policies in the form of PoAs. As part
of that analysis, we extended [2]’s result related to PoA of games over valid
utility systems to a 2-player leader-follower setting. In addition to theoreti-
cal bounds, we developed solution methods to solve a PCMOP under three
policies. In terms of empirical efficiency, there are relatively small differences
in the average PoA of the three policies, as seen in Figures 4.7, 4.9, and 4.11.
While the reserved path policy produces the best average PoA in most cases,
we see there are some where the average performances of the turn-based
policy surpasses it. Also, while the performance of the unreserved policy is
the worst on average for all but one of our test cases, there are individual
instances where it delivers the best value, albeit not as many as the reserved
and turn-based policies.
We have seen that the reserved path policy has the best theoretical guar-
antees on performance in terms of prize-collecting. However, it may produce
poorly distributed prize divisions: consider that with sufficient range on an
undirected graph, the first agent will collect all prizes, which defeats the
purpose of using multiple agents. Also, while the reserved path policy has
the best guarantees, it does not always produce the best results : A 2-Player
game on the directed graph in Figure 4.13 using either the unreserved or
turn-based policies results in all prizes being collected, but the reserved path
policy results in a PoA of 4+2ε
3+2ε
, its theoretical worst result.
The unreserved path and turn-based policies appear to produce the best
results in terms of distributions: earlier players have a hierarchical advantage,
being able to get any specific prize they want before or at the same time as
lower-ranked players and taking it from them, but they must weigh the cost
of the prizes they can no longer guarantee themselves against the ones they
want. The turn-based policy seems particularly realistic: if an earlier player
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Figure 4.13: Network with a 2-Player PoA of 4
3
for reserved policy and 1 for
other policies
makes it clear it is going after a specific large prize, it can make others back
off sooner and allow the player to stop and collect additional smaller prizes
along the way, rather than racing by them (as in the unreserved policy) even
though no other player is targeting the same prize. This is seen in Figure
4.1, where the prize at node B is collected in the turn-based policy but not
the unreserved path policy, resulting in a PoA of 4
3
for the unreserved case.
The main drawback to the turn-based policy is the computational com-
plexity: The game tree is exponentially large and while there is frequent
similarity among branches to reduce computations, it is still a problem. A
one player PCMOP/TOP is solved at each leaf node which is not recognized
as already solved, which, although likely a smaller problem (since much of
the graph is already traversed), is NP-Hard.
The advantage of the reserved path policy is that it is relatively easy to
compute, as it allows earlier players to completely ignore the actions of later
players, and every player after the first can remove prizes from the network
and pretend that it is the first player (for computation). Then each agent
only has to solve the single player PCMOP/TOP which, while still NP-Hard,
is more tractable than the other versions. While it can cause unbalanced prize
distributions in general, it is unlikely to do so when agent ranges divides the
workload approximately evenly between agents.
The unreserved path policy seeks to reduce the computational effort of
the turn-based policy by considering the best paths first: while computation
tends to be longer when there are a number of paths with the same value in
prizes, such as when the range is relatively large, in most cases the runtime
is shorter than in the turn-based policy. It also appears to produce a more
even distribution of prizes than the reserved path policy.
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CHAPTER 5
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
& PROGRESS SINCE PRELIMINARY
EXAM
In this chapter we will discuss progress which has been made in this disser-
tation since it was first presented in my doctoral exam, as well as propose
future directions to take the research contained here.
The most visible progress made has been the completion of Chapter 3.
While the bones of the chapter and most of its mathematical formulae and
theorems were already present, they were in a far rougher form which was
unsuitable for publication. Further, numerical studies at that point in time
were minimal. The majority of the time which has passed since my pre-
liminary exam in May 2020 has been spent experimenting with this model
on real social networks. While unexpectedly time-consuming, this led to a
wealth of evidence in support of our model from the fields of evolutionary
biology and psychology, as well as the surprising result of the difference be-
tween lexicographic and random tie-breaking (this was discovered entirely by
accident thanks to a coding mistake.) It also led to the surprising discovery
that increasing the opportunities available to agents (number of invitations
k) actually led to a decrease in trustworthy behavior rather than an increase
as we had initially expected.
While resulting in less change to this dissertation, two other accomplish-
ments which are just as important if not more are the acceptance for publica-
tion of work based on Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. Work [3] based on Chapter
2 was accepted for publication in the European Journal of Operational Re-
search in July 2020 and will be published in February 2021, however it is
already available online. Work based on Chapter 4 was accepted more re-
cently to IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering in late
October 2020 and thus is not available online at the time of writing.
Finally, I have completed additional work on the topic of minimizing the
spread of an influence cascade through counter-cascades which I proposed at
the time of my preliminary examination. It is currently being prepared for a
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conference submission. This work is independent of the work work presented
in this dissertation, both in the thematic sense as it is not connected to the
topic of trust and minimizing selfishness, and in the literal sense as I have
completed it independently from my advisors who have contributed to all of
the work presented here. As such it is not included in this dissertation.
Next, we will discuss future research directions for the work presented in
this dissertation. There are two major directions for the work in Chapter
3. The first is a study of network structure and how it influences behavior
in the system, as we saw that it does indeed have a strong impact on how
selfish agents decide to be. The second more theoretical route involves as
study of the metagame in Chapter 3.6, as at this point in time we have
only been able to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium and nothing
else. There is also a third, heavily applied, direction. This would be the
development of a bot to act as an agent in this system through a method
such as reinforcement learning. I had initially planned to include work on
this topic in this dissertation, but due to the extensive and time-consuming
numerical studies in this work I was unable to.
There is also continuing research to be done on the work in Chapter 4. The
motivation of that chapter was to find a policy that forced agents to divide up
tasks “fairly” and with minimal inefficiency. One area which we are currently
just beginning to pursue is the study of fair-division in chores. This area
has received attention in recent years, and building on results discovered in
our own department I am interested in methods which fairly allocate chores
which have transition times between them. This general framework easily
lends itself to the setting considered in Chapter 4 and I would be interested




This chapter marks the end of this dissertation. Thus far, we have presented
three major topics of research. The first, in Chapter 2, is the introduction
of a model of non-selfish behavior called the limited-trust equilibrium. This
concept captures the idea that agents are willing to help each other, provided
it is not too expensive for them personally. They do so in order to inspire
reciprocal behavior from each other later on, sacrificing a small gain in the
present in the hope of avoiding a larger cost in the future. Following its
theoretical analysis, we show numerically that when two agents play in a
limited-trust manner both stand to gain in expectation.
The second topic of research builds upon the foundations and motivations
of the first. When considering limited-trust players in a social network trying
to form partnerships, we see empirically that not playing in a myopically self-
interested manner in each game is actually the most selfish action that many
agents can take. This is because it allows them to form more partnerships,
and although these players derive less utility per partnership, they derive
more by obtaining a greater volume. It also benefits their partners, as that is
the reason these partnerships were formed. Interestingly, we also see that in
this setting there is a metagame of selecting the right trust level in response
to other players. This has the potential to be a rich area of both theoretical
and applied research in the future, but for now we are able to show that
this metagame is guaranteed to possess a mixed Nash equilibrium in certain
circumstances.
The third major topic of research is a bit of a departure from the first two,
proposing and considering a game theoretic version of the orienteering prob-
lem. This formulation is motivated largely by UAV fleet coordination, and
considers the inefficiency of policies under which agents are allowed to route
themselves, rather than consulting a central fleet manager. This research
also extends a broad result from [2] on the price of anarchy of valid utility
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games to the leader-follower setting.
After presenting the core of the author’s research during the graduate
program, in Chapter 5 a discussion of changes from the version of this dis-
sertation presented in the Preliminary Exam is given, as well as additional
research proposals for future work. These proposals include new directions to
take from the results of Chapter 3, as well as a new method for approaching




A.1 Proofs for Chapter 2
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider that






δi ≥ ui(σGi , σ∗−i)− ui(σi, σ∗−i)
prior to the constant cj being added. Each player i 6= j now has to solve
σ∗i






δi ≥ ui(σGi , σ∗−i)− ui(σi, σ∗−i)
which has the same solution, and player j has to solve
σ∗j






δi ≥ (uj(σGj , σ∗−j) + cj)− (uj(σj, σ∗−j) + cj)
which also has the same solution. Therefore, σ∗ is still an LTE(δ).
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A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. First, suppose that we have a feasible solution (x, y). Given that it
is a feasible solution, the last four constraints will not be violated as x and
y are valid strategy profiles. The first two constraints ensure that neither
player is giving up more than δi that it could be making by playing the
greedy best response to the other player’s strategy. The next two ensure
that the social utility from the players actions is at least the amount which
would be provided if each player played its limited trust best response to the
other. Therefore, since each player is providing as much social utility as if it
had been playing its limited trust best response (more is impossible without
violating constraint 1 or 2) and is not giving up more than δi of what it could
be making, (x, y) is an LTE(δ).
Now, consider an LTE(δ) given by (x, y), which we will show to be a
feasible solution. Because (x, y) is an LTE, x and y are both valid strategy
profiles and thus do not violate constraints (5-10), particularly as constraints
(7) and (8) are disabled for SA = [m], SB = [n]. (x, y) is an LTE, so neither
player is giving up more than δi and therefore constraints (1) and (2) are
fulfilled. Finally, because it is an LTE, x is a limited-trust best response to
y and y is a limited-trust best response to x, which means that constraints
(3) and (4) are fulfilled with equality.
A.2 Additional Results: Leader-Follower Games
A.2.1 Demonstration of Policies
Given the interpretation of the policies in Section 2.4, we now provide a
practical demonstration of each on the 2 × 2 game given in Table A.1. The
Stackelberg equilibrium in this game occurs when the first player plays 2 and
the second player plays 1. We first consider the incomplete knowledge policy:
for δ1 < 1, the first player will play 2, as it otherwise stands to lose 5− 4 = 1
if it plays 1. If the first player plays 1, then for δ2 < 1, the second player
plays 2, but for δ2 ≥ 1, the second player plays 1 as well. If the first player
plays 2, then the second player plays 1 for δ2 < 1.5 and 2 for δ2 ≥ 1.5. Thus
for the socially optimal policy (1,1) to be played, we must have δ1, δ2 ≥ 1.
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Table A.1: A 2-Player 2× 2 Game
p2
1 2
p1 1 6, 4 4, 5
2 5, 3 8, 1.5
We next consider the complete knowledge policy. The second player’s
behavior is the same: if the first player plays 1 the second plays 1 for δ2 ≥ 1
and if the first player plays 2 the second plays 2 for δ2 ≥ 1.5. Suppose δ2 < 1,
then the first player is selecting between (2,1) and (1,2): if δ1 ≥ 1 then it
plays 1, and otherwise it plays 2. Suppose 1 ≤ δ2 < 1.5, then the first player
is choosing between (1,1) and (2,1) and so plays 1 regardless of δ1. Finally,
suppose δ2 ≥ 1.5. Here, the first player is selecting between (1,1) and (2,2).
If δ1 < 2, the first player plays 2 to receive 8 after the second player also
plays 2. If δ1 ≥ 2 it plays 1 instead.
The complete knowledge policy has the property that if we have (δ′1, δ
′
2) ≥




2) game is greater
than or equal to that of the (δ1, δ2) game: the δ1 = δ2 = 1 game results in
a greater net utility than the δ1 = δ2 = 1.5 game over the utility above.
This is interpreted as the first player taking advantage of the second player’s
trustworthiness. If (δ′1, δ
′
2) ≥ (δ1, δ2) then we can say that at least one of
the following is true: player 1 receives higher utility under (δ′1, δ
′
2), or the
net utility is greater under (δ′1, δ
′
2). This is because had player 1 selected the
same strategy as it would with (δ1, δ2), it would have achieved at least as
much utility for δ′2 ≥ δ2. The fact that it did not select the same strategy
indicates that it selected one which increases either its own utility or the net
utility.
Finally, we consider the cooperative complete knowledge policy. This pol-
icy is especially interesting as for any δ1, δ2 ≥ 0, the social optimum of (1,1)
will be played: as stated earlier, the Stackelberg equilibrium in this game oc-
curs when the first player plays 2 and the second player plays 1. The social
optimum occurs at (1,1), with a net payoff of 10, and at the social optimum
both players are receiving strictly more than they would in the Stackelberg
equilibrium. This is the only policy which has the possiblity of reward with-
out risk: for any game in which δ1 = δ2 = 0, each player is guaranteed a
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minimum of what they would achieve in the Stackelberg equilibrium and the
possibility of more. For the other two policies, δ1 = δ2 = 0 guarantees that
they will play the Stackelberg equilibrium, meaning no risk, no reward.
Because the behavior of games under the cooperative complete knowledge
policy is different from traditional leader-follower games even when δ1 =
δ2 = 0, we will use the term zero-trust game to refer to the traditional
leader-follower game.
A.2.2 Playing Social Optima
In this subsection we will examine what the structure of a 2-player bimatrix
game must be in order for the Socially Optimal (greatest net payoff) strategy
combination to be played. We will confine our discussion to 2×2 games, but
the result generalizes to m× n games.
Let A,B be the payoff matrices for the first and second players, respec-
tively. Without loss of generality, assume that the social optimum occurs
when (1,1) is played.
First, we consider what must happen for the Stackelberg equilibrium to
be the social optimum. An immediate requirement is b12 ≤ b11, as otherwise
even if the first player plays 1, the second player will play 2. Without loss
of generality, assume b21 ≥ b22 so that if the first player plays 2, the second
player will play 1. In order for the first player to play 1 rather than 2 we
must have a11 ≥ a21. More formally, (1,1) is the social optimum and gets
played if and only if E1, E2, E3, E4 are satisfied where
E1 = (a11 + b11 ≥ {a12 + b12, a21 + b21, a22 + b22})
E2 = (b2i ≥ {b21, b22})
E3 = (a2i ≤ a11)
E4 = (b11 ≥ b12).
and i is player 2’s best response to the first player playing 2.
Geometrically, we can determine the outcome of a game by plotting its
entries in R2 in terms of the utility for each player, as in Figure A.1 where
the horizontal axis a is the utility for the first player and the vertical axis b










Figure A.1: Geometric Leader-Follower Representation
From the figure, we can see that (1,1) is the social optimum. It is also
the Stackelberg equilibrium: b12 < b11, so the second player will play 1 if the
first plays 1. b21 > b22, so the second player will play 1 if the first plays 2,
and a21 < a11, so the first player will play 1. In terms of the geometry, we
can say that (1,1) is the Stackelberg equilibrium and the social optimum if
and only if (1,2) is not in area 1 and whichever is larger out of b22 or b21,
that point is not in area 3. Then the first player will prefer 1 to 2 and the
second will prefer (1,1) to (1,2). This is true for all complete knowledge 2×2
leader-follower games, and is easily generalized to m× n games.
Now consider the incomplete knowledge policy. If the social optimum
occurs at (1,1), what must occur for it to be played? If b11 ≥ b12 and
b2i ≥ b21, b22 the first player will play 1 if a2i ≤ a11 + δ1, and the second
player will also play 1. If b11 < b12 and b2i ≥ b21, b22, then the first player
will play 1 if a2i < a12 − δ1 or if a2i ≤ a12 + δ1 and a2i + b2i < a12 + b12 or
a2i ≥ a12+δ1. If the first player plays 1, the second player will play 1 as well if
b12 ≤ b11 +δ2. We can therefore say that (1,1) is the social optimum and gets
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played if and only if E1, E2, F3, E4, E1, E2, F5, F6, F7, or E1, E2, F5,¬F6, F8
are satisfied where
F3 = (a2i ≤ a11 + δ1)
F5 = (b11 < b12 ≤ b11 + δ2)
F6 = (a2i + b2i < a12 + b12)
F7 = (a2i ≤ a12 + δ1)
F8 = (a2i ≤ a12 − δ1)
As with the Stackelberg game, we geometrically model these constraints by
plotting the payoffs in R2, with both possible constraint sets seen in Figures
A.2 and A.3. On both figures, given the points (1, 1) and (1, 2), the social















Figure A.3: E1, E2, F5, F6, F7
We next consider the complete knowledge policy. Again we assume, with-
out loss of generality, that (1,1) is the social optimum. Let b2i ≥ b21, b22 ≥ b2j.
We want to consider when the second player would play j given that the first
player plays 2. This only occurs if a2i+b2i < a2j +b2j and b2i < b2j +δ2. Now
we can determine that the first player will only choose 2 (given the second
player would play the social optimum if the first chose 1) if a2i > a11 + δ1 or
a2j > a11 +δ1 and a2i+b2i < a2j +b2j and b2i ≤ b2j +δ2. Therefore, the social















Figure A.4: Geometric Complete Knowledge Leader-Follower
Representation
is satisfied where
G9 = (a2j ≤ a11 + δ1)
G10 = (a2i + b2i ≥ a2j + b2j)
G11 = (b2i ≥ b2j + δ2).
Suppose b21 ≥ b22. If the geometric representation of the incomplete knowl-
edge policy primarily depended on (2,1) and was dictated by (1,2), here it
is dependent on (2,2) and dictated by (2,1). Figure A.4 displays this: given
the (1,1), (1,2), and (2,1) the the red region represents where the point (2,2)
cannot be in order for the social optimum to be played. Additionally, we
must have b12 ≤ b11 + δ2 and a21 ≤ a11 + δ1.
Finally, we consider the cooperative complete knowledge policy. It is easy
to write the requirements for the social optimum to be played in terms of
the Stackelberg equilibrium: if (1,1) is the social optimum and (i, j) is the
Stackelberg equilibrium, (1,1) is played if and only if aij ≤ a11 + δ1 and









Figure A.5: Geometric Cooperative Complete Knowledge Leader-Follower
Representation
is played if and only if the Stackelberg equilibrium occurs in the red shaded
area.
A.2.3 Leader-Follower Random Repeated Games
While the LTE is capable of analyzing one-off games, it is also a suitable
tool for repeated games with a particular emphasis placed on day-to-day
societal interactions. Such interactions between players are not identical,
but will likely display a pattern over time so that they could be said to come
from some “typical” distribution. Because of this, we now consider games
where the payoff matrices A,B for each player are generated according to
some distribution. In particular, we consider matrices where each entry is
generated iid for each player, though A and B may not come from the same
distribution. Let fa and fb be the probability distribution functions of A and
B, respectively.
Theorem 15. In a 2 × 2 leader-follower game with zero trust where all of
player 1’s payoffs are aij iid and are independent from player 2’s payoffs bij
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which are iid, the probability that Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is the
social optimum is


































Proof. Given that every entry in the payoff matrix is equally likely to be the
social optimum, and equally likely to be played if it is the social optimum, we
will approach this problem by finding the probability that 1, 1 is the social
optimum, and is played. This occurs if E1, E2, E3, and E4 are satisfied.
Because E2 and E3 are equally likely to be fulfilled by i = 1 or i = 2 and
each is equally likely to occur, we can pick i = 1 and multiply by two.
While it is easy to evaluate if any given game results in the social optimum
being played, it is difficult to organize the integrals necessary to construct
the probability of it occurring. To help visualize the integrals, we consider
the graphical representation of a 2× 2 game given in Figure A.1. For a fixed
a11, b11, we have
















For 1,1 to be the social optimum and be played by player 2 if player 1
plays 1, it is necessary and sufficient that b12 ≤ b11 and a11 + b11 ≥ a12 + b12.
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Since









is independent of P (a11 + b11 ≥ a21 + b21, a22 + b22, E2|a11, b11), we then have
P (E1, E2, E4|a11, b11) = P (a11 + b11 ≥ a12 + b12, b11 ≥ b12|a11, b11)
· P (a11 + b11 ≥ a21 + b21, a22 + b22, E2|a11, b11)
= Q(a11, b11) ·H(a11, b11)
= M(a11, b11)
Since P (E1, E2, E3, E4|a11, b11) = P (E1, E2, E3,¬E4|a11, b11), this tells us








Since all 4 entries in a 2×2 game are equally likely to be the social optimum
and be played, this gives us






We see from Theorem 15 that although we have a method to exactly com-
pute the probabilities of the social optimum being played in a zero-trust
game, it is already quite complex for even a 2× 2 game. Further, introduc-
ing the δi values for either the incomplete or complete knowledge policies
vastly complicates the geometry of the space over which our probability dis-
tributions are computed. Therefore, assuming that fa and fb have finite
expectation and variance, it will be generally more cost effective to use sam-
pling methods to estimate the probability of playing the social optimum as
well as related properties due to the relative ease of solving leader-follower
games. Before we move on to Section 4.6 to do exactly that, we will first
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briefly discuss the expectation of zero trust leader-follower games, as a metric
against which to measure the effectiveness of our policies.
Theorem 16. The expected payoff of each player i in a m1 ×m2 × ...×mn
zero-trust n-player Stackelberg game where each player i’s payoffs for each
entry in the probability tensor are generated iid from a distribution Ai is





where fAi is the probability density function for Ai and FAi is the cumulative
distribution function.
Proof. Consider player i’s choice: player 1 makes its choice based on all
other players’ responses, however player 1’s payoff is independent of these
players. Players 2 through i − 1 have also made choices based on all later
players responses, but again each of their payoffs is independent of these later
players. Thus, after players 1 through i− 1 have made their choices, player
i chooses between mi possible responses, each with an iid payoff and each
independent of the other n− 1 players’ payoffs despite the fact that previous
players factored i’s action into their choices, and i will factor later players
into its choices. Player i will therefore be choosing the maximum of mi iid
variables and its payoff is distributed as the maximum of mi samples from
its payoff distribution Ai.
Let X be a random variable and let X(k) be the maximum of k iid samples
of X. For its CDF we have F
(k)
X (x) = (FX(x))
k which gives us a PDF of
f
(k)
X (x) = kfX(x)(FX(x))






which means the expected value of the game for player i is





Theorem 17. The social optimum of a m1×m2×...×mn zero-trust n-player
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where X is distributed as
∑n
i=1Ai for independent Ai and M =
∏n
i=1mi.
Proof. The social optimum is defined as the maximum value of
∑k
i=1 ui(σ)
across all strategies σ ∈ Σ, and is always a pure strategy profile. There are
M such pure-strategy σ, all iid. By the same reasoning as in the proof of









Given the results of Theorems 16 and 17, we can conclude that the expected
PoA of a zero-trust 2-player m× n leader-follower maximization game is
E[(A+B)(mn)]
E[A(m)] + E[B(n)]




B.1 Additional Notes: Rate of learning δ−i
In Section 3.3 we looked at how a player i can learn δj through interactions
with player j as both a leader and a follower. In this appendix we provide
bounds on how quickly i can learn a fixed δj. We focus on doing so from i’s
perspective as a leader, rather than as a follower: although we saw in Section
3.3.2 that information about δj can be inferred when j is the leader, i cannot
guarantee that j will ever invite it to interact. Further, the likelihood of
gaining this information changes with δij, player j’s estimate of δi. We will
assume that j believes that uj(θij) ≥ 0, as otherwise it will never accept an
invitation from i to interact. We now consider how many games are needed
for i to determine δj to within an error of ε > 0.
First, we note that in order to guarantee that |δj − δji|≤ ε where δji is
player i’s estimate of δj, both of the following must be true:
1. δj − δji ≤ ε
2. δji − δj ≤ ε
While trivial, this implies that if player i can determine an interval [δlji, δ
u
ji)
such that δj ∈ [δlji, δuji) and δuji− δlji < 2ε, then δj must be within ε of at least
one of the lower bound δlji or the upper bound δ
u
ji. Consider the expected
number of observations required for player i to determine both an upper and
lower bound within ε of δj. As this is a stricter condition than is required to
estimate δj to within an error of ε, determining it serves as an upper bound
on the expected number of observations to estimate δj to within ε.
Suppose that player 1 and player 2 are participating in a randomly gener-
ated m × n leader-follower game generated via A12,B12 in which all entries
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of each matrix are generated independently and identically to all other en-
tries in the matrix. Without loss of generality, we will assume that player 1
chooses to play si as the leader. We want to determine the probability that
the follower player 2 will choose a strategy sj which reveals a lower bound δ
l
21
such that δ2− δl21 ≤ ε. Note that a leader-follower game after the leader has
chosen its strategy is equivalent to a 1 × n game, as in Table 3.4 in Section
3.3.1. In order for player 1 to observe a lower bound δl21 > 0, it is necessary
for player 2 to not pick the sj in Table 3.4 that maximizes its utility. Without
loss of generality, assume b1 ≥ bj ∀i ∈ [n], where [n] = {1, 2, ..., n}. If player
2 instead chooses to play sj, then player 1 can deduce that δ2 ≥ b1 − bj and
set δl21 = b1−bj using Algorithm 1. Based on the fact that all such values are
randomly generated from known distributions A12,B12, we can compute the
probability of finding an acceptable lower bound δl21 by taking the cumulative
distribution functions of the distributions over the relevant areas in R2.
Lemma 9. For the game in Table 3.4, the probability of the game revealing
δl21 such that δ2 − δl21 ≤ ε is































Proof. We begin by considering the probability of an event E occurring where
E is the event that b1 is the greedy choice for player 2, s2 is chosen, and this
results in a lower bound δl21 within ε of the true δ2. In order for this to occur,
the relationship between s1 and s2 must be as in Figure B.1, where both s2
gives better net utility than s1 and b2 is within ε of δ2 but not greater than
it. The diagonal line which passes through s1 is the set of all points which
provide equal net utility to s1: points above the line provide better net utility
and points below it provide worse net utility. Additionally, given s1 and s2
it is necessary for another strategy sj where j 6= 1, 2 to not both give better
net utility than s2 and have b1− bj ≤ δ2. If both of these conditions are met,
sj will be picked instead of s2. Therefore, for a given s1, s2 that fulfill the
necessary conditions, sj must lie in the shaded region of Figure B.2 for event
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E to occur. Thus if Ej is the event that sj is in an acceptable position













This must be true for every sj with j 6= 1, 2, so P (E|s1, s2) = P (Ej|s1, s2)n−2.
Next we note that for event E to occur for a given s1, we require that s2 lie


















Given that any si could be the greedy response and any sj for j 6= i could
provide the bound upper bound with equal probability, but each of these
events is mutually exclusive, we finally get that P l(ε) = n(n−1)P (E), which
completes the proof.
Figure B.1: Area for s2 given s1
to establish lower bound
Figure B.2: Area for si given
s1, s2 to establish lower bound
The role of n as indicated by Lemma 9 is somewhat counterintuitive. The
Lemma shows that the probability of the first player establishing an accept-
able lower bound δl21 on δ2 goes to 0 as the second player’s number of strate-
gies n → ∞: if the second player is presented with more choices, shouldn’t
they have a higher probability of getting one which allows them to precisely
play near δ2 and maximize utility? This may be the case in smaller values of
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Figure B.3: Example game from Table 3.4, n = 1000 fa = fb = U [0, 1]
n, but it does not occur in general.
Suppose fa = fb = U [0, 1], the uniform distribution. For high values of
n, when the first player chooses strategy si the second player will have a
greedy best response sj = G2(si) with bij ≈ 1 with high probability, as for
a high number of independent samples of U [0, 1], the expected value of the
maximum sample goes to 1. Also due to the high value of n, there will be
another response sl with bil < bij but bil ≈ ail ≈ 1 with high probability
due to the same independent sampling. Consider this game with n = 1000
and suppose the first player selects strategy si. The second player’s strategy
set now resembles Figure B.3, which is a randomly generated row of the
m × 1000 game matrix. In the figure, a δ2 of approximately 0.02 appears
to be sufficient for the socially optimal strategy near the top right corner
to be played. This means that if, for example, δ2 = 0.2 it will be nearly
impossible to ever establish an acceptable lower bound within ε = 0.05 of δ2;
it is similarly difficult to establish any upper bound at all.
Next we derive the probability player 1 observes an upper bound δu21 <∞
on δ2 in the game in Table 3.4. For this to occur, player 2 must choose si
over sj because bi > bj despite the fact that ai + bi < aj + bj. If, without loss
of generality, s1 is the greedy best response for player 2, this allows player
1 to conclude that δ2 < b1 − bj and set δu21 = b1 − bj. As we have already
seen, it would also allow player 1 to set δl21 = b1− bj, thus showing that both
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upper and lower bounds can be observed within a single game.
Lemma 10. For the game in Table 3.4, the probability of the game revealing
δu21 such that δ
l
21 − δ2 ≤ ε for ε > 0 is








P (E ∩ E1|s1) = P (si ∈ A1|s1)n−1 − (P (si ∈ A1|s1)− P (si ∈ A2|s1))n−1,


























a1+b1−b2 (P (A3|s1, s2)
n−2 − (P (A3|s1, s2)− P (A4|s1, s2))n−2) fa(a2)da2
)
fb(b2)db2,





















Proof. Despite its intimidating look this lemma is simply the result of inte-
grating probability distribution functions overR2. Consider the event E that
s1 is the greedy choice for player 2. There are two possible outcomes: player
2 chooses s1 (event E1) or player 2 chooses another strategy (without loss of
generality we assume that strategy to be s2) with better net utility such that
b1 − b2 ≤ δ2 (event E2). We refer to these two outcomes as (respectively)
case 1 and case 2.
Case 1 occurs if all strategies si are in the shaded region in Figure B.4. As
a function of s1, a strategy si is in this region A1 with probability













Next, for fixed s1, we need to consider the probability that case 1 occurs
and at least one strategy is able to provide an upper bound on δ2. This
occurs if all strategies lie within the shaded area in Figure B.4 and at least
one strategy lies in the shaded area A2 in Figure B.5. The probability of a
124
strategy lying in A2 is








which means that case 1 occurs and an acceptable bound is established with
probability P (E ∩ E1|s1) = P (si ∈ A1|s1)n−1 − (P (si ∈ A1|s1) − P (si ∈
A2|s1))n−1.
Figure B.4: Area for s2 given s1 to
establish upper bound, case 1
Figure B.5: Area for si given s1 to
establish upper bound, case 1
We now consider case 2, that another strategy is played, and assume with-
out loss of generality that the strategy played is s2. Case 2 requires that
occurs if all strategies si are in the shaded region in Figure B.6, for i 6= 1, 2.
As a function of s1 and s2, a strategy si is in this region with probability













Next, we want to consider the probability that case 2 occurs and an accept-
able upper bound is observed. For a fixed s1, s2, s2 is played if all other si
lie in the shaded region A3 in Figure B.2, the probability of which we know
from the proof of Lemma 9 is













In order for one of these si to provide an acceptable upper bound, at least
one of them must be in the shaded region A4 in Figure B.6, providing better
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Figure B.6: Area for si given s1, s2 to establish upper bound, case 2
net utility than s2 and providing utility bi such that b1−δ2−ε ≤ bi ≤ b1−δ2.
The probability of an si being in this region is








which means that case 2 occurs and establishes an acceptable upper bound
with probability P (A3|s1, s2)n−2−(P (A3|s1, s2)−P (A4|s1, s2))n−2. Note that
this value is zero for n = 2, indicating that in a two strategy game an upper
bound cannot be established if case 2 occurs. Therefore, as a function of s1
the probability case 2 occurs and an acceptable upper bound is established
is




a1+b1−b2 (P (A3|s1, s2)
n−2 − (P (A3|s1, s2)− P (A4|s1, s2))n−2) fa(a2)da2
)
fb(b2)db2.
Finally, this gives us that the probability of establishing an acceptable upper
bound is




−∞ (P (E ∩ E1|s1) + (n− 1)P (E ∩ E2|s1))fa(a1)da1
)
fb(b1)db1.
As we noted before the lemma, when n ≥ 3, it is possible for both upper
and lower bounds to be established in a single game. The derivation of
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Lemma 10 allows us to do so directly through our derivation of P (E∩E2|s1),
which was the probability that the player 2 did not select the greedy best
response but still revealed an upper bound within ε of δ2.
Lemma 11. The probability of player 1 observing both an upper and lower
bound within ε of δ2 is given by













a1+b1−b2 (P (A3|s1, s2)
n−2 − (P (A3|s1, s2)− P (A4|s1, s2))n−2) fa(a2)da2
)
fb(b2)db2.
Theorem 18. For the game in Table 3.4 the expected number of games for
player 1 to get an estimate δ21 of δ2 guaranteed to have error most ε from
the true value is less than or equal to











Proof. We note that the only way for player 1 to make an estimate of δ2 which
is guaranteed to be within at most ε of the true value is to find an interval
[δl21, δ
u
21) such that δ
u
21 − δl21 ≤ 2ε. Next, we note that in order to obtain
this interval at least one of δl21 and δ
u
21 must be within ε of δ2. Therefore
we can find an upper bound on the expected number of games required by
finding the expected number of games required to observe both upper and
lower bounds within ε of δ2.
Beginning from the first game, the expected time to discover one or more
bounds is 1
Pu(ε)+P l(ε)−Q(ε) . This event can occur in any of three ways: an
acceptable upper bound is found, an acceptable lower bound is found, or both
are found. The probabilities of these events are proportional to P u(ε)−Q(ε),


























With the completion of Theorem 18, we now have an upper bound on the
expected time to discover both an upper and lower bound within ε of the
game in Table 3.4. However, we are interested in that 1× n game because it
is equivalent to an m×n game in which the leader has made its decision and
is waiting for the follower. Now we return to our original goal, estimating
the expected time for the leader in an m× n game to estimate the follower’s
δ value to within ε.
If player 1’s goal is to learn δ2, rather than to play according to δ1, the
challenge it faces is deciding which of its m strategies to select each game.
Note also that in pursuing this behavior player 1 has decided to focus purely
on exploration and has abandoned any interest in its own utility, which means
that it is impossible for its neighbors to learn anything about δ1 based on its
actions as a leader. Theorem 18 implies that the expected time for strategies
which reveal an upper and lower bound within ε of δ2 to occur in a randomly
generated game is 1
m
T (ε), which provides an upper bound on the expected
time of player 1’s theoretical optimum strategy. Similarly, it implies that if
the leader chooses its strategy si randomly, it has an upper bound of T (ε)
on the expected time to achieve this estimate. However, choosing in such a
random manner ignores what the leader has already learned from the follower:
while it may not have δu21− δl21 ≤ 2ε, it will still over time gain some [δl21, δu21)
interval in which δ2 is located through the use of Algorithm 1. This allows
the leader to determine whether or not it will refine its knowledge of δ2 by
selecting si. Assume without loss of generality that s1 is the follower’s greedy
best response to the leader selecting si: if the Pareto frontier of player 2’s
responses to si contains an sj such that δ
l
21 < b1 − bj < δu21, selecting si will
result in the player 1 refining at least one of the bounds on δ2. If the frontier
does not contain such an sj, there will be no improvement in the bounds by
selecting si. Figure 3.2 in Section 3.3.1 gives an example of this with player
2’s potential response s3: if player 2 responds with s3 then the lower bound






B.2.1 Proof of Theorem 8
Theorem 8 Consider a social network G with uniform interactions Aij = Blh
for all l, i, j, h ∈ [N ] such that all payoffs are nonnegative and for agent i with
neighbors j and l, δj ≤ δl → ui(θij) ≤ ui(θil). Then the N-player metagame
with closed interval strategy space ∆i ⊆ R and utility function ui for i ∈ [N ]
possesses a mixed Nash equilibrium.
For simplicity of notation, in the this proof we will use ui(δi, δ−i) instead of
ui(θ−i, δi). Also, before formally starting the proof we first state the following
result:
Theorem 19 ( [57]). Let Σi ⊆ R for i ∈ [N ] be a closed interval and let
Ui : Σ → R be continuous except on a subset Σ∗∗(i) ⊆ Σ∗(i). If
∑N
i=1 Ui(σ)
is upper semi-continuous and Ui(σi, σ−i) is bounded and weakly lower semi-
continuous in σi then the N-player game with closed interval strategy space
Σi ⊆ R and utility function Ui for i ∈ [N ] possesses a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium.
[57] uses the following definition of weak lower semi-continuity in R:
Definition 13 (Weak lower semi-continuity). Ui(σi, σ−i) is weakly lower




Ui(σi, σ−i) + (1− λ) lim inf
σi
+→σ′i
Ui(σi, σ−i) ≥ Ui(σ′i, σ−i)
Proof. Proof of Theorem 8: This proof will make use of Theorem 19. As such,
we need to show three things: a set ∆∗(i) = {(δ1, ..., δN) ∈ ∆|∃j 6= i,∃d, 1 ≤
d ≤ D(i) such that δj = fdij(δi)} which appropriately captures discontinuities
in ui(δ), that ui(δi, δ−i) is bounded and weakly lower semi-continuous in δi,
and that
∑
i∈[N ] ui(δ) is upper semi-continuous.
We begin by determining the set ∆∗(i). We earlier noted that ui(δi, δ−i)
has at most |N1i | discontinuities in δi when all interactions are uniform and
nonnegative and δj ≤ δl → ui(θij) ≤ ui(θil), and that all of them occur in
wi(δi, δ−i). wi is the utility gained by agent i receiving invitations. Therefore,
if i receives an invitation from agent j when δi changes, another agent l that
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previously received an invitation from j now loses it. Given that δi ≤ δl →
uj(θji) ≤ uj(θjl), this discontinuity occurs when δi = δl. Therefore, we can
let D(i) = 1, fdij(x) = x, the identity function, and
∆∗(i) = {(δ1, ..., δN) ∈ ∆|∃j 6= i, such that δj = δi}
will contain all potential discontinuities.
Next we will show that ui(δi, δ−i) is bounded and weakly lower semi-
continuous in δi. From Theorem 7 we observe that ui(θji) and ui(θij) are
both continuous in δi. Therefore all discontinuities in wi(δi, δ−i) occur due to
K2i changing. Consider one such discontinuity point δ
′: We know that there
is an agent l such that δ′i = δ
′
l and there is another agent j which i and l
both neighbor who is now indifferent between sending an invitation to agent
































































Therefore ui(δi, δ−i) is weakly lower semi-continuous by selecting λ = 1.
Finally, we prove u(δ) =
∑
i∈[N ] ui(δ) is upper semi-continuous. Actually,
we will prove the stronger condition that it is continuous. Let δ′ be a point of
discontinuity for some ui. As we have discussed, this occurs due to some other
agent j shifting on whether or not to issue an invitation to agent i or another
of its neighbors agent l (the case where it is actually a set of neighbors L
follows naturally). As a consequence, δ′ is also a point of discontinuity for ul.
However, it is not a point of discontinuity for uj. Theorem 7 shows uj(θji) and
uj(θjl) are continuous in δi and δl, respectively. Therefore wj(δ) is continuous
in both. While the set of invites j issues, K1j , is subject to change, vj(δ) the
sum of the kj highest values in the set of functions {uj(θjh)}h∈N1j , all of which
are continuous in δ and is therefore continuous as well. This means uj(δ) is
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continuous, leaving us to show that while ui and ul are discontinuous at δ
′,
the sum of the two functions is not. Again, we only need concern ourselves









































































l) = limδi→δ′i ui(δ
′
j, δi) implies that the left- and right-






































at δ′. This implies that ui + ul is continuous at δ
′ and hence that u(δ) is
continuous. Therefore, the metagame of selecting δi ∈ ∆i possesses a mixed
Nash equilibrium in this setting.
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B.3 Additional Figure




























ij ∀m ∈ [k], (C.3)













xij + dj ∀j ∈ [n], (C.5)

















i ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [n], (C.10)
z1i ≥ (V 1i ∗ t2i − T 1i )/M ∀i ∈ [n], (C.11)
z2i ≥ (v2i ∗ T 1i − t2i )/M ∀j ∈ [n], (C.12)





j ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j ∈ [n], m ∈ [k]. (C.14)
Algorithm 3 Algorithm 1: ReservedSolution(G, k, prizes)
Require: G,k,prizes
Initialize sum← 0;
Initialize Paths as a size k array;
for i = 1 to k do
path, score ← SolveIP1(G, k ← 1,prizes);
for j in path do
prizes[j] ← 0;
end for




Algorithm 4 UnreservedSolution(G, prizes)
Initialize score1← 0, score2← 0, path1, path2;
Initialize model← TOP(G, k = 1,prizes)
while True do
p1, s1 ← SolveIP1(model);
if s1 ≤ score1 then
return score1, path1, score2, path2
else
p2 ← SolveIP2(G, p1,prizes);
s1, s2 ← ComputeScores(G, p1, p2,prizes);
if s1 > score1 then





Algorithm 5 TurnSolution(G, prizes)
Initialize hashset Space ← ∅;
Initialize nCur ← 1, nNext ← 1, rCur ← r, rNext ← r, colBetween ← ∅;





n1 ← state.nCur, n2 ← state.nNext, r1 ← state.rCur, r2 ← state.rNext;
curPrize ← prizes, collected ← state.collectedBetween;
for node in collected do
curPrize[node] = 0;
end for
if state in Space then return
else if n2 = n then
path, score = SolveIP1(G,curPrize,startFrom←n1, r1);
if IP1 is infeasible then
valCur ← −∞;
else valCur ← score;
end if
valNext ← 0, nextState ← (n, n, 0, 0,∅);
nextStep ← path;
Space[state] ← (valCur, valNext, nextState, nextStep);
return
else
Space[state] ← (−∞,−∞,∅, n);
nextMoves ← possible moves for current player;
for j in nextMoves do
collectedBetween ← ∅;
for i ∈ [min (node2, j),max (node2, j)] do








p ← curPrize[j] +valNext;
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